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The complexity of the subject and its research focus areas had the potential to 
pose some challenges generated by the diverse methodologies utilized by the 
participants who come from widely diverse backgrounds. To better cope with 
these challenges a Harmonization Group (HG) for the HAOE Project was been 
established. Members of HG possessed a high degree of expertise reflective of 
individuals with a solid background in strategic leadership, extensive military 
operational service and sound academic expertise. The HG provided a valuable 
feedback regarding the project’s relevance for NATO’s adaptation to emerging 
security challenges, and acted as a guarantor of the quality and consistency of the 
project’s outcomes. 
The Harmonization Group was chaired by Dr. Jamie Shea - NATO Deputy Assistant 
Secretary General for Emergency Security Challenges, Great Britain, supported by: 
• Brigadier General Cristian-Iulian Dincovici - Chief of Military Intelligence 
Directorate, Romania,  
• Major General (Ret.) Andrew MacKay - Former General Officer 
Commanding of the Army’s 2nd Division Scotland, Northern England and 
Northern Ireland, Great Britain,  
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“Every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions,  
and its own peculiar preconceptions.” 
Carl Philipp Gottfried von Clausewitz 
 
 
“Cultures are never merely intellectual constructs. They take form 
through the collective intelligence and memory,  
through a commonly held psychology and emotions,  




“The questions that universals raise, above all questions of human nature,  
will find their answers and their implications in thought and study 
 that cross the boundaries of biology, the social sciences, and the humanities. 
Seeking answers to these questions will lead to a truer account 
 of what humanity is and who we are.” 
Donald E Brown 
 
 
“Learn all you can.... Get to know their families, clans and tribes, friends and 
enemies, wells, hills and roads. Do all this by listening and by indirect inquiry. 
... Get to speak their dialect ... not yours. Until you can understand their 



















The Human Aspects of the Operational Environment (HAOE) project has 
its roots in the challenges posed to current North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) operations in Afghanistan. However it is obvious that focusing only on 
Afghanistan would not be enough since in the future NATO will be presumably 
involved more and more in operations outside its territory, and that the large 
majority of such operations will be represented by Non-Article 5 Crisis Response 
Operations (NA5CRO). 
The local population has been always one of the most important features 
of the operational environment, and as the conflict between the adversaries 
increasingly spreads among it, gaining local population’s support becomes the 
new centre of gravity of military operations.  
In NA5CRO NATO will have to interact directly with the local population 
that encompasses the entire range of ethnic groups and cultures and different 
actors from military/paramilitary, local governance, NGOs, criminality, security 
domains. Different environments require different capabilities. Therefore, a solid 
environmental understanding is vital during the operational planning and 
preparation phases, in order to ensure that appropriate capabilities are deployed. 
A thorough understanding of the local population is needed to 
comprehensively approach the operational environment, to enhance population 
support for NATO operations, and to improve the operational effectiveness and 
security. 
The NATO HUMINT Centre of Excellence (HCOE) assumed that the right 
manner to overcoming these challenges could be found only by a comprehensive 
approach, involving the military alongside academia and international and 
governmental organizations. Therefore the present project brought together 
subject matter experts (SME) from different domains with the goal of sharing 
their knowledge and current understanding of human aspects of the operational 




environment, in order to contribute to the improvement of NATO’s 
Comprehensive Approach Strategy, and to act as a catalyst for the 
multidisciplinary research related to this topic.           
This book consists of seven chapters, each of them encompassing the 
report drafted by the corresponding research panel and their focus areas are 
shortly described below.  
  The first chapter defining the main drivers of human action presumes 
that a military force has limited ability to meet all the requirements of a 
stability/security operation. Even though the local population is the likely centre 
of gravity of many future NATO operations, not all relevant local population 
characteristics can be understood in advance of an operation, but some general 
patterns concerning the basic drivers and motivators of human actions can be 
discerned from the scholarly literature, and these main drivers may help guide 
tactical and field leaders. Furthermore, understanding the goals of the relevant 
parties can minimize conflict and maximize cooperation. Conflict is likely when 
the people’s goals appear to frustrate each other. Alternatively, when a group 
believes that by pursuing its own goal and another group can facilitate the 
realization of their goal, cooperation is likely. 
Behavioural science research has demonstrated that a people’s explicit 
attitudes are only part of the story. Drivers of which a person is not consciously 
aware can motivate one’s actions. As a result, simply asking community and 
political leaders, “What do your people want?” can reap information that is 
inadequate and misleading. This chapter summarizes current scholarly 
perspectives on basic human needs and the main drivers of human action while 
recognizing that there is no one simple way to capture all drivers. Three common 
models of human motivation illustrate the difficulty of creating one 
comprehensive model – the rational choice theory, the evolutionary fitness 
maximization model, and Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.  
These views are critically summarized and then some further 
considerations that deepen our ability to predict drivers of human action are 
offered. Finally, we end this treatment with a model of human security that draws 
upon many of the successful features of the previous models of drivers of human 
action. 




The second part assumes that for understanding human environment the 
use of history is a critical component in perceiving local populations and 
developing parameters for analyzing them in conjunction with the social sciences. 
The role of history is important because it serves as a source of information about 
how societies and peoples behave. Past experiences offer significant insights into 
current behaviours, attitudes, beliefs and actions, as well as explanations as to 
how societies have become what they are today.  
History offers the most critical evidence for explaining how people 
behave in current social settings, and provides extensive data that can be used to 
understand how societies function. This understanding of how societies function 
is a key element in enabling security missions to build rapport with and support 
from local populations. Working in conjunction with the social sciences, the 
historical understanding of a population will aid the effectiveness of developing 
cultural awareness among those forces operating in unfamiliar environments.  
The third chapter examines the challenges posed by communicating 
across different cultures and proposes a communication strategy based upon a 
constructive approach. 
Cross-cultural communication is a key element in building rapport with 
other cultures. Understanding how people get information and adapting the 
message to the level of the target audience are the fundamentals of efficient 
communication. For effective management of a constructive cross-cultural 
communication it is essential to understand the cultural and social environment, 
particularly the social system, its sub-systems, and dynamics. 
‘Cross-cultural competence’ is viewed as a fundamental pillar for NATO 
military and civilian personnel who must interact with people from other cultures. 
We should consider also that NATO’s own multiculturalism can represent an 
important advantage in portraying the Alliance to the others. 
The fourth chapter assesses contemporary dynamics of the local 
situation, positing them as crucial elements of the Human Aspects of the 
Operational Environment that should be more formally incorporated in NATO 
planning and operations in order to yield success and ensure a stable peace. The 
first portion analyzes the change in contemporary war by depicting the 




complexity of the operational environment and defining the multitude of actors. 
Here, the salience of narrative and identity in various locales is examined. The 
nature of conflict in the information age is also addressed, including social media, 
strategic communications as well as official and unofficial information flows. 
The second portion describes how to best analyze dynamics of the local 
situation. Various group typologies and organizational structures are provided. 
Also, ASCOPE (Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events), 
Social Cultural Analysis (SOCINT) and Social Network Analysis (SNA) are defined 
and presented as under-utilized tools that can effectively depict the connection 
between and among apparently disparate structures and actors. The chapter 
concludes with recommendations on the most effective training and uses of these 
mechanisms to supplement traditional analysis. 
In the fifth chapter the understanding of population’s perception and 
acceptance of NATO operations starts from Admiral James Stavridis warning that 
we have to keep in mind that locals will always look differently at military 
personnel than civilian one, even when providing humanitarian assistance.  
Based on this observation, the intent of this chapter is to provide tools 
and advice on ways NATO can influence the perception and acceptance of its 
mission based on the realities of 21st century kinetic and non-kinetic military 
operations, especially, as NATO continues to expand its operational focus well 
beyond its traditional sphere of influence as it is the case with on-going or 
recently concluded operations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).  
The book’s sixth section focuses on the issue of measurable indicators of 
the population’s attitude toward NATO. It deals with basic questions, such as: 
what are attitudes? And how can we measure them? But it also deals with a 
military application: How are attitudes survey findings currently used in the 
operational environment? And how can we improve the efficiency of 
measurement and the use of survey research for tactical, strategic, and policy 
objectives?  
It is argued that there is considerable room for improvement both when 
it comes to our understanding of attitudes and actual measurement, as well as 
the translation of research findings to military application. Despite a large number 




of NATO doctrinal publications which mention the importance of attitudes of the 
local population relative to NATO operations (PYSOPS, INFO Ops, COIN), there has 
been no comprehensive effort to consider, analyze, integrate, and publish 
doctrine on attitudes of the local population.     
The final chapter addressing NATO capabilities transformation to better 
adapt to the human environments presumes that analysing NATO operations over 
the last two decades and examining NATO’s role in present and future Security 
Environments, as defined by the NATO Strategic Concept, it can be concluded that 
NA5CRO will continue to represent the core of NATO missions.  
At present, the entire NATO military machinery is primarily focused on 
meeting the requirements of major combat operations. Therefore most of the 
NATO (as well as national) doctrines and procedures, are designed to support this 
type of operation.  The current education and training process is mainly focused 
on combat skills, thus taking precedence over meeting the specific requirements 
of Peace Support Operations. Nevertheless, since the main task of the armed 
forces is defending NATO territory and our shared values, changing this approach 
is not desirable. 
However, some changes in the current operational thinking and planning, 
as well as reshaping the education and training process have a real potential to 
increase our forces capability to cope with the challenges they are facing in 
current operations. The chapter’s conclusion highlights the need for recognizing a 
comprehensive approach as the key for understanding HAOE, and the human 
aspects as a key element of the comprehensive approach. Acting in this respect by 
adapting strategic communications, the NATO Defence Planning Process (NDPP), 
and the proposals of the Joint Capability Integration Development system (known 
as well as DOTMLPFI) would result in improving NATO’s effectiveness in achieving 
the objectives of stability operations.    
The book ends with a brief conclusion that highlights the increasing 
relevance of the human aspects for the current and future NATO operations. 
Recent experiences in the field proved that the lack of detailed knowledge of 
military about the human aspects, the way that culture influence them, and 
furthermore, some prejudices and stereotypes, is still an impediment to 
successfully fulfil the strategic tasks and objectives. 




Whatever combination of terms we will use for defining it, the 
Human/Cultural Aspects/Dynamics/Environment/Factors remain a key element of 
the future military operational environment, especially in counterinsurgency, 
irregular warfare, stability, and support, transition, and reconstruction operations. 
 




CHAPTER 1  
MAIN DRIVERS OF HUMAN ACTION 
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A military force has limited ability to meet all the requirements of a 
stability/security operation. Even though the local population is the likely centre 
of gravity of many future NATO operations, not all relevant local population 
characteristics can be learned in advance of an operation.  Therefore, to conduct 
advance planning, NATO needs an information source for salient features of a 
local population. Also, tactical and field leaders need a repertoire of appropriate 
questions to ask members of the local population in order to gain necessary 
information about that group. To these ends, this first panel presents general 
principles and raises questions about key drivers of human actions. There will be 
specific exceptions to these general principles; yet, this panel seeks to describe 
drivers of human actions which appear to apply across diverse local populations. 
Human goals vary across time and place, but most spring from a set of 
basic drivers of human actions including fundamental needs. Recognizing the 
features of these “universal” basic needs and drivers enables military planners to 
anticipate the goals of groups and individuals in any particular operational 
environment. Furthermore, understanding the goals of the relevant parties can 
minimize conflict and maximize cooperation. Conflict is likely when people’s goals 




appear to frustrate each other. Alternatively, when a group believes that by 
pursuing their own goal another group can facilitate the realization of their goal, 
cooperation is likely. 
One obvious strategy for determining someone’s goals and motivations is 
to simply ask that person. Behavioural and psychological science research, 
however, has demonstrated that a people’s explicit attitudes are only part of the 
story. Actions can be motivated by drivers of which a person is not consciously 
aware. Further, explicit beliefs and attitudes are shaped by the actions that spring 
from these non-conscious drives. As a result, simply asking community and 
political leaders, “What do your people want?” can reap information that is 
inadequate and even misleading. For these reasons, a general portrait of the 
typical drivers of human action as discerned by the relevant sciences is necessary 
for considering the human aspects of the operational environment. 
This panel summarizes current scholarly perspectives on basic human 
needs and the main drivers of human action with recognition that there is no one 
simple way to capture all drivers. Three common models of human motivation 
illustrate the difficulty of creating one comprehensive model: (1) rational choice 
theory, (2) the evolutionary fitness maximization model, and (3) Maslow’s 
hierarchy of needs. Below we summarize the insights provided by the models and 
note important limitations that prevent any one model alone from being a 
sufficient model for anticipating the goals of individuals or groups in operational 
environments. We then offer some further considerations that deepen our ability 
to predict drivers of human action. Finally, we end this panel with a model of 
human security that draws upon many of the successful features of the previous 
models of drivers of human action. 
To set the scene, one anecdote is illustrative—particularly as similar 
events have been reported in multiple parts of the world. The story goes this way: 
NATO forces (or another well-intended foreign group) build a well so that the 
women of a community have safe, ready access to drinking water. NATO 
recognizes the importance of good drinking water—that it satisfies a basic human 
drive or need for potable water. Nevertheless, soon thereafter the well is found 
destroyed or has been abandoned. Why? Because walking to fetch water some 
distance away met needs beyond obtaining water, such as time to socialize away 
from the watchful eye of the men folk. The resources and efforts to create a well 
were wasted because of failure to consider all of the drivers of human action and 
a failure to harmonize those drivers. Satisfying one driver at the expense of others 
may ultimately be fruitless. 




1.1. The Complexity of Human Behaviour: A Preliminary Caution 
Unlike the explanations and predictions offered by physics and 
chemistry, those offered by the human and social sciences are always partial and 
probabilistic. For instance, whereas we may be able to say with almost perfect 
certainty that pure water at sea level will boil when it reaches 100 degrees 
Celsius, our predictions concerning human behaviour can never be held with such 
certainty. Human behaviour is much more complex than the behaviour of water 
molecules. Nevertheless, the relevant sciences can improve dramatically upon our 
experiences, casual observations, or “common sense” that yields understandings 
of human aspects of the operational environment. The observations from this 
panel—and indeed, the rest of this document as well—draw upon our best 
understanding of what typically happens and so can generate informed best 
guesses for tactical purposes. 
 
1.2. Rational Choice Theory 
Rational choice theory casts humans as rational economic decision-
makers. According to this model, people make a choice to act by balancing 
economic costs versus benefits to maximize their gains and get as much of a good 
for the lowest material cost. Such a view comes from microeconomics and can 
sometimes predict broad-scale trends in economic systems well. However, at the 
small-scale or individual level, such a view of human decision-making has major 
weaknesses. People do not always rationally calculate the costs and benefits 
associated with various goods and activities. For instance, one experiment 
showed that university students tended to regard an object (coffee mug) that had 
just been given to them as more valuable than if it did not belong to them, as if 
mere possession increases value (Van Boven, Dunning & Loewenstein, 2000). 
Likewise, economic games show that people will sometimes reject an offer of 
money that they perceive as unfair and rather accept no money at all. For 
instance, in economic games, when an anonymous other offers to share only one-
tenth of a pool of money, keeping nine-tenths, people across cultures typically 
reject the one-tenth even if they will receive no money at all and they have no 
reason to think they will engage in exchange with the anonymous person ever 
again. That is, people will punish others at cost to themselves even though this is 
“irrational” from a rational choice theory perspective (e.g., see Henrich, et al, 
2005). 
Perhaps more importantly for HAOE, it appears that some valued items 
fall completely outside of rational economic decision-making. Those goods are 




called “sacred values” (Ganges, et al., 2011). These sacred values, whether they 
are sacred lands, free religious exercise, or one’s mother, cannot be traded for 
monetary compensation or the like. In fact, in contrast to regular economic 
goods, the suggestion that they could be bought or bartered is offensive and may 
become more offensive the greater the price offered for them. Consider if 
someone were to offer $1000 for your mother. Offensive? But if they then offered 
$10,000, would you be less or more offended? Most people would be more 
offended because such negotiations suggest that at the right price one’s sacred 
values can be bought. Though it may be that in some places selling a family 
member (e.g., a daughter or mother-in-law) is not offensive, in every place, some 
actions are motivated aside from economic considerations and to treat them as 
economic may be disastrous. 
Main Implications from the Rational Choice Model 
• On a population level, humans will tend to move toward decisions 
that minimize personal costs and maximize material gains. 
• But on the individual level, in specific situations, many other factors 
trump economic considerations, particularly moral and religious 
values. 
• Local populations will tend to be attracted to arrangements they 
regard as economically beneficial to them, but economic 
considerations cannot be the only drivers considered of large tactical 
mistakes can be made in terms of human factors. 
 
1.3. Evolutionary Fitness Maximization Model 
The fitness maximization model comes from evolutionary sciences 
(including anthropology, biology, and psychology), and regards humans, like all 
animals, as vehicles for genetic propagation. That is, humans are naturally driven 
to behave in ways that maximize the likelihood that their genes (off-spring) will 
out-reproduce others’. Basic predictions from this model include drives to: 
• Obtain nourishment including water and food, particularly foods 
of high caloric and nutritive value that were scarce in ancestral 
environments such as fats, proteins, sugars, and salts. 
• Create or find shelter as necessary and otherwise protect selves 
from the elements as the natural environment requires. Because 
this drive is tailored to particular environmental concerns, it is 




knowledge that is passed down culturally rather than what would 
be considered “instinctual”. 
• Fight or flee enemies or predators, and create secure spaces that 
minimize risks from violent harm. As with shelter, though the 
fight-or-flight instinct seems to be part of evolved human nature, 
the particular modes of fighting or fleeing appear to be heavily 
culturally shaped, as are the techniques for creating secure 
spaces. 
• Procreate by balancing the number of offspring birthed with 
ability to provide for those offspring until they are mature enough 
to provide for and reproduce themselves. Importantly, 
reproductive strategies are not the same for men as for women 
given that men can reproduce more rapidly at a smaller personal 
cost than women. Likewise, a fitness maximization model predicts 
that typically sons will be valued more than daughters because of 
their greater potential to spawn offspring, and children 
approaching reproductive years will be more valued than younger 
children.  
Such an evolutionary perspective, when applied creatively, has been very 
productive in explaining patterns in human behaviour. Nevertheless, this model 
fails to solve many problems relevant to operations planning and execution. For 
instance, if humans are fundamentally driven to maximize the success of their 
genetic line, entire families fighting to the death and/or engaging in suicide 
attacks appears inexplicable. If you and your siblings are dead, your genetic line is, 
obviously, in a poor position to out-compete others. 
Main Implications from Evolutionary Fitness Maximization Model 
• Like other animals, humans have a basic drive to survive, reproduce, 
and maximize the number of their children and grandchildren. 
Women and men typically have importantly different strategies in 
fulfilling these drives. 
• Unlike other animals, humans can and do sometimes act against their 
“genetic best interest”. 
• Nevertheless, in general, harmonizing NATO objectives with the 
survival and reproductive goals of a local population likely will reduce 
conflict and increase cooperation. 




1.4. Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs 
Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is a widely applied theory of human need-
seeking behaviour. Maslow’s hierarchy asserts that people have a set of needs 
that must be met in order, starting with the most basic and progressing in 
complexity. The five classes of needs in ascending order are:  
(1) physiological (i.e., food, water, sleep, sex),  
(2) safety (i.e., security for one’s self, family, and resources),  
(3) love and belonging (i.e., relationships, community, sexual 
intimacy),  
(4) esteem (i.e., achievement, reputation), and  
(5) self-actualization (Maslow, 1954). Self-actualization is highly 
subjective but can be characterized by an individual seeking 
mastery, attaining ideals, and expanding their skills.  
 
Figure 1.1: The hierarchy of human needs – A. Maslow (Maslow, 1943) 
According to Maslow, lower needs must be satisfied before higher needs 
and only one level is satisfied at a time. For instance, once basic physiological 
needs are met (enough food and water) then security becomes a concern. Put 
another way, one will typically risk safety to obtain physiological needs. Likewise, 
if people are starving to death, they will not be concerned with their reputation. If 
lower order needs are not met, individuals will abandon the pursuit of higher 
needs in order to gratify the lower. The fulfilment of these needs, according to 
Maslow, leads to both health and happiness (Maslow, 1954). When considering 




human development, children are more concerned with the first three levels 
(minus sexual drives and intimacy). 
While Maslow’s hierarchy is popular, it is only partially supported by 
empirical research. Tay and Diener (2011) conducted a study with a sample of 
people from 123 countries examining how the fulfilment of needs is related to 
subjective well being (SWB, people’s feeling of being happy or well off). This study 
confirmed that the needs described by Maslow are present in a broad range of 
cultural contexts. The data partially supported Maslow’s hierarchy order in that 
basic and safety needs were met before psychosocial needs (Tay & Diener, 2011). 
Psychosocial needs refer to the human need to exist in a community and 
participate in meaningful relationships. Basic safety and psychosocial needs were 
generally met before more abstract needs such as autonomy (i.e., people perceive 
themselves to be free, able to choose what to do with one’s own time), respect 
(i.e., feeling respected by others, being proud of something), and mastery (i.e., 
experience learning new things, doing what one is best at; Tay & Diener, 2011). 
Each of these needs is met faster if the needs preceding it have been met (ibid). 
For example, while it may be possible for people to obtain respect in a war-torn 
area where their safety needs are not met, they could have exerted more effort 
toward achieving respect had their safety needs already been met. 
Basic and safety needs are the lowest order needs and they were 
generally found to be met before higher order needs. Operationally, these results 
suggest that to have the most impact on SWB in the shortest amount of time, it is 
important to secure basic physiological needs and safety needs first. That said, it 
is possible to have higher needs met before basic and safety needs. For instance, 
people can gratify their need for belonging by finding solace in a community while 
their need for safety is frustrated in a war zone. Additionally, each need was 
found to have a unique impact on improving SWB, independent of other needs. 
This finding suggests any approach aimed at increasing SWB should be multi-
faceted, including efforts directed at fulfilling each need simultaneously.  For 
instance, employing locals to perform jobs—even small jobs—may increase SWB 
more than simply giving aid, particularly if those jobs contribute to the needs of 
the local community. Level 1 basic needs are met simultaneously with Level 4 
esteem needs. 
In addition to these findings, an individual’s basic and safety needs were 
largely contingent upon the country in which one lives while higher order needs 
were more dependent upon individual experiences (Tay & Diener, 2011). Basic 
and safety needs are determined more by factors beyond the control of the 
individual. Such events could be famine, war, and natural disasters that may 




disrupt food production and distribution and impinge upon the safety of 
individuals and their families. Psychological needs (i.e., psychosocial, autonomy, 
respect, mastery) are more related to individual experiences such as their 
experience living in a community, feeling free and respected, and being able to do 
something well. This suggests that the fulfilment of basic and safety needs might 
be better fulfilled at the societal level (e.g., ensuring peace in a region and basic 
food and shelter) while higher needs should be met though measures that are 
aimed at individual experiences (e.g., interactions with occupying forces, personal 
opportunities). It was also found that the when a society had higher rates of 
needs being fulfilled, the nation’s average SWB was higher; more so than would 
be predicted by individual fulfilment of needs (ibid). This further supports the idea 
of national efforts to increase SWB.  
Maslow’s theory has also been critiqued for being geared specifically 
towards the fulfilment of needs in a western, individualistic society. Different 
cultures may prioritize different needs. For instance, individual esteem needs may 
be more highly valued in an individualistic culture than in a collectivistic culture 
(Oishi, Diener, Lucas & Suh, 1999). When striving to meet the needs of people in 
different cultures, the relative importance of each need should be assessed and 
the plan to meet these needs should be adjusted accordingly. 
Main Implications from Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs 
• Lower-level, basic needs (such as need for food, water, safety for self 
and children, health, and property) tend to be higher priority for 
people and less cross-culturally variable. 
• Nevertheless, local contexts and other factors (such as moral and 
religious concerns) may importantly modify how these needs are 
prioritized. 
• It may be most effective to target several levels of needs 
simultaneously. 
 
1.5. Limitations of the Models 
These three models have some meaningful convergence. The models 
agree that people will generally act in ways to get those things that they want or 
need with the least amount of loss of other things they want or need.  The most 
common and fundamental needs will relate to food, water and survival needs, 
and core social relationships, particularly concerning family relations.  




Nevertheless, these general patterns must be augmented by other concerns or 
else they remain very crude pointers.  
To date no one model capturing all main drivers of human action has 
been successfully discovered by social and behavioural scientists. Each of the 
models above has shortcomings and limitations. Perhaps it is best to use them in 
conjunction with each other to predict or explain those aims that motivate human 
action. Further, all three may be usefully augmented by considering the 
foundations of human sociality, morality, and religion. We consider these shapers 
below briefly. 
 
2. Important Modifiers of Human Action 
 
Humans are distinctive among animal groups in the complexity of their 
social arrangements. These social arrangements are managed in part by value 
systems. Some of these we identify as morality. Others, often including 
postulated relationships with spirits, ancestors, gods, or other supernatural forces 
and powers, we call religions. The foundations of human sociality, morality, and 
religion inform and shape the drivers of human action. To illustrate the 
importance of these modifiers on basic needs and drivers, consider the error of 
air-dropping pork in predominantly Muslim areas of the Balkans. The good 
intention was to meet a basic human need for food, but it ignored the fact that 
social, moral, and religious factors can dramatically impact how people seek to 
satisfy these needs and act on their common drives. Consequently, the food drop 
failed to meet that need and, instead, offended and alienated the local Muslim 
population for whom pork was considered religiously taboo, morally 
reprehensible, and disgusting. 
 
2.1. Human Sociality, Networks, and Social Dynamics 
A leading theory for why humans have evolved such large brains for their 
body size is the social brain hypothesis: humans have particularly large brains to 
manage the large number of social relationships they develop and maintain.  
These relationships are critical for cooperative resource-sharing practices, for 
passing down locally-important survival information, and for collective problem-
solving including building, farming, hunting, and defence. Human sociality is 
structured around nested rings of intimacy and trust. People average about five 




closest, most intimate relationships (which typically includes the closest friends 
and family members); then approximately 15 (inclusive) in the next layer of 
relational closeness, and typically around 150 in their active network of personal 
relationships (including family members). When it comes to who to trust and who 
one feels obligation toward, this 150 is particularly important: “These individuals 
seem to be characterized by a level of reciprocity and obligation that would not 
be accorded to individuals who fall outside this critical circle” (Dunbar, 2008, p. 9). 
The drive to help and reluctance to harm individuals in this 150 will be high. 
Researchers in this area have observed that not only are personal social networks 
organized around this number, but traditionally, villages, churches, and even 
military units have tended to average around 150 members (Hill & Dunbar, 2003). 
It appears that 150 is roughly the size a group can be to self-regulate through 
social pressures and personal obligations without strong hierarchical power 
structures. Everyone can know everyone else and monitor each other’s 
behaviour; hence, in intimate social groups of 150 or fewer, defection is rarer 
than in larger social units. 
Naturally, discovering key players’ social networks in an operational 
environment could be critical human intelligence because of its implications for 
identifying personal motivations and obligations. Observing how different 
individuals’ networks overlap could likewise reveal potential for cooperation or 
conflict. Becoming part of another’s personal active network immediately changes 
one’s relationship and triggers a different level of trust and potential cooperation. 
More details on the local dynamics appear in Panel 4. 
As already suggested, human sociality has implications for moral and 
religious reasoning.  Humans will tend to be most morally concerned about those 
in their circle of 150. That is, these individuals will be attributed moral rights and 
responsibilities even when others are not. Someone is likely to make sacrifices for 
a member of this personal social network (and particularly the inner circles of 15 
or 5) that he or she would not make for others. Likewise, at least in traditional 
societies, members of one’s active social network of 150 will tend to be members 
of one’s own religious community and share one’s religious commitments. Moral 
and religious shapers of human action are discussed below. 
Main Implications of Research on Social Networks 
• A high level of trust and moral obligation is reserved for 
approximately 150 personal relationships. Become part of that circle 
of relationships and you gain influence and opportunity for 





• To influence a person, be trusted by or influence members of that 
person’s primary social network. 
• Identifying the social networks of key persons in an operational 
environment is critical human intelligence. 
• Teams or communities of fewer than 150 are easier to manage 
through social obligations and pressure without strong hierarchical 
power structures once everyone knows each other. 
 
2.2. Social Influence and Dissemination of Ideas 
The main drivers of human action are shaped into particular local 
expression through social learning dynamics. A full discussion of such learning is 
beyond the scope of this panel, but a few observations may be helpful when 
NATO forces are placed in a position of needing to either monitor how opinion 
and action is being shaped by local dynamics (see also Panel 4), or trying to 
influence local attitudes and behaviour. 
Evolutionary psychologists and anthropologists have suggested that 
humans do not blindly respect the testimony or imitate the example of just 
anyone, but are subject to a number of social learning biases that help them pick 
out models for learning or imitation. Similarity bias is the tendency to imitate or 
learn from those that we regard as similar to ourselves on important dimensions 
such as age, gender, clan, tribe, ethnicity, religion and class (Henrich & Gil-White, 
2001). Young children even prefer to learn from people with similar accents to 
one’s own, using accent as a more important marker of similarity than race 
(Kinzler, K. D., Shutts, K., DeJesus, J., & Spelke, E., 2009). Prestige bias is another 
powerful shaper of learning. People who appear prestigious are more likely 
trusted as sources for learning information and used as examples for acting—
even if the prestige is borrowed from an irrelevant domain (Chudek et al, in 
press). For instance, a prestigious athlete or musician may be regarded as a 
credible source for information on politics or international policy, not because of 
demonstrated competence in those areas but because of a halo of general 
prestige. Of course skill in a particular domain is important. If someone wants to 
learn to hunt, they will gravitate toward the practices of the most skilled hunter 
(or at least the hunter who appears most skilled and/or successful). On top of 
these three, conformity is a general pressure that humans experience. We tend to 
think and act like the majority of people in our social group. 




Main Implications of Social Learning Biases 
• To know who it is that someone is influenced by, consider who it is 
they regard as relevantly like themselves (e.g., in terms of age, 
gender, and ethnicity), and regard as prestigious and skilled. 
• For NATO to influence local populations, soliciting the aid of 
individuals who are prestigious and relevantly similar to the various 
subpopulations in question (including young people, elderly, women, 
men, different clans, etc.) would be advantageous. 
• Sometimes NATO forces themselves will be regarded as particularly 
skilled and/or prestigious already but may not be relevantly similar to 
the local population but can elevate the prestige of locals 
strategically (e.g., through associating with them publically). 
 
2.3. Moral Foundations 
When people are committed to moral ideals they may radically break 
away from the patterns of action predicted by rational choice theory, the 
evolutionary fitness maximization model, or Maslow’s hierarchy of needs. People 
have been known to commit their lives (even to death) to deeply held values. 
Though these deeply motivating values vary across individuals and cultural 
groups, nevertheless, there may be some cross-culturally recurrent patterns in 
moral intuitions and judgment. 
Leading theorists in human values (Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 1992) have 
attempted to narrow down basic morals by supporting their premises based on 
underlying social and biological necessities of human beings. Moral Foundations 
Theory (MFT), (Haidt & Graham, 2007) proposes five facets of morality that occur 
cross-culturally (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993; Shweder, Mahapatra, & Miller, 1987), 
underlying most societies. MFT encompasses the following foundations:  
• Harm/Care is a foundation springing from the fact that humans 
are intensely social animals having uniquely close attachments to 
others. Specifically, humans feel for others through kindness, 
gentleness, and nurturance. Harming others (particularly in one’s 
social group) without their consent is generally considered 
immoral in any cultural environment. Likewise, failing to care for a 
member of one’s group (e.g., family) is generally considered 
immoral. 




• Fairness/Reciprocity is associated with the evolution of reciprocal 
altruism, in which a human being may reduce his or her own 
wellbeing in order to increase another’s wellbeing while expecting 
the other will act similarly at a later time. Humans appear to be 
very sensitive to violations of these kinds of fairness relationships.  
• In-group/Loyalty concerns the sense of obligation people sense 
that they have to their core social group. The size and character of 
the group may vary depending on the size and complexity of the 
society. Core family members and close friends are part of most 
everyone’s in-group in which certain loyalty expectations govern 
interactions. It is generally considered reprehensible to betray 
one’s in-group and virtuous to make personal sacrifices for the 
greater good of the group. A family member may make personal 
sacrifices for the betterment of their family or nation. Someone 
who is disloyal to an in-group may be ostracized because they can 
no longer be trusted. 
• Authority/Respect is a moral foundation associated with human 
beings’ history of hierarchical social arrangements, beginning 
within the family unit with children respecting the authority of 
parents. This foundation is primary to leadership, support, respect 
for authority, and honour for traditions. It follows that certain 
people are entitled to hold power or privilege and the authority to 
make certain decisions, and submitting to recognized authority is 
regarded as a moral imperative. The idea that harming or 
betraying a leader is the same as harming or betraying someone 
of comparable rank and status is unusual. 
• Purity/Sanctity may have evolved from human’s disgust and 
contamination instinct that evolved for avoiding pathogens by 
setting apart clean spaces and having strong visceral reactions to 
contact with contaminating objects. These disgust mechanisms 
and related actions have been co-opted by cultural systems so 
that certain groups of people or actions could be seen as 
disgusting and contaminating and marking off special “clean” or 
sacred spaces is a good way to avoid contamination. Behaviours, 
people, places, and objects may all become impure in a viscerally 
felt, morally charged way. Sometimes such emotional reactions 
are mysterious to outsiders as when a holy space is “defiled” by a 
foreigner entering it without being ritually “purified”. 




These five foundations appear to drive moral reasoning in most all 
societies and operate largely through emotions and intuitions rather than through 
reasoned reflection (Haidt et. al., 1993; Shweder, et. al., 1987). Nevertheless, 
these foundations may vary in terms of their relative importance as well as the 
particular size and shape of the relevant moral circle. That is, whom it is that 
counts as having moral status can range from all of humanity (and even some 
animals) to only one’s kin group. For instance, it may be perfectly permissible to 
harm people who speak another language in many societies, but it is almost never 
permissible to harm one’s family members. It is important to recognize that the 
universal expansion of moral considerations to humans and even many animals 
(apart from religious protections for some animals) is a product of western 
cultures and their Judeo-Christian heritage, and should be regarded as rare even 
as it becomes more widespread. On the other hand, the relatively high degree of 
collective social identity in non-western cultures is associated (generally) with 
stronger affirmation of the loyalty, authority, and sanctity foundations—
foundations that some westerners do not recognize as morally important but 
regard as negotiable social conventions. 
Note too that moral judgments may be driven more by the unconscious 
processes behind these five foundations than by explicit teachings, moral heroes, 
and morality tales. Thus, even when popular moral tales or exemplars are 
universally celebrated, the population within any nation may be split. Careful 
observation and research are necessary in order to determine a culture’s most 
valued morals. 
Main Implications Concerning Moral Foundations 
• Moral norms importantly shape how people seek to satisfy their basic 
needs and their other behavioural choices. 
• Local variability exists but generally people’s moral sensibilities focus 
on a few basic foundations that are cross-culturally recurrent and 
emotionally driven. 
• Traditional moral foundations are broader than many western 
societies and concern loyalty, authority, and sanctity, as well as harm 
and fairness. 






In this section we discuss (1) the naturalness of religion, (2) the 
importance of religion as a driver of human action, and (3) suggestions for how to 
approach religion. 
According to a 2009 Gallup World poll, 84% of adults in the world say 
religion is an important part of their life (Crabtree, 2010). Many cognitive and 
evolutionary scientists of religion argue that the prevalence of religious belief is 
because of what they call “naturalness of religion”. They propose that a belief in 
gods or a God naturally occurs as a result of typical cognitive development 
(Barrett, 2012, p. 4; see also Boyer, 2002). Specifically, Barrett argues that all 
humans have natural cognitive systems that are used to make coherent sense out 
of the world around them (e.g., ones that serve to recognize the presence of 
other intentional beings, like humans or animals in one’s surroundings). He argues 
that these cognitive systems cooperate to make people naturally receptive to 
religious belief (Barrett, 2011, p. 130). These cognitively natural predispositions 
are then culturally elaborated and acted upon in order to form religions—
individual and communal thoughts and actions related to the believed existence 
of superhuman agents. 
Two important implications can be drawn here. First, some type of 
religious commitments and activities will likely be encountered in almost all 
operational environments. Therefore, religion represents a significant human 
aspect of the operational environment during strategy development. Second, the 
specificities of religious expression will vary greatly from culture to culture as 
cognitive predispositions are elaborated on by cultural worldviews, history, 
geography, political climate, etc. Understanding the influences of these factors on 
religion is an integral part of preparing for religious engagement. 
There may be nothing more fundamentally human than the ability to 
imagine future outcomes and develop plans for living out goals (Emmons, 1999). 
While general goals are important, those that involve “striving toward the sacred” 
are psychologically of ultimate concern (Emmons, 1999, p. 6). They are what make 
human life meaningful, purposeful, valuable, significant, and consequently, they 
substantially amplify goal commitment and motivation. The implication is that if 
religious goals, convictions, or rituals are impeded by NATO missions/forces, the 
amount of resistance relative to other blocked goals will be substantially greater. 
Emotion theorists posit that anger results when one’s goals are frustrated or 
blocked (Power & Dagleish, 2007, p. 95). Impeding religious goals will likely result 




in emotionally powerful and motivationally significant resistance, of both 
psychological and physical nature. In addition, moral emotions likely have evolved 
through selection pressure because of the way they bond social groups together 
(e.g., see previous section on moral foundations regarding harm/care and in-
group/loyalty; Haidt, 2001, p. 826). In other words, moral groups survive to pass 
on their genes. Therefore, righteous anger not only manifests itself individually, 
but through social bonds and networks. Impeding religious goals is a recipe for a 
highly motivated, angry mob. Holy wars of all sorts are a testament of this 
dynamic. 
Alternatively, finding avenues of commonality between NATO goals and 
the religious goals of local people would go a long way toward building rapport 
and encouraging peaceful cooperation. A preliminary way of identifying 
commonalities is by asking local religious leaders and laypeople about their 
religious traditions, and listening for common concerns, then cooperating 
together toward the development of a list of common goals. (Official religious 
leaders are not necessarily the best source for information concerning the 
laypeople’s religious goals and so both sources are important.) For example, 
promoting peace is a core value of many religions. Encouraging joint participation 
toward peaceful goals that are situated within religious ideology would be a 
powerful means of uniting people together. The Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission in South Africa following Apartheid is a great example of uniting 
people through common goals (see Lederach, 2005 for further examples and 
theoretical approaches to uniting enemies towards peaceful efforts). A great deal 
of psychological research has exhibited the power of common goals on group 
cohesion. For example, a classic experimental study called the Robber’s Cave 
experiment demonstrated how the group friction between ardent enemies was 
dramatically reduced through the introduction of common goals (e.g., pushing the 
broken-down bus that they were riding in together; see Sherif, 1961). In addition, 
honouring religious expression and facilitating the accomplishment of religious 
goals is likely to result in positive emotions of trust and happiness, rather than 
anger. 
One common way in which religion has helped to create cooperative 
communities is through group religious practices. Research shows that people 
who participate in religious practices together tend to trust each other more, are 
more cooperative, and have more stable and economically successful 
communities (Bulbulia, 2009; Sosis& Ruffle, 2003). This bonding effect may be 
because ritual participation provides an opportunity to display or signal one’s 
commitment to the group and the group’s values that is relatively hard to fake. 




Main Implications Concerning Religion 
• NATO nations are among the least religious in the world. Religion is a 
prehistoric, natural way to organize life. 
• Religious values are highly motivating. 
• For the operational environment it would be helpful to consider: 
(1) understanding how religion informs and facilitates the goals of the 
local people,  
(2) avoiding frustration of specific religious goals, 
(3) listening, collaborating, promoting and encouraging goals that are 
common to the local religion (such as peace, conflict resolution, and 
reconciliation), and  
(4) finding ways to participate in those common goals together. 
• Participation in religious rituals (if permissible) may be an effective 
way to build trust. 
 
2.5. Expectations and Frustrations of Drivers 
Humans typically accommodate to levels of resources and how much 
their drives are typically satisfied in their environments, and adjust their 
expectations accordingly. Hence, reduced access to jobs, health care, and 
education in some places leads to demonstrations against the government or 
rioting but not in neighbouring societies with poorer conditions. Frustrated 
expectations can create conflict above and beyond absolute levels of drive 
satisfaction.  
 
2.6. Heuristics for determining the main drivers of human action 
The main drivers of human action summarized above represent general 
patterns based upon current research. Exceptions will arise and science and 
experience will produce new insights that may be relevant to the operational 
environment. NATO’s decision-makers and field commanders cannot always wait 
for these developments but must have tools for evaluating probable main drivers 
in a specific operational environment. The use of social and human sciences in 
operations planning and execution may be valuable to nuance these observations. 




Additionally, below are some heuristic questions—some ways to generate best 
guesses—at what the main drivers or motivators in a given place might be. 
 
2.6.1. Is the driver present in the first 6 years of life?  
Many of the most fundamental aspects of human drives, preferences, 
and ways of thinking arise early in life due to evolutionary selective pressure, and 
continue to structure human thought and action throughout life. Typically pre-
school-aged children across cultures have more in common with each other than 
older children or adults who have been formally educated or more thoroughly 
enculturated and indoctrinated. Hence, asking one’s self, “How important would 
this driver be in motivating a five-year-old?” is a good heuristic for evaluating a 
possible driver. Some important exceptions exist, especially concerning 
reproductive motivations—a five-year-old does not have important reproductive 
and related drives. 
 
2.6.2. Has the driver been with us for thousands of years?  
Many of the most fundamental aspects of human drives are due to 
evolutionary selective pressure that shaped our species over hundreds of 
thousands of years and are relatively unchanged for the past 10,000 years (at 
least). If ancient peoples were driven by this driver of action, chances are that so 
are people who will be part of the HAOE. A variant on this heuristic question is, 
“Was the driver invented by someone at sometime during history?” If it was, it is 
less likely to be a fundamental driver than if it was not. 
 
2.6.3. Does the driver involve or require special tools, technologies, or 
organized institutions?  
Generally, those aspects of human expression that require cultural 
innovations are newer, more transitory, and less recurrent across cultures. Being 
able to speak and gather with whom one wishes requires no tools, technologies, 
or institutions. These are human fundamentals. Getting a high school degree 
requires an educational institution. Access to the internet requires information 
technologies. Hence, these specific wants (a high school degree or internet 
access) are less likely to be a main driver across HAOEs, but older, more ancient 
drives (e.g. for acquiring important skills and information), are more cross-
culturally recurrent. 




3. Conclusions and Recommendations: Operational Implications and Human 
Security 
 
The limitations and convergence among the models presented above and 
the additional factors identified as main drivers of human action lead us to make 
one broad recommendation and several specific ones concerning human aspects 
of the operational environment. The first general recommendation is to adopt a 
broader view of human security for security operations (see below). We then 
conclude by briefly summarizing and adding to some of the implications offered 
above. 
 
3.1. Human Security Model 
Identifying the main drivers or motivators of human action is a critical 
human aspect of the operational environment if one’s aim is to minimize conflict 
and work collaboratively with local populations. Identifying local goals—typically 
variants on the themes suggested by the three models above—would be the first 
step to identifying sources of potential conflict and cooperation. Of course, the 
direct relevance of these main drivers will vary depending upon the level of 
operational goals under consideration. Likewise, the reality of goal conflict versus 
goal harmony is not the only relevant factor here. If local or NATO perception is 
that there are goal conflicts when there are in fact none, conflict may arise 
nonetheless (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 6). Nevertheless, identifying actual 
drivers of human action will help limit the problem space for tactical planners and 
field commanders to identify real goal convergence and real goal conflict, both 
important aspects of the operational environment. 
Our primary recommendation is for NATO to take a broad view of human 
security for use in security-stability operations on the strategic, operational, and 
tactical levels.  This broad view may be called a Human Security Model, and treats 
security to satisfy basic needs and drivers as part of the security aims of an 
operation. If winning security for local populations to act to satisfy their basic 
drives is a NATO objective and is duly implemented, cooperation with local 
populations will be high and operational success more likely. The Human Security 
model recognizes certain fundamental drivers of human action and then argues 
that to have “security” requires that one has reasonable access to satisfying those 
drives. That is, security is not merely about being safe from bodily harm—as the 




term “security” is often used—but security consists of being safe from threats 
against one’s basic drives being satisfied. 
The foundational concepts of the Human Security model were first published 
in the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) 1994 Development 
Report, but have undergone development subsequently. Drawing upon this 
development, we present for consideration seven aspects of human security that 
may be grouped under three “freedoms” that NATO stability operations should 
seek to guarantee for local populations: 
• Freedom from Fear refers to an individuals’ condition of 
protection from violent conflicts, conflict-precipitated poverty, 
and protection from the effects of a government’s inability to 
perform its duty to prevent various forms of inequality. 
Emergency assistance, conflict prevention and resolution, and 
peace building promote freedom from fear. The aspect of security 
that Freedom from Fear captures is 
(1) Personal (physical) security. Personal Security is the absence 
of violence toward the person, and is one of the vital 
elements of the human security, represented in Maslow’s 
second level of needs, and the basic self-preservation and 
survival drives identified by the Evolutionary Fitness 
Maximization model of action drivers. The predictability of 
violence varies by time and place. There are many types and 
sources of violent threats. Some of these include: one’s own 
state (physical torture), other states (in war), other groups of 
population (as a result of tensions provoked by various 
issues), delinquency and organized crime (urban violence), 
threats mostly specific to women (rape, domestic violence), 
or even the person himself, by addiction (e.g., to drugs), self-
mutilation, or suicide. If individuals and communities are to 
have personal security, they must have the right to preserve 
their life and healthiness, and to live in a safe and sustainable 
environment (Head, 1991). 
• Freedom from Wants moves beyond basic physical security, 
recognizing those just as fundamental to humans (and even a 
more fundamental level on Maslow’s hierarchy) are drives to 
secure physiological needs such as food, water, and protection 
from elements. Pursuing Freedom from Wants involves a holistic 
approach for meeting human needs thwarted by famine, diseases, 




and natural disasters, events that affect many more people than 
violent conflicts. These sources of uncertainty should be 
addressed by four other aspects of security: 
(1) Food security is mankind’s permanent access (both physically 
and economically) to basic food. Food is “available” when 
people have the right of gaining necessary food, by own 
production effort, by purchasing or receiving it through 
social services support. Thus, food accessibility is prefigured 
as a necessary – but not sufficient – condition of security. 
(2) Health security means freedom from diseases and maladies 
that have a high mortality rate. Many of these illnesses have 
roots in malnutrition and precarious life condition, but 
unhealthy lifestyle and diet may also increase susceptibility 
to such illnesses. 
(3) Economic security primarily means the assurance of a basic 
income. Income is normally obtained by performing a 
remunerated lucrative activity; otherwise, it can be obtained 
via publicly budgeted social assistance service networks. 
Economic security also implies adequate measures to reduce 
imbalanced access to working opportunities thereby 
eliminating artificial poverty and improving the quality of 
community’s material life. 
(4) Environmental security: Human beings depend on a healthy 
physical environment; the main environment threat to 
environmental security is the sometimes irreversible decline 
of local and global ecosystems. 
• Freedom to Live in Dignity is a variation of “freedom to act on 
one’s own behalf” (Ogata & Sen, 2003), a construct that advocates 
for the rule of law and democracy. In 2005, the UN Secretary 
General's report, “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, 
Security and Freedom for All” (2005), brought this third dimension 
to the concept of human security. It captures two additional 
aspects of human security more closely associated with higher 
levels of Maslow’s hierarchy:1
                                                          
1 Freedom to Live in Dignity is typically elaborated to include a right to live under Western democratic 
ideals, but as such an elaboration cannot be scientifically justified as a basic, pan-human natural drive 
or need, we leave these freedoms or ‘rights’ aside here, and employ a reduced version of Freedom to 
Live in Dignity. 
 




(1) Community security is achieved by ensuring protection 
against legal/political discrimination on the basis of age, 
gender, ethnicity or social status. It also includes maintaining 
access to safe social networks, knowledge, and information, 
as well as the right to free association. The concept of 
community security is based on the idea that a person’s 
social context is a fundamental aspect of their humanity. 
Furthermore, individual security is predicated on the security 
of the person’s reference group/ community/organisation. 
Belonging to a certain community constitutes a risk factor to 
the personal security if that group is a target of traditional 
oppressive practices that survived modernization. 
(2) Political security, the last dimension of the UNDP human 
security model, requires a society to be built on basic human 
rights and values. This political dimension also includes 
individual and collective rights of access to justice and 
protection against abuses, and freedom to exercise religion. 
 
Figure 1.2: Human security assessment models – peacetime vs. crisis (Kis, 2012b, 228) 
If NATO operations pursue these three freedoms (Freedom from Fear, 
Freedom from Wants, and Freedom to Live in Dignity) and their seven constituent 
aspects of security, NATO’s aims will share a general mapping onto basic drivers 
of human action. Highlighting these different drivers in a security framework 
elevates the need to consider all drivers simultaneously in a security operation. 
In addition to its comprehensiveness, this broad view of human security 
also recognizes that the relative importance of drivers of human action may 
change during crises and other contextual changes. The illustration below is a 
representation of some of the human aspects within a given territorial system 




Iano , 2000  from human securit  standpoint.2
 
 The aspects are categorized by 
evaluation/importance level (strategic/ operational/ tactical) and by degree of 
local stability (peacetime vs. crisis situation). Assessment of the human aspects of 
an operational environment requires military analyses and condition estimates, 
while peacetime assessments offer researchers the chance to gather baseline 
data that can be used to calibrate the local matrix. The diagram notes a difference 
in the order of perceived priorities in matters of security related to the change of 
safety condition in the general life environment. 
In a crisis response operation, security stakeholders demand clear ranges 
of action wherein their contribution will be valued (e.g., one stakeholder may be 
exclusively interested in relieving human physiological needs to ensure human 
survival, perhaps by providing food or potable water).  Relevance of the external 
actors on each stage of the human needs varies, and in each situation we must 
establish a cohesive estimation of the needs along with a robust understanding of 
how they can be prioritized, fulfilled and sustained. 
3.2. Additional Recommendations 
In addition to adopting the Human Security model for security-stability 
operations, we make a number of further recommendations.  By way of summary, 
we synthesize the conclusions provided in each sub-section presented above, and 
then offer some additional recommendations that emerge from our general 
treatment of drivers of human action. 
To influence key individuals, become part of their personal social network 
or influence members of their personal social network. A high level of trust and 
moral obligation is reserved for approximately 150 personal relationships. 
Become part of that circle of relationships and you gain influence and opportunity 
for cooperation. Alternatively, if one can “win over” a number of people in a key 
player’s social network, it will be much easier to “win over” that key player 
through their influence. 
To be a credible source of information or target for behavioural imitation, 
it is best to be regarded as relevantly similar to the audience as well as skilled in a 
valued domain or prestigious. Likewise, to know by whom it is that someone is 
                                                          
2 A security stake in the definition of territorial systems embodies: safety indicators, resources’ 
sufficiency and perception of freedom, all these characteristics outlining a certain level (status) of 
human security (Kis, 2012a).        




influenced, consider whom it is they regard as relevantly like themselves (e.g., in 
terms of age, gender, and ethnicity), and regard as prestigious and skilled. For 
NATO to influence local populations, soliciting the aid of individuals who are 
prestigious and relevantly similar to the various subpopulations in question 
(including young people, elderly, women, men, different clans, etc.) would be 
advantageous. Sometimes NATO forces themselves will be regarded as 
particularly skilled and/or prestigious already but may not be relevantly similar to 
the local population but can elevate the prestige of locals strategically. 
Identify how moral foundations are manifest and discover religious and 
“sacred values”. The important modifiers of these needs – moral and religious 
values and practices – must be identified for any operational environment. These 
values and practices often generate considerable social cohesion and willingness 
of people to make enormous personal sacrifices. They also fall outside of 
economic negotiations. Traditional moral foundations are broader than many 
western societies and concern loyalty, authority, and sanctity, as well as harm and 
fairness concerns. Promoting and encouraging goals that are common to the local 
religion(s) and NATO’s objectives and finding ways to participate in those 
common goals together may be particularly fruitful. 
Manage expectations and frustration. Frustrated expectations can create 
conflict above and beyond absolute levels of drive satisfaction, so it may be 
strategic to seek to gauge and influence expectations as much as satisfy perceived 
wants and needs. 
Relative importance of drivers change with context, status, sex, age, etc. 
Understanding the specific local manifestations of these basic action drivers 
cannot be determined by simple consultation with the leading class of that 
community. The drivers will likely vary considerably by rank, status, age, sex, and 
so forth. Hence, a broadly representative picture of drivers is needed. 
Create conditions that address multiple needs/drivers simultaneously. 
Because drivers vary by age, sex, status, and so forth, and also because their 
priority may vary as a function of expectations and environmental stressors, often 
a good strategy when trying to create security to satisfy these drives is to address 
multiple categories simultaneously. Returning to the illustration of the un-used 
well, the failure of the well was not because it wasn’t useful to meet a basic need. 
It failed because it pitted two needs—two drivers—against each other instead of 
harmonizing multiple drives together. 
Main Drivers are not always consciously accessible. It is easy to support 
that determining the motivations and passions of a people is relatively easy: just 




ask. But research in the psychological sciences has shown that people often are 
not aware of their own primary drives and motivations. So, direct questioning will 
not always reveal them accurately. In many cases it is better to systematically 
observe behaviour and emotional responses to situations to identify root drivers. 
Another heuristic amplified in the document is to consider those needs that 
humans have had for millennia, all over the world. Generally, the old needs are 
still the most basic and most recurrent ones. 
Social and human scientists are needed in the operations planning and 
execution process. We echo the US military initiative “to provide socio-cultural 
teams to commanders and staffs in order to improve the understanding of the 
local population and apply this understanding to the Military Decision-Making 
Process (MDMP)”3.  NATO, like the US, recognizes the great need for the MDMP 
to have access to and use better understanding of the local population.  
This research panel (and those that follow) stress the necessity of 
understanding the human aspects of the operational environment through 
synthesizing data, and analyses of people as they live and act as a part of 
societies, populations, communities, and other groups, including their activities, 
relationships, and perspectives (stakeholders, drivers, enablers and processes). 
This identified need ensures support for new efforts to understand the local 
population and leaders welcome new suggestions about how to achieve this. 
However, any plan must ensure that a wide range of social sciences are involved: 
cultural studies, demographics, social geography, political science, religious 
studies, sociology, and especially scientific psychology (e.g. social and 
evolutionary), and anthropology (e.g. cognitive and evolutionary), so that they 
each can provide a unique contribution. It may be possible in many cases for 
civilians with appropriate clearance to contribute to operations in various 
capacities, but it may also be important for NATO and the military forces of the 
alliance to cultivate officers with training in critical areas of the human sciences. 
 
Recommendations 
• Primary recommendation is for NATO to take a broad view of human 
security for use in security-stability operations on the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels.  This broad view may be called a 
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Human Security Model, and treats security to satisfy basic needs and 
drivers as part of the security aims of an operation; 
• To influence key individuals, become part of their personal social 
network or influence members of their personal social network; 
• To be a credible source of information or target for behavioural 
imitation, it is best to be regarded as relevantly similar to the 
audience as well as skilled in a valued domain or prestigious; 
• Identify how moral foundations are manifest and discover religious 
and “sacred values”; 
• Manage expectations and frustration; 
• Relative importance of drivers change with context, status, sex, age, 
etc.; 
• Create conditions that address multiple needs/drivers 
simultaneously; 
• Main Drivers are not Always Consciously Accessible; 
• Social and human scientists are needed in the operations planning 
and execution process. 
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“History is not a cookbook which gives recipes; it teaches by analogy and forces us 
to decide what, if anything is analogous. History gives us a feel for the significance 
of events, but it does not teach which individual events are significant. It is 
impossible to write down a conceptual scheme and apply it mechanically to 
evolving situations. Certain principles can be developed and certain 
understandings can be elaborated through a study of history, but it is impossible 
to predict in advance how they apply to concrete situations.”  
Dr. Henry Kissinger 
 
“Awareness of the cultural dimension will not necessarily guarantee victory, but 
ignorance of it, history shows us, will guarantee defeat.” 
   Dr. Huw Lewis4
                                                          
4 Lewis, Dr. Huw, “Will history repeat itself in Afghanistan?” BBC News, July 15, 2009. 
, Lecturer in Defence Studies, King's College 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/8151294.stm 






Use history and other disciplines from the humanities and social 
sciences to establish parameters for the analysis of local populations. 
• Impact of interaction (or not) with the “West” (i.e. 
colonialism/imperialism) on politics, economics, society, values, 
national aspirations and so forth. 
• How do these experiences (or lack of them) affect local perceptions 
of the West (NATO)? 
•  Historical analysis is a significant element in the development of 
country profiles. 
•  Help provide insights as the decision making process is studied. 
• Provide insights into propaganda and other mass persuasion 
mechanisms. 
• Enhance understanding of human networks that are able to 
transform vision into policy. 
• Apply history as part of a multi-disciplinary approach in an effort to 
understand cultural similarities and differences. 
 
2. The Importance of the Historical Background 
 
History serves as an important vehicle by which these objectives can be 
achieved, especially when utilized in conjunction with other disciplines from the 
humanities and social sciences. History gives us a storehouse of information about 
how people and societies behave. The experiences of the past also provide 
insights into current behaviours, attitudes, beliefs and actions as well as how 
communities have come to their current status. Therefore, history gives us key 
evidence about past behaviours and actions and how they have shaped present 
day communities in a variety of ways. 
Critical to developing a working relationship with the local population is 
an understanding of how these people behave in social situations. Again, 
historical knowledge can play a vital role by providing critical evidence which can 
help explain how people have come to behave in a variety of social settings. 
History offers the only set of extensive data and evidence for analyzing how 




societies function, and this is an essential component for the success of a security 
mission as it tries to build rapport and support within the local population. 
As an effort is made to understand the circumstances that have brought 
about the development of present day societies and cultures, it is important to 
keep in mind that the present is built upon the past. Therefore, understanding 
current situations requires some knowledge of events that took place. It must be 
kept in mind, however, that events in the recent past may offer clues to the 
occurrence of a major development, but the causes of change may have to be 
explained by looking further back in the past in order to identify them. It is this 
ability to examine the past that enables us to understand and analyze why things 
change and apply this understanding to the present day. By identifying the factors 
that precipitate change, it becomes possible to understand not only the process 
of change but also why some societies or cultures resist change.  
Finally, it is important to keep in mind that history provides the most 
extensive source of evidence for the study of humankind. It offers a database that 
brings to light the complex processes of social change, both in the past and the 
present. It also gives societies and cultures as sense of identity. The data provided 
through the study of history reveals a wealth of information about the formation 
of families, groups, institutions and nations and can help explain how they have 
remained cohesive over time. Many different groups and institutions use history 
in order to reinforce their sense of identity and a failure to appreciate this can 
lead to misunderstandings or conflicts that might otherwise be avoided.5
However, it must be understood that history does not offer absolutes, 
nor does it provide complete answers. Whether utilized alone, or paired with 
other disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, history, despite the many 
sources of evidence that are available to us, does not offer a complete picture of 
the past. It is a discipline that requires interpretation of the existing evidence, and 
not all scholars may agree on historical interpretations. Moreover, events from 
the past, while they may appear similar to events taking place in the present, will 
also be different in any number of ways. It is just as important to identify and 
learn from these differences in order to produce historical analogies that may be 
applicable to a current situation, especially in making an effort to understand an 
unfamiliar society or culture.
 
6
                                                          
5 See Peter N. Stearns, “Why Study History” at 
 
http://www.historians.org/pubs/free/WhyStudyHistory.htm 
6 The process of developing effective historical analogies, especially for decision makers, can be found 
in Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decision Makers, 1986. 




Using history effectively both as an analytical tool, and for trying to 
determine how best to interact with foreign cultures and societies will not be an 
easy task. The role of the historian has been compared to that of explorers and 
cartographers mapping an unknown land as they fill in bits and pieces to create as 
accurate a picture of the strange territory as possible. No matter how complete 
the map becomes, there will always be empty spaces that well require additional 
exploration. The same holds true for historical analysis.7
History can also be used for political or other purposes. Historical 
memory can be selective, for example. There may be a tendency to respond to a 
NATO security or stability mission on the basis of past experiences with outsiders. 
Depending on that experience, the local population may have a preconceived 
viewpoint about the presence of NATO forces in their homeland and that will 
affect how they respond to that situation. Opponents to a NATO mission may 
twist the historical record to present an interpretation of the past that 
emphasizes the negative experiences of a foreign presence at some time in the 
past, even though that event may have proved extremely beneficial, in order to 
build a sense of suspicion and antagonism toward the presence of foreigners on 
their soil.
 
8 Or, the opposite could take place. Proponents of a NATO mission to 
their country could downplay negative consequences of dealing with outsiders in 
the past in order to encourage support of the mission, perhaps for their own 
purposes. Therefore, it is essential to be sensitive to the historical viewpoint of 
any foreign society or culture in which NATO may become involved in order to 
have as complete a historical analysis and understanding of the local population 
as possible before beginning any operations there. 
Why History? 
• Aids in the understanding of people and societies 
• Provides an understanding of change and how present-day societies 
have come to be 
• Gives us the only extensive body of evidence and database for the 
study of humankind 
• Focuses attention on the complex processes of social change, 
including those that take place in the present day 
• Provides societies and cultures with a sense of identity 
                                                          
7 See John Lewis Gaddis, The Landscape of History: How Historians Map the Past, 2002. 
8 The ways in which history can be manipulated are examined in Jill LePore’s The Whites of the Their 
Eyes: The Tea Party’s Revolution and the Battle over American History, 2010 and Margaret McMillan’s 
Dangerous Games: The Uses and Abuses of History, 2008. 




• Offer clues as to how a society might react or respond to a security or 
peacekeeping mission 
 
3. A brief survey of the Impact of Empire and Colonialism 
 
From the earliest days of recorded history, the organisation of human 
habitation is written down in terms of “culture”, “civilisation” and “empire”.  Long 
before the organisation of the modern world into the Westphalian state system, 
the ebb and flow of the ancient, classical and medieval empires left a layering of 
historical myth/memory that modern concepts of nationalism and local 
community identity have absorbed to a greater or lesser degree. “The notion of a 
collective memory implies a past that is not only commonly shared but also jointly 
remembered.”9
• Colonialism,  
 
There is hardly a place on Earth that has not experienced some form of 
“conquest” in the past, or been responsible for such adventure.  There are various 
interlinking and overlapping experiences that have impacted on the community of 
nations. Roughly, there are six key processes, ranging from the immediate 
traumatic to the gradual consensual: 
• Occupation, 
• Conversion,  
• Absorption,  
• Transplantation and  
• “Voluntary” unions.  
The legacy of each of these on present day community perspectives will 
depend on the degree of historical memory and interpretation and the nature of 
the “takeover”, as is obvious.  
The terms “imperialist” and “colonial” are, today, closely associated with 
European global adventure.  However, in the United Kingdom a famous comedy 
group10
                                                          
9 Anna Catalani “Telling Another Story: Western Museums and the Creation of Non-western Identities”, 
2010 
10 Monty Python’s Flying Circus ‘The Life of Brian’. 
 coined a phrase that has become popular, “What did the Romans ever do 
for us?”, an amusing recognition that the Roman invasion of Britain, two 




thousand years ago, and the subsequent absorption of Britain into the Pax 
Romana still resonates and defines aspects of life in the UK, and large parts of 
Europe, to this day. The same can be said of the ancient dynamic colonisers who 
left memory of conquest, slavery and profound change in language, religion and 
social structures such as (to name but a few) the Greeks under the Macedonian 
dynasty (Alexander), the Persians (Darius and Cyrus), the ancient Egyptians, the 
Mongols, the Umayyids, Abbassids, and Fatimids, the Saffavids and Moghuls, the 
Chinese Qin, Han and Tang Imperial dynasties as well as in the Americas, 
famously, the Aztecs, Incas and Mayans, and in Africa the Benin, Zimbabwe and 
Zulu Empires. From the safety and comfort of text books and armchairs we are 
able to read of acts of aggression against neighbours, of armies pitched against 
each other, of sieges and seizure followed by the appalling experiences of the 
defeated, sacrificed, massacred or sold into slavery. All histories recall brutal 
episodes of great cruelty, inexcusable injustices of oppression, cultural 
destruction, obliteration of language and religion, and enslavement. 
The modern European High Imperialism, beginning in the nineteenth 
century, defines the world today and was of an entirely different order.  There 
had always been the notion of technological advantage in expansionist activity in 
the past, such as the bow and arrow, the stirrup and the axle.  High Imperialism 
was much larger in scale and characterised by the enormous disparity in power 
between colonisers and colonised, because of industrialisation and the 
technological advantages of the steam ship, rapid firing rifles, machine guns, the 
telegraph and the railway.  “Whatever happens we have got the Maxim gun, and 
they have not”.11
The second key experience is that of occupation. This is a human 
experience that, again, reaches back through ancient times.  When the population 
of the whole earth was a few millions, before the drawing of boundaries and 
delineations of territories in the pre-agrarian era, groups and families of humans 
would move around, travelling vast distances, in search of grazing for animals, 
water, safer fishing, more agreeable climate, a better future for the clan. People 
move when stressed.  In the past this was easier because the perception of the 
 Motivations for colonial expansion in this period have also left 
indelible marks on the colonised. In the simplest terms, the search for raw 
materials to feed the industrial revolution, of luxury goods to amuse and feed the 
growing consumer class, for land to provide for aspiring scions of lesser noble 
families or the new industrial wealthy, for a supply of people for cheap labour, 
servants and slaves. 
                                                          
11 Hillaire Belloc, the character of William Blood in “The Modern Traveller”. 




world in the age of exploration, in Europe, from the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries was that of vast open spaces, of unclaimed land, of total ignorance or 
dismissal of the peoples already inhabiting the coveted spaces. 
From the turmoil of the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, all across Europe, persecuted groups began to think about escaping, to 
rebuild their lives in a new place, led by God to lead lives dictated by Biblical truth 
in a promised land.  The most notable of these groups, spearheading a wave of 
migration from Europe into other continents which had the most far-reaching 
consequences, were the Pilgrim Fathers into North America and the Boers into 
Southern Africa.  The speculators, traders and armies followed over the centuries.  
A third occupation occurred in Australasia.  Having secured Australia and New 
Zealand for the British Empire, the “empty” lands were filled by adventurers 
looking for life-changing opportunities in trade, prospecting or ranching, and, 
most notoriously, as a convenient empty space on the other side of the world on 
whose shores the United Kingdom could dump its felons.  Transportation to 
Australia was a statutory punishment. Most of the condemned stayed in Australia 
at the end of the sentence. The original nations of North America, Australia and 
New Zealand were driven off their lands so that these states are now referred to 
as part of the “Anglo-Saxon world”. White European settlers into the African 
colonies acquired land, status and political pre-eminence, but were never secure 
after these colonies gained independence and outcomes in the post-colonial years 
have varied considerably and continue to fuel provocative policies concerning the 
ownership and use of land.12
Overlapping the first two examples, a third could be the experience of 
conversion.  Dating from the first religiously motivated exodus of Muslim Arabs 
from the Arabian Peninsula in the century after the prophet Mohammed’s death 
in 632 CE, colonisation and conquest across Northern Africa, around the 
Mediterranean into the Middle East and Asia was the start of a massive, largely 
natural and convenient, conversion of all the indigenous populations. Established, 
centuries old religions were marginalised or became largely extinct and the 
 Therefore, migrating populations have been a 
source of conflict as they settled or occupied land and displaced or dominated 
indigenous groups across all continents.  Long memories of previously owned 
land, access, lost traditions and language have emerged as grievances in civil 
unrest. 
                                                          
12 In 1800   the Western powers held 35% of the Earth’s surface. In 1878, land holding had risen to 67% 
and by 1914 Western powers held 85% of the world’s land. During this period, Britain gained 66 
million new subjects, France 26 million and Germany 12 million. The Italians, Portuguese, Belgians and 
Spanish also had significant subjects. 




universal use of Arabic dominated local languages. There is confusion now as 
nationalist and democratic sentiments in the Middle East and North Africa 
compete with Islamic/Islamist notions of supremacy in the struggle to shape 
futures. For example, the Berbers, whose ancient writ runs across North Africa, 
have reclaimed their pre-Islamic alphabet and are beginning to resist Islamic 
culture in some areas. 
The experience in South America was shaped by Roman Catholic religious 
revival during the Reformation era in response to the Protestant challenge to the 
supremacy of Rome in the 16th and 17th centuries – the Age of Discovery.  The 
Catholic Church inaugurated a great mission to spread Christianity in the New 
World and to convert the Native Americans and other indigenous peoples.  The 
missionary effort was a large part of the justification for the colonial conquests of 
the Native Americans by the catholic powers of Spain, France and Portugal.  “For 
Prince Henry the Navigator of Portugal and his contemporaries, the colonial 
enterprise was based on the necessity to develop European commerce and the 
obligation to propagate the Christian Faith.”13
The Spanish were committed by Vatican Decree to convert the New 
World indigenous subjects to Catholicism.  “If we had to choose a single, 
irreducible idea underlying the Spanish colonialism in the New World, it would 
undoubtedly be the propagation of the Catholic Faith.  Unlike other European 
rivals, the British or the Dutch, Spain insisted on converting the natives of the 
lands it conquered ... More than any set of economic relationships with the 
outside world, more even than the language first brought to America’s shores in 
1492, the Catholic religion continues to permeate Spanish-American culture 
today, creating an overriding cultural unity which transcends the political and 
national boundaries dividing the continent.” (5) Rather like the Umma in the 
Muslim world order. However, critically “The catastrophe of South America’s rape 
at the hands of the Conquistadores remains one of the most potent and pungent 
examples in the whole history of human conquest of the wanton destruction of 
one culture by another, in the name of religion”
 
14
Protestant Christian missionary incursions into the African continent 
converged with the ‘Scramble for Africa’ from the mid-nineteenth century.  
Missionaries from the newly formed biblical societies in the United Kingdom were 
moved to visit little-known regions and peoples, at great risk to life and limb.  In 
many instances they became explorers and pioneers of trade and Empire, the 
 
                                                          
13 Jan van Butselaar, “Bridge or Barrier: Religion, Violence and Visions for peace”, 2001. 
14 Adrian van Oss, “Catholic Colonialism: a parish History of Guatemala”. 




most famous of whom was David Livingstone.  “The missionaries played manifold 
roles in colonial Africa and stimulated forms of cultural, political and religious 
change.”15
Britain had been exploiting the African continent for some years before 
Congress of Berlin in 1884, when the other European powers, and the newly 
formed powers of Italy and Germany, joined in the challenge to British supremacy 
in Africa. This overt colonialism had a huge effect that completely changed the 
nature and face of a continent. “Boundaries did exist but not in the modern 
European sense. They were linguistic, cultural, military or commercial and they 
tended to criss-cross and overlap, without the neat delineations so much beloved 
by Western statesmen since the treaties of Westphalia.  Colonial European logic 
played havoc with the delicate cobweb of relationships”.
 
16
The colonialists created capital cities, railway networks, administrative 
structures and western schools, introducing European languages. It was not a 
uniform impact for it depended on which western power was in control, the 
industry surrounding the extraction of raw materials, minerals and other goods 
and the extent and purpose of European settlements. “The greatest single effect 
was the totally artificial boundaries which united at least two, but usually very 
many more, recognisably distinct peoples, and, conversely, divided homogenous 
groups between two or more different countries”.
 
17
More seriously, in terms of community identity was the impact of 
slavery.  At its peak, whole nations were hollowed out, the fittest and best being 
selected for transport to the New World, or the Middle East. Slaves had been 
traded for centuries before the arrival of the Europeans. In the aftermath of tribal 
conflicts, defeated enemies and their families were routinely sold. However, the 
industrial scale of the trans-Atlantic slave trade changed the nature and ethnic 
 Also, the huge size of the 
colonial administrative areas laid down the blue print for the doubtfully viable 
states. The colonial powers’ answer to managing the complexity of the different 
and various lands they governed was the tendency to use one favoured or 
dominant ethnic group. Following independence the scene was set for explosive 
re-organisation of what had been workable only with highly centralized and 
sporadically brutal enforcement. 
                                                          
15 M Jordan “In the name of God: Violence and Destruction in the World’s Religions” 2006; Heather 
Sharkey in “Christianity and Colonialism in South Africa”, John Comoroff, 1986. 
16 Gerard Prunier, “From Genocide to Continental War: The ‘Congolese’ Conflict and the Crisis of 
Contemporary Africa”, Hurst, 2009. 
17 Paul Gifford, “African Christianity; Its public Role”, Hurst, 2001. 
 




dynamics of North, Central and South America and, possibly, sent West African 
civilisations into stagnation. 
The European powers did not limit the drawing of lines of maps to Africa.  
Many tribal cultures on the receiving end of great power expansion and post-war 
settlements, found themselves arbitrarily bound together, as unequal partners,  
or torn apart according to the convenience of the Imperial powers. Present state 
boundaries bear witness to this as turmoil rages in significant parts of Africa, the 
Middle East, Central Asia and the Indian sub-continent. Tensions remain in large 
parts of the world, including Europe, where separatist and liberation movements 
still exist as violent groups or political parties. The list is exhaustive. 
Simultaneously with the pressure of growing independence movements 
in the post-war world, the global political division was being played out in 
increasing intensity as the Cold War dominated decision-making and support in all 
the immature nations. The highly centralised, authoritarian administrations 
created by the colonial powers, and which created a sense of alienation amongst 
the governed, were usurped by “Liberation Movement” cadres to create new 
exploitative elite kleptocracies before the newly independent states had any 
chance to evolve. The impact has been to create extreme poverty through 
distorted development, and vulnerability because of dependency on aid. 
Much of the focus of discussion of “Empire” tends to concentrate on the 
European model of global empire, dependent on sea power. However, there are 
the nation-states that are, in fact, contiguous empires and have grown through 
expansion and absorption of neighbouring peoples through the centuries, and 
now find themselves facing rebellion, subversion and resistance as cohesive 
cultural groups fight for recognition. China, Ethiopia and Iran are modern 
examples. In attempts to prevent coherent resistance, or to dilute ethnic 
homogeneity many authoritarian leaders have resorted to transplantation of 
peoples internally.  The Soviet Union, memorably, used this method both as 
punishment and as inducement across all the soviet states. Pakistan, China and 
Saudi Arabia, for example, have relocated favoured ethnic or religious groups to 
take over key positions in troublesome areas. As a result, the former elite ethnic 
groups have been “stranded” in newly independent states. The response of Serbs 
finding themselves as minorities in the successor states to Yugoslavia is an awful 
warning, as was the decision at Versailles to gift the Sudetenland to 
Czechoslovakia. 
The euphoria following the end of the Cold War masked a worrying 
development in the family of nations. The break-up of the Soviet Union led to a 
cascade of states into the United Nations, notably those that had been subject to 




conquest, or absorption. The notion of strength in unity seemed to be irrelevant 
as peace broke out between the two super powers. “Voluntary” unions of all sizes 
began to be fragile as the need to hang together diminished. The notable 
dissolution of a nation state was the “Velvet Divorce” between the Czechs and the 
Slovaks.  A catastrophic break-up was that of Yugoslavia. The European Union has, 
unwittingly, provided cover for small nations to declare their interest in breaking 
away from old unions. The most notable of these is Scotland and the rise of the 
Scottish Nationalist Party, with independence at the heart of its agenda. The 
United Kingdom is a prime example of a political entity forged by historic 
occupation and ‘voluntary’ union of crowns in 1707. Ireland has resisted from the 
first day of Union in 1802 to this day, bar the six counties of Northern Ireland. 
Quebec in the Canadian Union has a powerful nationalist movement. Catalonia  
and the Basque region are other such in Spain  Most states with ‘Union’ as in the 
USA and ‘Federal’ as in Germany or Ethiopia, reflect the decision to join together 
to form one political unity and all our histories reflect the struggle and heartache 
in the making. The extent to which this process was a success and how it was 
achieved is a clue to the future integrity of some states, and the likelihood of 
breakdown in the future. 
As previously discussed, the world has been defined in terms of empire, 
and of memories of lost cultures, languages, religion and traditions. The intensity 
of the experience of loss and destruction quite clearly is linked to distance in time, 
the relative progress of the nation and the advantages delivered. Economic 
grievances, demographic stress and literacy levels play into the hands subversive 
groups. Significant ancient minorities continue to exist and are persecuted or 
tolerated, but can become catalysts for nationalist, separatist movements 
depending on geographical location, religious differences and sense of betrayal. 
Language revival/retrieval has been on the increase as a marker of growing 
confidence amongst minorities, whether oppressed or not. Where borders have 
sliced through clearly defined ethnic groups border disputes erupt, or regional, 
political meddling in the spirit of ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’, has the 
potential to destabilise large areas. We are all aware of these global problems and 
the complexity of resolving such long-running grievances.  
The lines drawn on the map are the states defined in the current world 
order. We must be very clear about how the states formed - by revolution, 
resistance, colonial independence, occupation/acquisition or evolution. It is 
crucial to understand not only the recent history, but the historical myth/memory 
of status, language, religion, old tribal, cultural boundaries and kinships, the 
natural trading and dealing instincts, the nature of loyalties and folk heroes past 




and present whose name can be invoked for ‘glorious’ purposes. By 
understanding and, more importantly, by using that knowledge a security or 
peace-keeping operation is much more likely to move from grudging 
acquiescence to positive acceptance. 
Implications of Empire and Colonization 
• 18th and 19th century colonialism help define the modern world 
• Colonial/Imperial occupations of the past may have left long standing 
grievances in the present 
• Past imperial/colonial occupations have set up present day conflicts – 
nationalism/democratization vs. Islamic fundamentalism as an 
example 
• Arbitrary redrawing of maps in Africa, Asia, India and the Middle East 
• Implications created by transplantation or forced removal of peoples 
• Emergence of modern day nationalist movements 
 
4. Cultural Intelligence 
 
In 21st century warfare, a lack of understanding of culture not only can 
have negative consequences to military operations at all levels of the operational 
spectrum but also (and above everything else) put in danger the lives of soldiers 
and civilians alike. As a consequence, a solid understanding and application of 
cultural awareness should be a pre-requisite in the planning and execution of 
military operations, particularly in low intensity conflicts, such as the ongoing 
conflict in Afghanistan. To this end, one way to lighten cultural challenges in low 
intensity conflict is by  developing cultural intelligence, which in a military sense, 
“is a complicated pursuit in anthropology,  psychology, communications, 
sociology, history, and, above all, military doctrine.”18
Unfortunately, there is not “a one size fits all” that encompasses human 
culture which is extremely diverse and intricate, as we are not dealing with 
machines or clones but rather with human beings that have rational thoughts and 
  As a result, the application 
of cultural intelligence (at times) can be more effective and even surpass that of 
traditional military intelligence.   
                                                          
18 Center for Advanced Defense Studies (CADS), 2. 




feel emotions. Therefore, as one studies culture one must take into consideration 
many aspects of a specific country/society to include: 
• Composition (ethnicity, sex, languages, level of education, etc.)    
• Institutional influences (religious, political, economic, etc.). 
• Where an individual falls within that society (opportunities of 
advancement, pluralistic vs. individualistic society, interests, etc. 
Consequently, the study of history of any country/society is essential to 
understand many of these aspects. The example of T.E. Lawrence provides an 
excellent case study on the benefits of understanding the history and culture of a 
particular society. 
T.E. Lawrence, better known as Lawrence of Arabia, was a British officer 
assisted Bedouin Arab tribes in their fight against the Ottomans Turks during 
World War I. Prior to the outbreak of war he had been an anthropologist and 
archaeologist with a deep understanding of Arab customs and culture. This 
enabled him to obtain “a profound understanding of native [Arab tribal] ways, 
[thus becoming] a nationalized Arab instead of merely a European visitor in Arab 
lands.”19 He wrote; “In my case, the effort for these years to live in the dress of 
Arabs, and to imitate their mental foundation, quitted me of my English self, and 
let me look at the West and its conventions with new eyes: they destroyed it all 
for me.”20 
Beyond his battlefield successes, one of Lawrence’s greatest 
achievements was in providing insights to understanding Arab culture by penning 
The Twenty Seven Articles. Originally published in 1917, The Twenty Seven Articles 
provide guidelines on how to deal with Arabs based on his keen observation of 
their customs and culture. A close study of his observations and dictums as they 
appear in the Twenty Seven Articles reveal universal codes that are critical to 
deciphering any country/society. Two critical dictums are discussed below. 
Dictum 1: “The beginning and ending of the secret of handling [Arabs] is 
unremitting study of them” 
The first step to understanding this dictum is to remove the word Arab 
and replace it with a specific target audience, whether they are, for example, 
Sudanese, Berbers, Bedouins or Kurds. Moreover, what this dictum implies is that 
                                                          
19 Liddell-Hart, B.H. Lawrence of Arabia, New York, NY: Da Capo Press, 1989, 11-12.  
20 Lawrence, T.E. Seven Pillars of Wisdom, New York, NY: Anchor Books, 31.  




you must learn everything about a specific society/culture:  their books, their 
history, their customs, and, if possible, their language. Strive to achieve language 
proficiency. Learn how historical events have affected behaviour, beliefs, and 
relationships with others. Learn about religious beliefs and practices, their food, 
their tastes, their customs, and so forth. Opportunely, there are many tools 
available in the 21st century to assist in the study of a specific society/country, 
including, among others, anthropology and other social science books, language 
classes and cultural exchanges. 
 A perfect example of how this comes into play occurred back in World 
War II with the publication of The Chrysanthemum and the Sword, written by 
American anthropologist Ruth Benedict in 1944. This book included a 
comprehensive study aimed at understanding Japanese culture and how to 
comprehend and predict the behaviour of the Japanese by making references to a 
series of contradictions within their traditional culture. In her study, she tried to 
“use Japanese behaviour in war as an asset in understanding them, not as a 
liability” in order to comprehend how “the Japanese would behave, [and] not how 
we would behave if we were in their place.”21  As such, this book was extremely 
influential in shaping American ideas about Japanese culture and even affected 
the way the United States used Emperor Hirohito as a unifying symbol in the post-
war period, not unlike the way he was used during the war, thus ensuring a 
smooth transition of power, enabling the occupation as well as legitimizing the 
new power structure.  
 The successful application of the first dictum leads to the second dictum 
which states: 
Dictum 2: There is nothing unreasonable, incomprehensible, or 
inscrutable (enigmatic) in the [blank] experience of them, and knowledge 
of their prejudices will enable you to foresee their attitude and possible 
course of action in nearly every case. 
 Having a basic understanding of a specific country/society is just the first 
step as it is imperative to recognize the intricacies of their culture. To this end, an 
understanding of their prejudices or biases is indispensable, including the 
treatment of minorities, women or other specific groups within that society. 
Determining if these prejudices are driven by religion, education, social structure, 
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political systems or other elements is critical to this understanding. It is equally 
important to remember that we also come from a stereotyped culture with 
prejudices of our own that must be overcome. These realizations can help shape 
the attitude of the local population toward a NATO operation taking place in their 
country.  
The experience of Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Christopher Hughes during 
the initial stages of Operation Iraqi Freedom serves as a case in point.  On the 
morning of April 3rd 2003, the men of LTC Hughes reached the holy city of Najaf 
and were approaching the Imam Ali Mosque to request from Grand Ayatollah Ali 
Sistani a religious proclamation allowing an American presence in the city. In the 
meantime, a large crowd of locals blocked the soldiers’ path, fearing they were 
going to destroy the mosque.  The situation grew tenser by the minute until LTC 
Hughes asked his soldiers to stand down and point their weapons to the ground. 
He then directed his soldiers to smile at the crowd and wave at them while slowly 
backing away until they were far away from the mosque. The crowd understood 
the universal goodwill gesture and calmed down and a dangerous situation which 
could have resulted in unnecessary bloodshed was defused. Later that day, Grand 
Ayatollah Sistani issued the requested decree.22  Not only did the actions of LTC 
Hughes prevent unnecessary violence, but by preventing damage to the mosque 
there were strategic ramifications to the overall Iraqi campaign.  By avoiding 
damage to or the destruction of the Mosque the possibility of a revolt by the 
Shi’ite majority against the coalition was prevented.   
In conclusion, the level of cultural understanding depends on the 
individual and how much effort is invested in expanding that knowledge. Yet, 
regardless of an individual’s level of cultural knowledge, it does not take a cultural 
expert to recognize the significance of culture and how culture can work to their 
advantage by simply applying these dictums as advocated by one of the foremost 
cultural experts in history, T.E. Lawrence. 
Cultural Intelligence 
• Cultural awareness is essential prerequisite for all planning and 
execution of political-military operations 
• Need for “cultural intelligence” – melding of historical and social 
science analysis, linguistics and military doctrine 
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• Identify and determine how cultural prejudices may impact upon 
building popular support for a security or peace-keeping mission 
 
5. Historical analysis develops and maintains popular support for the operation 
 
Military operations have taken place for thousands of years, however the 
importance of popular support for them and their success has not always been 
acknowledged. Some variables for the justification of military operations have 
been identified as, for example, anticipated financial or political benefits, 
prospects for success, costs, the tolerance of casualties and consensus support 
from political leaders. Perceived advantages of warfare have included new 
colonies and economic growth of the enterprises supporting the military machine 
with their requirements, such as weapons, uniforms food and other supplies. 
While considering and planning for security or peace keeping operations, NATO 
would be well advised to keep in mind past responses of individual members to 
military operations. Any failure to prepare the home population’s understanding 
of the rationale for taking part in such operations may result in growing 
opposition that could undermine a member’s ability to participate successfully in 
them. It is just as important to understand the participant’s previous experience 
with popular support or opposition to its involvement in past wars or military 
operations in order to gain acceptance for planned involvement in a current arena 
of conflict. Doing so carries the same level of importance for NATO members as 
does an understanding of the human terrain in which these operations may be 
taking place. Thus, detrimental events that may occur in the operational 
environment due to a lack of cultural understanding may also serve to undermine 
support for the operation back home.  Therefore, an understanding of the human 
environment within the operational theatre is essential not only to avoid harmful 
or adverse incidents that can be damaging to the operation itself, but also to 
maintain popular support back home. The following case studies highlight some 
cornerstones of acceptance for military operations. 
 
5.1. Case Study: Spain 1808: Anticipated Political Benefits Result in Resistance 
The secular ideals of the Enlightenment and those of the French 
Revolution found supporters in Spain among those who supported the idea of a 
constitutional monarchy and some progressive reforms. The term “Afrancesado”, 




meaning “turned French” was applied to those who favoured these principles, 
and likely supported the alliance between France and in the early years of the 
Napoleonic Wars. However, by late 1806, Napoleon had grown increasingly 
dissatisfied with his ally’s performance, particularly at the Battle of Trafalgar. 
Following the 1807 invasion of Portugal, the occupation of Spain and the 
placement of his brother, Joseph, on the Spanish throne in 1808, Napoleon may 
have hoped to rely on the support of the Afrancesados in the administration of 
the occupation. Some Afrancesados seem to have viewed the French domination 
of the Spanish throne as a better option than the dismemberment of their 
country, while others may have hoped that the Napoleonic Code might bring 
about the reforms they hoped for.23
However, Napoleon misjudged the situation badly. Although, through his 
brother, Napoleon would follow through on his promises to abandon feudal and 
clerical privileges, the installation of Joseph as king helped precipitate resistance 
to French interference in Spanish affairs. Riots in Madrid a month before Joseph’s 
coronation were soon put down, but more uprisings occurred and by the time of 




                                                          
23  http://eres.lndproxy.org/edoc/FacPubs/loy/WardT/Afrancesado-08.pdf 
24  http://www.historyofwar.org/articles/campaign_french_invasion_spain_1808.html 
 Most Spanish liberals came to oppose the occupation for the 
violence and the brutality that followed.  
Although Napoleon had intended to bring Spain under French control for 
some time, as he had grown suspicious of his ally, he failed to plan effectively for 
doing so. He may have overestimated the degree of support he had among the 
Afrancesados, and the degree to which the Spanish people would resist his efforts 
to integrate Spain into the French Empire. Totally misunderstood was the role of 
the Catholic Church and its importance in the rural areas. The destruction of 
churches due to the maxims of the anti-clerical French revolution was another 
factor that moved the Spanish population to resistance. By failing to plan 
adequately for the invasion of Spain and underestimating the reaction to his 
interference in the politics of the Spanish throne, Napoleon significantly reduced 
his chances for success in the Iberian Peninsula. He may also have overestimated 
the degree of support he would receive from the Afrancesados and failed to 
consider the reaction to the implementation of liberal and anti-clerical reforms 
among those in the rural areas of Spain. Taken together, the combination of poor 
planning and misjudgements locked France into a military conflict in Spain that 
might otherwise have been avoided. 




5.2. Case Study: Failure to Build Popular Support at Home 
For the majority of individuals, support for their nation’s involvement in a 
conflict is built upon expectations about key factors including the outcome, 
direction, value and costs of the conflict. Among the critical factors that will come 
under consideration is the number of military and civilian fatalities that may be 
sustained during a security or peacekeeping operation. Without appropriate 
information and context the home population has no real basis upon which to 
build an informed opinion about national participation in actions of this sort. 
Japan entered World War II with strategically limited aims and with the 
intention of fighting a limited war. Its principal objectives were to secure the 
resources of Southeast Asia and much of China and to establish a "Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" under Japanese hegemony. The failure of this strategy 
and the eventual victory of the Allied Powers inflicted substantial losses on the 
civilian population through constant bombardment from the air, while the 
military suffered heavy casualties in a variety of naval and land engagements. 
More than two million Japanese died during World War II.25
The suffering experienced by the Japanese, along with Article Nine (the 
“no war clause”) of the Japanese Constitution of 1947, may have made Japan 
reluctant to assist another country in a peacekeeping operation sixty years later. 
The Japanese Prime Minister, Junichiro Koizumi, was able to persuade his 
government in 2003 to authorize sending a small military force to Iraq in support 
of the American invasion. The Japanese contingent was tasked primarily with 
humanitarian work and was prohibited from combat except in self-defence. 
Threats from Iraqi insurgents against the Japanese force along with protests at 
home led Japan to withdraw its small contingent in 2006.
  
26
                                                          
25  
 After six decades of 
peace, Japan’s political leaders may have determined that the Japanese people 
would support a small military operation of this sort. Another explanation might 
be that the government’s leaders agreed that the objectives of the operation 
were worth the cost and risk, increasing the likelihood of support from those who 
found their leaders credible and trustworthy. However, in the case of Japan and 













Similar examples could be found within NATO and elsewhere: Spain's government 
had sent about 1,400 troops to Iraq, despite widespread public opposition. It 
removed its troops in 2004. Thailand, Hungary and Iceland were among those 
nations that removed their forces in 2005. Norway and Italy withdrew in 2006, 
Slovakia and Denmark in 2007 and more than a dozen nations removed their 
forces in 2008.27 Media reports about accusations of the mistreatment of Iraqi 
prisoners and the fear of high casualty rates during the support of the mission by 
these countries, among factors, may have caused popular support to decline as 
well.28
Another example is the Federal Republic of Germany, which sent troops 
to Afghanistan in support of the United States in 2002. The resulting shock from 
the 9/11 attacks led the government to believe that it had to assist its American 
allies. Adding to this conclusion was a traditional friendship between Germany 
and Afghanistan dating back to the 1920s. However, studies have shown that 




                                                          
27  
 In the end, Germany eventually joined other war-weary 
NATO states in minimizing their participation in the mission. This, along with the 
economic issues that have affected Europe over the past several years, has 
contributed to a planned reduction of NATO forces in Afghanistan.  
Therefore, political leaders urging popular support for their military in 
missions like the present ones in Iraq, Afghanistan or Libya need to explain to 
their populations, in detail, the advantages of  these commitments. In effect, this 
is about expectations management. Negative side effects such as casualties or 
alleged atrocities reported in the media can undermine popular support for even 
a successful military operation. The people’s trust in their political leaders must 
be high and can be easily lost. Understanding previous popular responses to a 
nation’s involvement in earlier conflicts can serve as a useful guide to preparing 
the home population as a nation plans to take part in a new one. Therefore, clear 
and achievable mission goals must be established along with a definite plan for 
the eventual end of the mission.  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multi-National_Force_%E2%80%93_Iraq  
28  See Sobel, Furia and Barratt, Public Opinion and International Intervention. 
29  Ibid., pp. 137-156. Although the chapter discusses the German role in the 2003 Iraq War and the 
following occupation, the lessons from that conflict are instructive in regard to Germany’s 
participation in the Afghan War; http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/sep/12/western-support-
afghanistan-war-collapsing; http://afghanistan.blogs.cnn.com/2010/04/28/declining-support-in-
germany-for-afghan-operation/ ; 
http://www.pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=9 ; http://www.economist.com/node/15954464.  




Developing and Maintaining Popular Support for the Mission 
• Political/military leaders need to explain in detail the anticipated 
advantages of the mission to local populations in order to earn their 
trust and support 
• Negative side effects can undermine popular support quickly 
• A people’s trust in their leaders can be easily lost 
• Understanding previous responses to involvements in earlier   conflicts 
can be a useful guide to preparing a population for a new one 
• Clear and achievable mission goals must be established and 
communicated to the home population 
 
6. Independence Movements 
 
Historical assessments must also take into account the aspirations of a 
people to have their own state. This is especially true with the dissolution of the 
“voluntary unions” such as Czechoslovakia following the end of the Cold War. The 
experiences of the states that were once under Soviet domination, for example, 
might lead to the creation of a historical connection with those nations that were 
once part of colonial empires. The possible affinity that these states might have 
with former colonies might be useful to NATO in terms of building support for a 
security or peacekeeping mission among local populations in these types of 
states. Units from these nations may be especially valuable in the effort to build 
local support for a NATO mission as they may be less likely to be perceived as 
Western “occupiers” or “neo-colonialists”.  
 
Popular Aspirations and Nationalism 
• Cultural/historical assessments must account for aspirations to 
statehood – particularly in line with dissolution of so-called “voluntary 
unions” 
• Affinity of such states with nations that were once colonies may be 
useful for efforts to build popular support within a local population for 
a NATO mission in their country 
• May be less likely to be perceived as Western “occupiers” or “neo- 






7. Additional considerations and recommendations 
 
While historical analysis can serve as an effective foundation for 
understanding unfamiliar societies and culture, it must always be kept in mind 
that history is not an exact science. History is a discipline that relies on 
interpretation, while teaching by both example and analogy. Since historians 
often deal with evidence that is incomplete, they must rely on their best 
judgement in trying to explain historical causes and effects. Ultimately, history 
does teach by analogy, but determining whether or not an analogy is appropriate 
requires careful analysis and consideration of a variety of factors, especially in 
regard to the effort to understand another culture that may be quite different 
from one’s own.30  It should be kept in mind, that the population in those regions 
or countries where NATO might find itself conducting security or peacekeeping 
operations will apply their own past experiences and historical analogies in their 
assessment of the operation as they determine whether or not to support it. The 
natural inclination may be to seek out areas of commonality as both sides try to 
understand one another. This may be a good thing, but it is in seeking out 
commonalities and differences that analogies must be carefully considered and 
analyzed. Effective application of historical analogies requires recognizing and 
understanding both likenesses and differences when doing so.31
Political-military organizations rely on intelligence analysis for the 
process of planning policies and/or operations. This requires identifying patterns 
of behaviour and predictions about how local populations might react to toward 
NATO intervention in their homeland, and historical analysis can play a key part in 
this process. Therefore NATO operational planning processes should include 
elements of intensive self-study in regard to some of the issues noted above, as 
well as the careful analysis of those cultures that with whom NATO may be 
 This is especially 
so when analyzing cultural similarities and dissimilarities. Making assumptions 
about cultural similarities may result in overlooking differences that may be of 
greater importance than what both sides may have in common.  
                                                          
30 An excellent discussion of the process of determining whether or not historical analogies may be 
relevant to a present day situation can be found in May and Neustadt’s Thinking in Time: The Uses of 
History for Decision Makers. 
31  Neustadt and May, pp. 89, 156, 235, 237, 269. 




interacting. While intelligence analysts are often required to provide assessments 
and forecasts within a brief period of time, this may not be beneficial to effective 
cultural analysis and preparations for building support from the local population 
for an intervention by NATO in their homeland. NATO might be well advised to 
consider the creation of a permanent cultural analysis unit that can begin the 
work of identifying those regions or nations where intervention may be most 
likely in the foreseeable future. Such a unit could be tasked to begin research and 
analysis of critical areas and their populations where NATO forces may be sent. 
Utilizing and implementing historical analysis and social science methodologies, 
plans can be formulated by a unit such as this that contain critical information 
about the cultures of these regions/nations and recommendations for training 
NATO personnel in regard to building local support for the mission in which they 
might be involved. Such a unit would likely need to be a permanent structure, as 
constant monitoring of conditions and events in these critical areas will be 
necessary.  
As a political-military organization, NATO requires the tools necessary to 
effectively study the processes that shape the attitudes, beliefs and opinions of 
the cultures in which it might be required to carry out an operation of some sort. 
This will be especially so when dealing with non-democratic nations or 
organizations that oppose democratic values. What will be required is intelligence 
analysis that will incorporate not only the techniques of historical analysis, but 
also those of the various academic disciplines within the social sciences, including 
cultural anthropology, psychology, political science and sociology to name but a 
few. Analysts will be asked to deal with a great many variables, both independent 
and dependent, as they study other cultures.32
                                                          
32  See Gaddis, The Landscape of HIstory, pp. 53, 55, 60, 64-65, 73 and 91, regarding thinking about 
variables in historical analysis. 
 Therefore, the integration of the 
methods of thinking utilized by the social sciences and humanities into the 
process of intelligence analysis will be critical to effective preparation in terms of 
dealing with non-western cultures. In this regard, history will serve to provide a 
foundation from which the diversity of human interactions can be analyzed in 









• Historical analysis should be the foundation for preparing to build 
support among the local population for peacekeeping/security 
operations. 
• Utilize historical analysis along with other disciplines to develop 
cultural awareness in order to maximize opportunities to build 
rapport with the local population. 
• Historical analysis should not be limited to the recent past, but 
should take into account long term factors and influences that 
have created a sense of identity within the local population. 
• Analyze the local population’s history of relations with outsiders in 
order to anticipate how they may view the presence of NATO 
forces in their country. 
• Learn everything possible about the culture in which the operation 
will take place, utilizing history, linguistics, and the social science 
disciplines to do so. 
• Local populations need detailed explanations of the anticipated 
benefits of the mission in order to earn their trust and support – 
this is true for the home population as well. 
• Learn about a population’s previous responses to conflict to 
anticipate possible reactions to a new one, especially a NATO 
intervention in their homeland. 
• Minimize the possibility that NATO forces may be perceived as  
occupiers” or “neo-colonialists”. 
• Develop and maintain a cultural analysis unit to identify regions or 
countries where NATO intervention might be most likely in order to 
prepare NATO personnel for operations in such places. 
• The integration of the methods of thinking utilized by the social 
sciences and the humanities into the process of intelligence 
analysis will be critical to effective preparation in terms of dealing 
with other countries. 
• Keep in mind that historical analysis can provide insights, clues and 




guidelines in preparing NATO forces to interact with local 
populations – but it does not deal in absolutes! Because history 
teaches by analogy and example, it will take careful study and 
analysis to identify the critical elements that will help NATO forces 
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1. Understanding the social systems and sub-systems: first step to 
communication 
 
Knowledge of a culture is the way to communicate with respect. Respect 
between cultures is the key to success. 
In a world that is increasingly interconnected, the success of 
organizations and their people depends on effective cross-cultural 
communication. In all these interconnections, communication needs to be as 
constructive as possible, without misunderstandings and breakdowns. Research 
on the nature of linguistic and cultural similarities and differences can play a 
positive and constructive role. 
Why is it important to improve intercultural communication? Lack of 
knowledge of the other culture can lead to embarrassing or amusing mistakes in 
communication; but such mistakes may confuse or even offend the people we 
wish to communicate with, making the conclusion of agreements or relationships 
difficult or impossible. To conduct a constructive cross-cultural communication it 




is fundamental to understand the cultural and social environment: in particular 
the social system and the sub-system structures and dynamics. 
The conduct of operations in “other” cultural areas33
A society is a system of sub-systems and social changes are driven by 
internal dynamics of the parts (not excluding external influences) and by the 
coupling together of the parts into the whole; social actions are seen as a 
consequence of the dynamic tendencies of each sub-system and of the 
interaction of the sub-systems.
 needs an approach 
oriented to local «systems» and «sub-systems» and not a simple and generic 
approach to «tribes» (often used in theatres of operations as well as Afghanistan 
and Iraq); in brief, the concept is: «local instead of tribal». 
The term “social system” is a large classification and the elements that 
compose it can include family, cultural groups, religious organizations, ethnic 
organizations, and states, among others. The social system is a complex unity 
formed of many often diverse components subject to a common plan or serving a 
common purpose. 
34
According to Talcott Parsons,
 
A social system is a bounded set of interrelated activities that together 
constitute a single entity; it is based on individuals or groups of persons who 
interact and mutually influence each other’s behaviour. These groups and 
organizations within the social system can be identified as “sub-systems” of the 
social system. If a part of a system is itself a system then that component is 
classified as the sub-system of the larger one. Thus, any organization or group can 
be classified as a sub-system of the society. Society contains various types of sub-
systems because the society at large expects and gains some advantages from the 
existence of such sub-systems. 
35
1. social systems, 
 there are four primary constituents that 
are part of the more general system of social dynamics: 
2. cultural systems, 
3. personality systems, 
                                                          
33The term “cultural area” as used here is meant to define a specific social group with common values, 
norms and traditions, but not confined by formal boundaries as well as country or regional borders, 
divisions, administrations. 
34Robert Hanneman, Systems and subsystems. Alternative views of societal dynamics, in “Computer 
assisted theory building. Modeling dynamic social systems”, SAGE publ., Newbury Park 1988, p. 283. 
35Talcott Parsons, The System of Modern Societies, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, SNK ed. 1971, 
pp. 4-8. 




4. behavioural organisms. 
All four are abstractly defined relative to the concrete behaviour of social 
interaction.36
• Provision of means to achieve common needs: sub-systems 
provide means to achieve group’s various types of needs ranging 
from basic to advanced (Example: job opportunities, security and 
safety, collective support). 
 
Sub-systems are social units created and maintained by the society in 
order to help the society itself accomplish tasks that are impossible to achieve if 
there are no such sub-systems: 
• Sub-Systems preserve knowledge, traditional norms, rules, and 
justice: most of the common rules are respected, applied and 
transmitted to new generations by the sub-systems. 
• Sub-Systems make the entire society: conventionally, especially in 
sociology, it is believed that society is a collection of individuals 
and their families; in specific cultural groups, individuals are a 
subordinated part of the group (sub-system),which is located in a 
predominant position (individual needs are less important than 
group needs). 
Finally, because any society is a collection of various types of sub-
systems, it is fundamental be aware of internal equilibriums and external 
dynamics in order to interact and communicate with its elements. In brief, 
subsystems are the subject NATO needs to communicate with. 
                                                          
36 Talcott Parsons, The System of Modern Societies, cit. 
Main Implications Concerning  Social Systems And Sub-Systems 
• The success of organizations and their people depends on effective 
cross-cultural communication. 
• Lack of knowledge of the other culture can lead to embarrassing or 
amusing mistakes in communication. 
• The conduct of operations in “other” cultural areas needs an 
approach oriented to local “systems” and “sub-systems”. 
• Sub-systems are social units which helps society itself to 
accomplish fundamental tasks: 





1.1. The social sub-system's environment 
In line with Parsons’ approach, analyzing the interrelations among the 
four aforementioned sub-systems of action – and between these systems and the 
environments of action – it is essential to underline the phenomenon of 
interpenetration. Perhaps the best-known case of interpenetration is the 
internalization of social objects and cultural norms into the personality of the 
individual. Learned content of experience, organized and stored in the memory 
apparatus of the group, is another example, as is the institutionalization of 
normative components of cultural systems as constitutive structures of social 
systems. The boundary between any pair of action systems involves a “zone” of 
structured components or patterns that must be treated theoretically as common 
to both systems, not simply allocated to one system or the other. 
It is by virtue of the zones of interpenetration that processes of 
interchange among systems can take place. This is especially true at the levels of 
symbolic meaning and generalized motivation. In order to communicate 
symbolically, individuals must have culturally organized common codes (cultural, 
traditional, ideological codes and rules) that are also integrated into systems of 
their social interaction (a clear example is the Pashtunwalì Code37
                                                          
37 Pashtunwali is a non-written 
 for the Pashtun 
people of Afghanistan and Pakistan). 
ethical code and traditional lifestyle which the indigenous Pashtun 
people follow. Some in the Indian subcontinent refer to it as "Pathanwali". Its meaning may also be 
interpreted as "the way of the Pashtuns" or "the code of life". Pashtunwali dates back to ancient pre-
Islamic times and is widely practised among Pashtuns, especially in rural tribal society. In addition to 
being practiced by members of the Pashtun diaspora, it has been adopted by some non-Pashtun 
Afghans or Pakistanis who live in Pashtun regions or close to Pashtuns, and have gradually become 
Pashtunized over time.  
There are ten main principles of Pashtunwali. Although Pashtunwali is believed to date back to the 
pre-Islamic period, its usage or practice does not contravene basic Islamic principles.  
(1) Provision of means to achieve common needs. 
(2) Sub-Systems preserve knowledge, traditional norms, 
rules, justice. 
(3) Sub-Systems make the entire society. 
• It is fundamental be aware of internal equilibriums and external 
dynamics: sub-systems are the subject NATO needs to 
communicate with. 




The structure of social systems may be analyzed in terms of four types of 
independently variable components: values, norms, collectivities, and roles.38
• Values take primacy in the pattern-maintenance functioning of 
social systems; they are conceptions of desirable types of social 
systems that regulate the making of commitments by social units. 
 
• Norms, which function primarily to integrate social systems, are 
specific to particular social functions and types of social situations. 
They include specific modes of orientation for acting under the 
functional and situational conditions of particular collectivities and 
roles. 
• Collectivities are the type of structural component that have goal-
attainment primacy. They include statuses of membership: 
members and non-members (inside or outside the system). There 
is also differentiation among members in relation to their statuses 
and functions within the collectivity, so that some categories of 
members are expected to do certain things that are not expected 
of other members. 
• Roles are the type of structural component that has primacy in the 
adaptive function (a group of individuals who, through reciprocal 
expectations, are involved in a particular collectivity). Hence, roles 
comprise the primary zones of interpenetration between the 
social system and the personality of the individual. 
Many norms regulate the action of indefinite numbers of collectivities 
and roles, but only specific sectors of their action. Therefore, a collectivity 
                                                                                                                                      
Pashtunwali rules are accepted in Afghanistan and Pakistan (mainly in and around the Pashtunistan 
region), and also in some Pashtun communities around the world. Some non-Pashtun Afghans and 
others have also adopted its ideology or practices for their own benefit. Conversely, many urbanized 
Pashtuns tend to ignore the rules of Pashtunwali. Passed on from generation to generation, 
Pashtunwali guides both individual and communal conduct. It is practiced by the majority of Pashtuns 
and helps to promote Pashtunization.  
Pashtuns embrace an ancient traditional, spiritual, and communal identity tied to a set of moral codes 
and rules of behaviour, as well as to a record of history spanning some seventeen hundred years.  
Pashtunwali promotes self-respect, independence, justice, hospitality, love, forgiveness, revenge and 
tolerance toward all (especially to strangers or guests). It is considered to be the personal 
responsibility of every Pashtun to discover and rediscover Pashtunwali's essence and meaning. 
Although not exclusive, the following ten principles form the major components of Pashtunwali. They 
are headed with the words of the Pashto language that signify individual or collective Pashtun tribal 
functions: Melmastia (hospitality); Nanawatai (asylum); Badal (justice); Tureh (bravery); Sabat 
(loyalty); Imandari (righteousness); Isteqamat (trust in God); Ghayrat (courage); Namus (protection of 
women); and Nang (honour). 
38 Talcott Parsons, The System of Modern Societies, cit. 




generally functions under the control of a large number of particular norms. It 
always involves a plurality of roles, although almost any major category of role is 
performed in a plurality of particular collectivities. However, social systems are 
comprised of combinations of these structural components. To be 
institutionalized in a stable fashion, collectivities and roles are "governed" by 
specific values and norms, whereas values and norms are themselves 
institutionalized only insofar as they are "implemented" by particular collectivities 
and roles.39
Example: Afghanistan as study case. 
Afghan society is based on durable social and cultural connections 
between groups (sub-systems) as part of a complex system. Afghanistan is home 
to a multiplicity of ethnic and linguistic groups, as well as several religious sects 
and other religions. Historic and geographic factors created and preserved this 
diversity although varying degrees of cultural assimilation continuously take place 
and a considerable degree of cultural homogeneity exists. Ethnicity means 
different things to different groups. Any simple classification is bound to have 
exceptions for an Afghan society that has never been static within fixed 
boundaries. 
Tribal society organization (supra-system), in particular the Pashtun one, 
descends from a common ancestor, who is the reason for the relation between 
the subjects; the subjects are thought of as family groups and not individuals. 
Every group, as a sub-system, uses the identification term qawm to explain a 
complexity of affiliations, a network, of families or livelihood. Each has a rich 
density of meanings. Every individual belongs to a qawm, which provides 
protection from outside encroachment, support, security, and assistance, which 
can be social, political or economic. Frequently a village corresponds to a qawm, 
but it does not necessarily exist in a precise geographic setting. In a more 
restricted sense qawm refers to descent groups; in tribal areas qawm refers to a 
common genealogy from an extended family (khor), or clan (khel), to tribe (millat) 
or tribal confederation (watan). Most simply, qawm defines an individual's 
identity in his social world. 
 
 
The Pashtunwali code (system of values, norms, collectivities, and roles) 
is the source of legitimacy of the tribal institutions. Knowledge and application of 
traditional norms is a responsibility of the elders (spingiri) and of the “wise 
                                                          
39 Ibid. 




individuals” who take part to the collective assemblies (jirga and shurà), the 
jirgadar. 
The hierarchical organization of tribal groups is structured on concentric 
circles of solidarity (fig.1): 
• The core group of Afghan tribal society is khor (“home”, or 
“family”);a very close relationship that ties all the components of 
the family to the head of the family. It is based on loyalty among 
its members and respect for hierarchies. 
• The second level is the khel (or khankhel) the «clan», composed of 
some khor strongly linked by social and historical reasons. Usually 
it is led by a community representative (malek, or walì, or wakel) 
elected by the jirgadar. 
• The third level is the qawm, which is the primary solidarity group; 
it is formed by more khel who are linked according to security, 
cooperation, source access, and opportunity reasons. The qawm 
defines the individual within his social environment. 
• This is followed by the millat (nation, people or ethnic group), in 
which most qawm may be included. 
• The mamlakat could be envisioned as the “country” of a people; it 
is the presence of a specific and defined extended community 
(without a formal geographic delimitation) which contributes to 
form the highest level of the group: the watan, translated by the 
term «homeland» of all Pashtuns. 
Nota bene: In conclusion, what is fundamental to understand is the fact 
that loyalties and connections between and within the sub-systems are based on 
a bottom-up process; essentially for this reason, a communication process must 
follow a specific track based on these lines and connections between the 
(sub)systems, therefore avoiding an approach based on “modern institutional” 
lines of communication. 






Figure 3.1: Afghan Pashtun tribal organization  
 
Main Implications Concerning Social Sub-System's Environment 
• In order to communicate symbolically, individuals must have culturally 
organized common codes. 
• The structure of social systems may be analyzed in terms of four types of 
independently variable components: values, norms, collectivities, and 
roles. 
• Afghanistan as study case: 
(1) Afghanistan is home to a multiplicity of groups. 
(2) Tribal society organization (supra-system) descends from a 
common ancestor. 
(3) Pashtunwali code (system of values, norms, collectivities, and 
roles) is the source of legitimacy of the tribal institutions. 
• The communication process must follow a specific track based on the 
lines and connections between the (sub) systems, avoiding an approach 
based on a “modern institutional” line of communication. 




1.2. Approach to social systems and local matters 
A social systems perspective could provide the best theoretical basis for 
the application of the cross-cultural communication. 
The adoption of systemic thinking – using the mind to recognize patterns, 
consider unity, and form some coherent wholeness – is considered useful in order 
to complete the picture of the social systems.40
• The Holistic Viewpoint (where the whole determines the actions 
of its parts and the people are determined by society); implies 
“downward” causality 
 
In brief, “Macro vs. Micro” and “Whole vs. Part” represent two different 
points of view in regard to social systems: 
• The Atomistic Viewpoint (in which the whole is the sum of its parts 
and the persons determine the society); implies “upward” 
causality. 
These two positions are important and powerful when applied to the 
task of deciding how to intervene in human behaviour. This duality has emerged 
as the historical distinction between “casework” and “community organization”, 
or as “individual change” vs. “social change”. Both positions are significant and 
should be considered when examining human affairs and going through local 
systems. An approach inspired (not exclusively) by the Atomistic viewpoint is 
recommended. 
It is very important to be aware of the concept that each social system 
whether large or small, complex or simple, is simultaneously a part and a whole. A 
social unit is made up of parts (sub-systems) of which it is the whole (supra-
system) while, at the same time, it is part of some larger whole (sub-systems). 
Therefore, any system is by definition both “part and whole”. 
Furthermore, it is important to comprehend the system (supra or sub-
system) which will be approached, identifying the perspective from which the 
observer (NATO operator) views, and analyzes the system and its environment. 
The idea of “part and whole” requires the observer to be aware of both the 
components of the sub-system and the supra-system in order to understand it 
adequately. 
                                                          
40Social Systems Theory. Human Behavior and the Social Environment, Lecture Paper, California State 
University, in http://www.csub.edu/. 




Exploring a system means being able to understand the dynamics of sub-
systems and to be accepted within the system as observer or recognized 
counterpart in a constructive dialogic relationship. Schematically, a social system 
approach requires: 
1. Definition of the social system object of the study; 
2. Definition of the components that constitute the social 
system; 
3. Definition of the significant environmental systems; 
4. Definition of one’s own position relative to the supra-system. 
The basic “stuff” of a system is information and resources. System action 
can be understood as the movement of information: 
• Within a system; 
• Between a system and its environment. 
What occurs in and between social systems in order to establish a cross-
cultural communication are “transfers of information” and reciprocal trust 
between the external actor (observer, operator, and counterpart) and the sub-
systems; in such circumstances, the cross-cultural communication must be based 
on the following operator’s capabilities: 
1. Competence; 
2. Capacity for action; 
3. Action; 
4. Trust; 
5. Power to take decision. 
Finally, information collection is the effect of a positive communication 
activity and is derived from a variety of sources including the physical capacities of 
the members, social resources such as loyalties, shared sentiments, common 
values and resources from its environment. It should be kept in mind that an 
important source for personal appreciation is the recognition of one’s status by 
society and one’s colleagues in a group. 
 Systems and subsystems are permanently linked because each one is the 
reason for the existence of the others, according to the principle that the whole is 
the sum of the parts and the parts are recognized in their entity as elements of 
the whole. Recognition, respect, dynamics, economy, justice, and so forth are not 
separate entities; a system performs them at the same time. In any exchanges 
between the whole and its parts, all elements receive some input, results, 
advantage/disadvantage, and have some goals met. 




The reciprocal nature of the transactions and exchanges should be kept in 
mind because interaction with a sub-system could have consequences affecting 
the equilibrium between sub-systems and supra-system (part and whole). If one 
function (or other dynamics) is always dominant, the other functions could be 
neglected, to the detriment of the total system. 
It is important to consider the social (as well as the political and 
traditional) organization keeping in mind that organization is not synonymous 
with higher levels of complexity. Furthermore, the measure of effectiveness of 
the organization is its capacity to fulfil the system’s goals, as well as the goals of 
its components. 
Groups (within sub-systems) with problems are generally disorganized 
groups, and the reasons for this disorganization can emanate from internal 
dynamics and/or external forces; this could happen when: 
1. The aspirations of one or more members is in opposition to 
supra/sub-system goals; 
2. The elements of the system are disrupted or unclear; 
3. The environment exercises a disorganizing influence on the 
system (oppression, injustice); 
4. Access to sources is denied from the supra-system 
(unemployment, welfare benefits cut off); 
5. External actor supports a group that creates a disadvantage 
for the others. 
The NATO operator (as mediator) must be aware and has to be conscious 
about these topics and must be able to give an answer (if requested) contributing 
to the mediation process, or to a possible solution; always keeping in mind his 
external role and not putting himself in a factious (perceived or otherwise) 
position. 
Finally, the NATO operator has to know who is who and who the 
individual with whom he has to speak is (see below, paragraph 3). 
 
Main Implications Concerning The Approach To Social Systems and Local 
Matters  
• Social systems perspective could provide the best theoretical basis for 
the application of the cross-cultural communication. 




• The “systemic thinking” approach is useful in seeking to complete an 
image of social systems. 
• Each social system is simultaneously a part and a whole. A social unit 
is made up of parts (sub-systems) to which it is the whole (supra-
system). 
• Social system approach: comprehend the system which will be 
approached, identifying the perspective from which the mediator 
(NATO operator) observes. Schematically the approach requires: 
(1) Definition of the social system which is the object of the study; 
(2) Definition of the components that constitute the social system; 
(3) Definition of the significant environmental systems; 
(4) Definition of one’s own position relative to the supra-system. 
• Cross-cultural communication must be based on the following 
mediator’s capabilities: 
(1) Competence; 
(2) Capacity for action; 
(3) Action; 
(4) Trust; 
(5) Power to make decisions. 
• Keep in mind the reciprocal nature of the transactions and exchanges: 
conduct businesses with a sub-system could have consequences to the 
equilibrium between sub-systems and supra-system.  
• The NATO representative has to know who is who and who the 
individual with whom he has to speak is. 
 
2. What NATO has to improve? 
 
2.1. Socio-cultural analysis 
Socio-cultural analysis is a primary concept based on cross-cultural 
competencies/abilities and an adequate intelligence process. Interaction, dialogue 
and communication between NATO elements and civilians require a specific set of 
cross-cultural knowledge and skills.  Understanding how the local population 




thinks and behaves can help NATO avoid making massive cultural mistakes and 
increase the chances of positive communication and operational impact. 
Working, interacting and dealing with partners across cultures raises 
challenges and demands new attitudes and skills. Direct experience shows that 
without the right approach, cultural differences greatly reduce effectiveness in 
the early stages of a relationship. Active management of the intercultural 
communication process and a conscious effort to acquire new skills will drive to 
competitive advantage. 
Because of the necessity of an in-depth socio-cultural analysis, it is 
necessary to expand cultural communication competencies/abilities and develop 
intelligence analysis processes. 
 
2.1.1. Cross cultural communication competencies/abilities 
The concept of cross-cultural competence is centered on the capability to 
understand and act in a culture different from one’s own: it is a fundamental pillar 
for NATO military and civilian personnel who must interact with people from 
other cultures. Cross-cultural competence is a set of culture-general knowledge, 
and abilities developed through education, training, and experience that provide 
the ability to operate with efficacy within a culturally complex environment. 
Cross-cultural competence can prove very advantageous, as it equips 
individuals with the necessary knowledge, abilities, and personal characteristics 
that enable them to operate effectively in culturally different situations. 
Furthermore, cross-cultural competence provides a conscious knowledge of a 
“culturally appropriate, adaptable mode”, helping to mitigate undesirable 
outcomes by supporting critical skills, in particular for conflict resolution and 
communication. Recent events demonstrate how a lack of cross-cultural 
competence can provoke cultural misunderstanding and security problems (in 
particular Insider threats/green-on-blue attacks); these cultural mistakes continue 
to place NATO personnel at risk. 
In contrast with the high level of technology that maximize the distance 
between military members and antagonists on the battlefield, the emergent 
nature of the NATO missions has increased the need for adaptive interpersonal 
interaction and capabilities. These kinds of employment often require close 
interaction between ground personnel and those from other cultural 
backgrounds. In these scenarios, the military need to communicate, negotiate, 




and conduct local key-leader engagement is vital: NATO personnel must be able 
to proceed and respond appropriately to any situation. 
Institutionalizing cross-cultural competence may require an 
organizational cultural change using multipronged approaches that comprise a 
number of cross-cultural resources, including: 
1. Education and training; 
2. Individual/unit-level assessments; 
3. Information (at local and regional levels); 
4. In progress research (info-collection) activity on the field. 
 
2.1.1.1.  3M approach: three levels of analysis (Macro, Meso, Micro) 
The concept level of analysis is a social sciences approach that points to 
the location, size, or scale of a research target. The “3M approach” is based on 
three levels of analysis: Macro-level, Meso-level, and Micro-level. 
• Macro-level analysis generally traces the outcome of interactions, 
such as economic or other resource transfer interactions over a 
large population. Examples of macro-level units of analysis include 
the nation, the society in general, international relations and 
regional equilibriums. It is based on the systemic level of analysis, 
which explains outcomes from a system wide level that includes 
the state. It takes into account both the position of states in the 
international system and their interrelationships. The position of 
states constitutes the systemic structural level of analysis. This 
involves the relative distribution of power, such as that of states 
or alliances, great, mid-level, or small powers, and geopolitics. The 
interaction of states constitutes the systemic process level of 
analysis. At this level, we are concerned with which state or 
alliance aligns with which other state or alliance and which state 
or alliance negotiates with other states or alliances. It is a general 
topic that must be clear for all NATO strategic communications 
operators. 
• Meso-level analysis, in general, indicates a population size that 
falls between the Micro- and Macro-levels, such as a community, 
an organization or a regional group; it may also refer to analyses 
that are specifically designed to reveal connections between 
Micro- and Macro-levels. Examples of Meso-level units of analysis 




include clan, tribe, community, solidarity organizations, villages, 
towns, cities, formal organizations and state institutions. It is 
centered on the domestic level of analysis that locates causes in 
the character of the domestic system of specific states and 
organizations. Thus, conflict is caused by aggressive or warlike 
groups, not by evil, inept, or misguided people or the structure of 
power in the system. The failure of domestic institutions may also 
cause open conflict and war. . Domestic level cases may come 
from various characteristics of the domestic system. Stable and 
failed institutions are domestic level factors affecting state 
behavior; a failed state usually means an institutional breakdown 
at domestic level of analysis. Thus, we can explain the ongoing 
local/regional conflicts in terms of absence of capabilities and 
institutions able to prevent such conflicts; however, system wide 
institution does not always mean harmony among groups. It is a 
specific level that must be understood by all the NATO strategic 
communication operators, in particular the key-leaders, 
mediators, subjects involved in business with major local 
organizations and governmental institutions. 
• Micro-level is the smallest unit of analysis in the social sciences; it 
is the more important for cross-cultural communication. At the 
Micro-level (also Local-level), the subject typically is a small group 
of individuals in their social setting, or in a particular social 
context. Examples of Micro-levels of analysis include local key-
leaders, local relationships, families, local alliances, conflicts and 
dynamics. It is based on the analysis of the individual level, which 
identifies the influence on events that individual leaders or the 
immediate circle of decision-makers within a community or small 
group have. It focuses on human actors identifying the 
characteristics of human decision-making. For example, the cause 
of a local conflict could come from the particular leaders in power; 
a leader (or a would-be community leader) might be considered 
the source from which the cause originated. It may be that he 
seeks power to hide a sense of inferiority, or it may be his inability 
to understand the conflict dynamics, or he could have different 
interests. All of these possibilities are drawn from an individual 
level of analysis. It is the fundamental level that must be clear to 
all NATO operators, in particular the key-leaders, mediators, 
subjects involved in durable relationships with local 




representatives and business activities based on direct 
communication. 
From the basis of strategic communication planning, meso- and micro-
levels are the most important categories upon which NATO should apply the 
cross-cultural competencies that will focus on the primary communication 
activities. 
 
2.1.1.2. Understanding of local decision processes 
The guiding principles of communication at all levels have to be 
developed to support local decision-making. This includes decisions made as part 
of the development of the Strategic Communication plan. 
Local decisions should be made in the context of, and be consistent with, 
NATO goals, national policies and local priorities, prioritization processes and 
governance frameworks. Cross-cultural communication should create a linkage 
between all these elements. 
In brief, NATO should: 
• Support decision-making groups, with a clearly designated focus 
of accountability, which include a locally defined mix of members 
with the appropriate range of skills; 
• Be aware about criteria for decision-making: demonstrate 
understanding and respect for the local decision-making 
procedures that allow recommendations to be developed through 
collaboration. 
Furthermore, decisions should be based on the best available evidence, 
take into account the appropriate ethical frameworks and comply with basic 
requirements: 
• NATO decisions-process in respect of local traditions and 
procedures; 
• Take reasonable steps to engage with local stakeholders to help 
increase understanding of local priority; 
• Clear communication with stakeholders; 




• Communication about NATO policy and actions should include the 
processes, decisions and the rationale for decisions, while 
maintaining appropriate confidentiality; 
• Establish assurance processes to monitor the application and 
performance of decision-making arrangements, and to enable 
learning to be incorporated into future process improvements. 
Moreover, the goal of being aware of the local decision-making 
organizations is to provide a simple overview of how local government decision-
making works. It addresses the key questions about local decision-making 
organizations processes, including: 
• The unique aspects of collective decision-making – how decision-
makers and the public determine which course of action best 
serves the community's interests. 
• Who does what – the similarities and differences in the roles that 
villages, communities, cities and districts play in enacting policies 
and providing public services; the division of authority among 
village, town, city traditional or governmental 
institutions/organizations; the key decision-makers in local 
government and the role of the elders. 
• How decisions are made – the unique rules that govern public 
agency decision-making, when public officials must step aside 
from the decision-making process, and the distinction between 
central governmental and traditional acts. 
 
2.1.1.3 Understanding of dissent and criticism: read the social causes 
and the political consequences 
Conflicts and wars are the origin of a variety of social ills, such as poverty, 
interethnic conflicts, widespread thievery and crime, among others. 
In Afghanistan, for example, blood feuds continuing through generations 
are legendary, and revenge is regarded as a necessary redress of wrongs: the civil 
war has strengthened these tendencies. The ongoing civil war had continued to 
kill, wound, and displace thousands of civilians. Kabul has been largely without 
electricity since 1994. Water, phones, and sewage systems have been destroyed. 
Years of war have separated and impoverished extended families that 
traditionally cared for widows and fatherless children. Lastly the foreign military 




presence, generally read as a military occupation, is characterized as the presence 
of soldiers who lack respect for the local culture, norms or traditions. 
Dissent, protests and criticism against the foreign military presence 
usually have political, social and cultural origins. In line with a strict approach, 
some media and newspapers have reported very strict evaluations, as such as: 
• “In Afghanistan, the Coalition has violently occupied the 
country for more than a decade”; it has, as the former military 
commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal himself explained, ‘killed 
what he called an “amazing number” of innocent Afghans in 
checkpoint shootings’”.41
Additional examples: 
 For example, demonstrators in Kabul 
in 2012 protested because the “Americans had violated 
cultural and religious traditions”. 
• “’This is not just about dishonoring the Koran, it is about 
disrespecting our dead and killing our children,’ said Maruf 
Hotak, 60, referring to an episode in Helmand Province when 
Coalition soldiers urinated on the dead bodies of men they 
described as insurgents and to a recent erroneous airstrike on 
civilians in Kapisa Province that killed eight young Afghans”42
• “’Foreigners are invaders, and jihad against foreigners is an 




Absence of communication as well as the media’s influence on public 
opinions, both local and global, could support a sort of “fault line conflict” based 
on cultural divergence mixed with negative operational events; this result could 
drive the local population to receive a more amplified message of conflicts 
between the factions. This is, undoubtedly, a situation closed to any opportunity 
of dialogue: no prospect of communication between the actors is possible in a 
way characterized, on one hand, by a deficiency in strategic policy and, on the 
other hand, by shortcomings in cultural competences and assets. Thus, cross-
. 
                                                          
41 Gen. StanleyMcChrystal: We've Shot 'An Amazing Number' Of Innocent Afghans, Huffington Post, 2 
April 2010, in http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/04/02/mcchrystal-weve-shot-an-
a_n_523749.html. 
42 Alissa J. Rubin, Afghan Protests Over the Burning of Korans at a U.S. Base Escalate, 
New York Times, 27th of February 2012, in http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/23/world/asia/koran-
burning-in-afghanistan-prompts-second-day-of-protests.html?_r=0 
43 Ibidem. 




cultural communication competence could contribute (in particular if combined 
with a strategic socio-political approach) in supporting cross-cultural 
communication (see Paragraph 2.2). 
2.1.2. Adequate intelligence analysis process 
In accordance with NATO ACO Directive (Ad) 95-2 and ACO Strategic 
Communications directive, “an assessment of the information environment in 
which NATO is to conduct operations/activities is essential to inform effective 
Strategic Communication planning and delivery, involving all of the information 
disciplines as appropriate, and building upon their existing planning, analysis and 
assessment capabilities”.  
In particular: 
• Analysis of the information infrastructure, the cultural dimension, 
the key decision-takers and opinion-formers, and NATO’s own 
capabilities are necessary to plan and execute missions and 
operations. 
• Strategic Communication planners should leverage all available 
open-source information, and Knowledge Development 
capabilities to develop an understanding of the information 
environment, potentially supplemented by contractor support. 
• Analyzing potential audiences is important, as NATO/ACO must 
communicate to a variety of external audiences with differing 
interests and priorities. These range from conventional media, 
through IOs/NGOs and academia, to adversaries. External 
audience analysis and assessment capabilities are critical to the 
success of this process.44
In order to make this activity successful, the implementation of an 
Operational and Cultural Network (OCN), as useful support for Intelligence 
purposes is recommended. 
 
 
2.1.2.1. The Operational and Cultural Network (OCN)45
The implementation of an Operational and Cultural Network (OCN), a 
graphical and digital construction would create the capability to categorize the 
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45 Theoretical approach proposed by the Author of this contribution. 




elements of a society in primary groups in accordance with their self-
representation (supra-systems, systems and sub-systems). The proposed OCN 
would operate on the Macro, Meso, and Micro-analytical levels, focusing on each 
one in line thorough the process of socio-cultural analysis. 
Each level represents a focal point for Strategic Communication. 
The capabilities to be developed by the proposed OCN would be: 
• Definition of the operational research fields (socio-cultural 
approach); 
• Description of the subjects (systems and sub-systems) within the 
main levels (Macro, Meso, and Micro); 
• Definition of the communication targets, both active and passive: 
1. Active: information collection and communication activities 
conducted by specialized personnel (specific socio-cultural 
approach); other than Intelligence branch activities, but in 
strict coordination with them; 
2. Passive: subject targets of the NATO strategic (but also 
operational and tactic) communication activity (elders, 
leaders, communities, etc.); 
• Create an exhaustive database, which would serve to explain local 
alliances, conflicts and social dynamics; 
• Generate a visual representation of the aforementioned alliances, 
conflicts and social dynamics upon which NATO must opportunely 
work with in order to achieve results, goals and, finally, 
accomplish the mission. 
2.1.3. Understanding Local Decision Processes: Communication and 
Intelligence 
It is necessary to invest in communication systems and capabilities to 
ensure that NATO will be informed and engaged in activities, decision making and 
local development processes. This participative and facilitative communication 
approach respects the capacity and capability to know where to go and how to 
get there. Robust local decision-making is all part of this approach and will assist 
in developing the cooperation and mutual support based on an appropriate cross-
cultural communication activity.  
NATO Strategic Communication operatives will need to be proactive 
rather than reactive to the challenges that effective cross-cultural communication 
will entail. These individuals will also have a responsibility to be active participants 




in “local strategic” issues which help develop better approaches to planning, 
problem solving and reaching potential. 
Concerning the intelligence process, cross-cultural competence offers 
knowledge, competencies, and abilities to promote effective comprehension of 
culturally complex situations. These include: 
• Facilitating effective requirement determination, info-collection 
and analysis, 
• Building effective interpersonal relationships with local 
populations and/or non-traditional/non-state actors and discern 
the intent of their leaders, 
• Aiding partnership building with an array of GO/NGO to assist in 
promoting foreign country national security. 
While socio-cultural analysis is a collection of techniques to enhance and 
discern the meaning of socio-cultural knowledge, cross-cultural competence 
represents a collection of capabilities that are necessary to increase the 
effectiveness of thinking/analytical techniques. Cultural sense-making and 
perspective-taking will aid in neutralizing cognitive and cultural bias that often 
influences the intelligence cycle, outcomes and products. Cultural priming 
represents one approach to mitigating bias through sense-making and 
perspective-taking. A comprehensive cross-cultural competence learning program 
(see next section) should be considered across the Intelligence Community to 
enhance and better facilitate the mission.46 
See Table 1, «Understanding Local Decision Processes: Communication 
and Intelligence». 
 
Main Implications Concerning Socio-Cultural Analysis 
• Communication and intelligence process require cross-cultural 
knowledge because of the necessity of an in-depth socio-cultural 
analysis. 
• Institutionalizing cross-cultural competence requires an organizational 
                                                          
46 See the contribution of James Stavridis, To Know the World, in Robert R. Greene Sands and Thomas 
J. Haines, «Promoting Cross-Cultural Competence in Intelligence Professionals. A new perspective on 
alternative analysis and the intelligence process», Small Wars Journal, April 2013, 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/promoting-cross-cultural-competence-in-intelligence-
professionals. 




cultural change using a multipronged approach comprised of: 
(1) Education and training; 
(2) Individual/unit-level assessments; 
(3) Information; 
(4) In progress research (info-collection) activity on the field. 
• Implement the “3M approach”, based on the three levels of analysis: 
(1) Macro-level  
(2) Meso-level 
(3) Micro-level. 
• Dissent and criticism: understand the social causes and the political 
consequences. 
• Adequate intelligence analysis process supported by the Operational 
and Cultural Network (OCN): 
(1) Definition of the socio-cultural, and operational fields; 
(2) Description of the subjects within the 3M levels; 
(3) Definition of the communication targets; 
(4) Creation of a database designed to explain local dynamics; 
(5) Visual representation of local dynamics. 
• Cross-cultural competence: 
(1) Offers knowledge to promote comprehension of cultural 
situations; 
(2) Facilitates requirement determination, info-collection and 
analysis, 
(3) Builds effective interpersonal relationships, 
(4) Aids partnership building. 
• A comprehensive cross-cultural competence learning program should be 
developed across the Intelligence Community to enhance and better 
facilitate the mission. 
 
 




Understanding Local Decision Processes: Communication and Intelligence47 
1.1. OUTCOME: Communication through effective understanding of the 
social-cultural environment and interaction with counterparts 
STRATEGY ACTIONS 
1.1.1 Increase NATO operators’ 
cultural awareness; in 
particular be aware of 
social and cultural 
organization and structure 
of the systems/sub-
systems involved in 
cooperation activities. 
1.1.1.1 Define the hierarchical structures, 
leaderships, the individuals/elders 
influence/role/position within the 
group/society drawing an operational-
cultural network (OCN) map (“Who is 
who, and who is the counterpart”) and 
understand individual role, 
responsibilities, power, influence 
(formal/informal). 
1.1.1.2 Acquire competences on social-political-
traditional norms and show full respect 
for power rules. 
1.1.1.3 Identify the correct interlocutor (in line 
with point 0.1.1.1). 
1.1.1.4 Plan the schedule according to local 
times (respect of local decision-making 
procedures and times). 
1.1.1.5 Participate in collective discussions 
concerning cooperation between NATO 
and local community expressing and 
underlining NATO intents, goals and 
mission. 
1.1.1.6 Communicate with respect for social 
traditions and roles. 
1.1.2 Prepare well trained and 
competent groups of 




1.1.2.1 Before deployment basic and advanced 
cultural training and ongoing (in theatre) 
training on the field. 
1.1.2.2 Interpreter vs. translator: adopt a 
cultural mediator as conflict preventer 
(well trained, briefed, and extremely 
conscientious about his / her mission 
and role). 
                                                          
47 Scheme derived from the “Kingborough Council Strategic Delivery Plan” 2010-2015. 




2.1. OUTCOME: Engaged and informed community sectors 
STRATEGY ACTIONS 
2.1.1 Create partnerships and 
dialogues with local 
communities and support 
residents to work for 
collective solutions to 
community needs (in 
agreement with local 
norms, traditions and 
rules). 
2.1.1.1 Survey residents, elders and power 
groups on their views regarding 
community engagement and priorities 
for community involvement.  
2.1.1.2 Support the operations and activities of 
local (formal and informal) organizations 
and institutions. 
2.1.1.3 Investigate options for new approaches 
for community partnerships.  
2.1.1.4 Sustain the Community Participation 
Strategy, which supports the concept of 
local action and external cooperation.  
2.1.2 Ensure that cooperation 
organization services are 
accessible and responsive 
and information is 
available to meet 
community needs and 
expectations  
2.1.2.1 Monitor and evaluate cooperation 
organizations service standards 
including the management of 
community requests in conjunction with 
Action 1.2.1.3 Communication approach.  
2.1.2.2 Regularly review cooperation activity 
information strategies to ensure those 
with special needs are able to access a 
reasonable level of support. 
2.1.3 Encourage the community 
to be engaged in local 
decision-making processes 
(according to local 
traditional, formal, 
religious norms and rules). 
2.1.3.1 In conjunction with the development of 
Action 1.2.1.3 Communication Approach 
and Action 1.1.1.4 Community 
Participation Strategy, implement an 
awareness campaign to increase 
participation in local discussions and 
activities. 
2.2. OUTCOME - Effective communication approach and inclusive, balanced 
consultation process 
STRATEGY ACTIONS 




and ensure locals and 
2.2.1.1 Review the effectiveness of current 
communication approach and services 
including participation to local 
community assemblies. 
2.2.1.2 Develop a comprehensive 




elders are provided with 
relevant information in a 
range of channels and 
formats to meet their 
needs. 
understanding of local communication 
needs to reflect the profile and diversity 
of the NATO personnel (operators).  
2.2.1.3 Develop and implement a NATO 
Communication Strategy, which 
addresses principles and protocols for 
communication and offers a 
multifaceted approach to 
communication tools and channels 
(traditional and technologic).  
2.3. OUTCOME - Local relevance and influence 
STRATEGY ACTIONS 
2.3.1 Promote NATO interests 
and aims through 
participation and 
cooperation in key local 
and regional initiatives. 
2.3.1.1 Actively participate in the local councils, 
assembly, and activities and support the 
development and implementation of 
local strategies, including planning and 
development, physical infrastructure, 
economic development, environmental 
performance and social well being. 
2.3.1.1 Actively support the local leaderships 
and the commitment to the partnership 
agreements between central 
government, local institutions and NATO 
forces.  
2.3.2 Promote the concept of 
resource sharing to deliver 
cost effective services to 
the community. 
2.3.2.1 Explore opportunities for resource 
sharing with other communities 
(groups/sub-systems) and other relevant 
organizations on key strategic initiatives. 
2.3.3 Support partnerships and 
cooperation with other 
institutions of GO/NGO to 
ensure the vision of NATO 
mission can be achieved. 
2.3.2.2 Actively research and develop 
opportunities for initiating joint projects.  
2.3.2.3 Develop and maintain strong networks 
and communication channels with other 
institutions of government.  
2.4. OUTCOME - Strong local decision making and delivery 
STRATEGY ACTIONS 
2.4.1 Encourage local 
representatives to 
participate in the activities 
2.4.1.1 Incorporate local engagement in 
decision-making opportunities in the 
Community Participation Strategy, 




and decisions involving 
(directly or indirectly) 
communities their areas. 
Action 1.1.1.4. 
2.4.2 Increase opportunities for 
the participation of local 
people in local decision-
making processes and 
community life. 
2.4.2.2 Implement the NATO StratCom Plan. 
2.4.3 In accordance with security 
standards and NATO 
policy, ensure decision-
making processes involving 
locals are accessible and 
available to the 
community. 
2.4.2.3 As part of the Community Participation 
Strategy Action 1.1.1.4 review the 
options for community meetings and 
forums (assemblies).  
2.4.2.4 Conduct public 
meetings/forums/assemblies in local 
areas that focus on local issues of 
interest. 
2.5. OUTCOME - Fair and just statutory compliance administration 
STRATEGY ACTIONS 
2.5.1 Support best practice 
governance standards in 
the delivery of statutory 
and community 
responsibilities. 
2.5.1.1 Develop systems that facilitate 
continuous improvement in NATO 
operations and services. 
2.5.1.2 Confirm (or not) that all legal 
requirements are being met. 
2.5.2.3 Support the development of associated 
procedures for their effective 
implementation. 
2.5.2 Support all legislative 
changes which impact on 
the local government. 
2.5.2.1 Support review and update governance 
and corporate policies and procedures 
to encompass changing legislative and 
statutory requirements. 
2.5.3 Support the promotion of 
a sense of a fair and just 
statutory compliance 
administration with the 
community through a 
commitment to open and 
accountable decision-
making.  
2.5.3.1 Support and maintain policies on 
decision-making, corporate ethics and 
code of conduct arrangements that 
uphold the StratCom Plan core values. 
2.6. OUTCOME - Forward planning and leadership 





2.6.1 Ensure NATO activities are 
in agreement with official 
procedures. 
2.6.1.1 Develop and maintain an integrated 
tactical and operational planning 
process. 
2.6.1.2 Develop a long term asset management 
plan based on a step-by-step approach. 
2.6.2 Ensure NATO’s strategic 
and operational 
communication planning 
process continues to be 
well-informed and 
reflective of community 
needs and aspirations.  
2.6.2.1 Develop appropriate strategies for 
effective consultation processes through 
the Community Participation and 
Communication Approach, Actions 
1.1.1.4 and 1.2.1.3 
3.1. OUTCOME – Adequate intelligence process based on socio-cultural 
analysis 
STRATEGY ACTIONS 
3.1.1 Verify that NATO 
operational intelligence 
planning process at the 
tactical level continue to 
be reflective of NATO’s 
strategic needs and goals. 
3.1.1.1 Create the OCN (Action 0.1.1.1): 
Knowledge of the terms and names 
(structure/composition) is the way to 
understand the socio-political net based 
on the concept of social groups (family, 
clan, sub-clan, social status, etc..). 
3.1.1.2 Create a OCN database paying attention 
to phonetic transposition (one way to 
read and spell names and personal data 
avoid repeating the same subjects, etc.). 
3.1.1.3 Define the insurgency nature: evolution 
(ongoing) of the phenomena and the 
role of the supra-tribal ideology and 
traditional structures. 




3.1.2.1 Plan training in advanced cultural 
activities (Actions 0.1.2.1) 
3.1.2.2 Promote an open information sharing 
approach: common know-how and 
competences. 
3.1.2.3 Introduce a new perspective on 
alternative analysis and the intelligence 
process. 
3.1.3 Distinguish “local conflicts” 3.1.3.1 Adopt an in-depth social-cultural 




from “insurgency”. analysis approach. 
3.1.3.2 Change approach to conflicts, from 
“tribal” to “local”: understand local 
dynamics case by case, step by step, 
building the ongoing cultural mosaic. 
3.1.3.3 Define the boundaries of the three 
levels of analysis (Macro, Meso, Micro = 
Strategic, Operational, Tactical). 
3.1.3.4 Comprehend dissent and criticism: read 
social causes and political consequences 
from different points o view (political, 
military, social, economical, religious, 
etc.) 
3.1.4 Distinguish “local 
insurgency” from “external 
elements” and local 
“reasons from “external 
ideologies”. 
3.1.4.1 Resolve “local problems” in order to 
avoid influences and linkages with 
external pressures and manipulation. 
3.1.5 Adopt the “intelligence of 
the name” method. 
3.1.5.1 Focus on the knowledge of the 
individual and social “name 
construction” and meaning: it’s the way 
to build the map of the socio-political 
net. 
3.1.5.2 Define local and regional alliances and 
conflicts in accordance with the position 
of the “subject” within the OCN. 









2.2. How to do it? A brief guideline for a cross-cultural communication training 
model 
 
2.2.1. Micro-strategy cross-cultural communication approach: Cultural 
Awareness Program48
NATO components deployed in areas of operations need adequate 




A “Micro-strategy” approach could achieve long-term objectives through 
individual effort; it could also obtain a balance with some limitations on the 
classic military approach. 
 
2.2.1.2. Changing approach: from “tribal” to “local”: 
Particular attention has been given to changing the erroneous perception 
of cultural areas, here defined as “local” instead of “tribal” (see table 1, Actions 
2.1.3.2).A change in approach to conflicts is necessary; this entails evaluating local 
dynamics case by case, step by step, in order to build an ongoing cultural mosaic. 
The “simplified tribal approach” contributes to several counterproductive 
results obtained in conflicts resolutions activities: the dynamics of socio-cultural 
areas are “local”, and as “local” should be approached because unconscious 
ignorance of local cultures is the origin of the lack of ability in communication, or 
in key leaders engagement activities. 
 – a mix of bottom-up and top-down processes – is the result 
of a conscious commitment to prepare military personnel with specific and 
defined cultural criteria required to operate efficaciously. This section (the 
starting point for a critical discussion) will focus on a socio-cultural approach 
methodology to the contemporary asymmetric battlefield and in support of the 
intelligence process. 
A Micro-strategy cross-cultural approaches program (Cultural Awareness 
Program) is based on a basic cultural training set on complementary study-
                                                          
48 This section is derived from a previous article published by the Italian Military Centre for Strategic 
Studies (CeMiSS): C. Bertolotti, Counterinsurgency and «micro-strategy» approach. Societies, Cultures 
and Conflicts of Contemporary Afghanistan: beyond the “cultural awareness” course, Military Centre 
for Strategic Studies, CeMiSS, Rome 2011. 
49 Approach introduced by the Author to Italian advisor teams in Afghanistan (Omlt/Mat/Pat). Test 
phase applied to contingents Omlt XI, XII and XIII, Mat/Pat/OCCAT from 2009 to 2013 (in progress). 




modules of specific theoretical lectures, which is accompanied by Academics 
(anthropologists, sociologists, historians, specialists in local languages, etc.) and 
the contribution of scientists (MA/PhD) for basic and advanced training; further 
step is the learning phase in “theater” (on the field-ongoing learning) followed by 
a fully-critical sharing of experiences and, finally, the “experiences-reports 
analysis” and the “training standards revision”50 (See Fig. 2). 
 
Figure 3.2: Cultural training cycle 
 
2.3. Cross-cultural competence training 
A change in teaching methodology – top-down process and bottom-up 
development – mainly academic supported by role games and simulations, and 
availability of “end of mission” experience reports should be a primary focus of 
cross-cultural competence training. 
At the end of a complete cycle of cultural training, an operator will be 
able to understand the cultural area in an historical, social and geopolitical 
context; in particular he will be able to: 
• Apply an appropriate approach to local cultures; 
                                                          
50 These preliminary activities took about a year – first phase of planning, study, field research and use 
of techniques as focus group and semi-structured interviews – and a second experimental phase 
lasting a further year – courses, lessons, discussions, and analysis. 




• Understand local dynamics, social and operating contexts; 
• Improve his knowledge through direct interaction (on the field-
ongoing learning); 
• Recognize the struggle for "local power" from the activity of 
insurgents; 
• Contribute to the intelligence process; 
• Provide immediate feedback to improve the later stages of 
cultural training. 
In brief, this training method is structured on: 
1. Basic cultural training (all personnel) 
2. Advanced cultural training (key specialists – Cultural 
Advisors) 
3. Ongoing (on the field) training (all personnel) 
 
2.3.1. Cultural Awareness Program (CAP) and Cultural advisor 
The goal of the CAP program is the individual risk reduction connected with 
cultural miscomprehension thanks to the support of Subject Matter Experts (SMEs): 
sociologists, anthropologists, ethnologists, psychologists, historians, linguistic 
mediators, etc. A key figure useful during the training phase pre-deployment and, 
eventually as “on the field” will be a Subject Matter Expert (a Special Cultural 
advisor). 
 
2.3.1.1. Essential aims of the project: 
The project will produce the following main outcomes: 
• Improve adequate and standard cultural skills: 
1. Implement a communication system based on acquired 
information, in order to obtain outcomes at strategic level. 
2. Capability to manage the communication plan in order to obtain 
general consensus. 
• Improve personnel safety  through a not-kinetic method; 
• Problem solving:  conflict understanding, prevention and containment; 
• Obtain an adequate staff capacity about socio-cultural 
interpretation and understanding, both in planning and 
operational phases; 




1. Improving a safe approach to the operational environment 
(through dialogue and correct communication strategy);  
2. Conflictprevention/containment; 
3. Protect and respect traditional aspects and local cultural systems 
through correct management of acquired information; 
4. Reduce the level of risk, direct or indirect, deriving from an 
inappropriate socio-cultural approach (physical security risks). 
• Adopting the professional figure of the “on the field SME”51
1. Optimize the operators cultural capacity; 
 (Special 
Cultural Advisor at Brigade/Battalion level) will make it possible to 
obtain the following results: 
2. Define potential political and social developments; 
3. Understand cultural context with immediacy, in order to 
prevent risks and assess each situation; 
 
2.3.1.2. Learning methodology  
The methodology which the project is based upon includes the 
following procedures: 
• Training: individual/team including lectures, conferences, 
workshops, role-plays and focus-groups; 
• Multidisciplinary approach to cultural environment (sociology, 
anthropology, psychology, geopolitics, strategy, economy, media 
– including Psy-ops). 
• Continuous updating and distance learning MCOOS (Massive Open 
Online Course). 
 
2.3.1.3. “On the field” SME’s capabilities and requirements 
• High professional and cultural background (MA/PhD); 
• “Gender” operational capacity (the presence of women specialists 
is required); 
                                                          
51 The professional figure of the “on the field SME” is not intended to be a substitute or surrogate of 
the Human Terrain System project, but a more flexible support and advisor to decisional processes, 
planning phases  and commander/operator’s general needs. 




• Ability to contribute to the intelligence process (analysis) and 
operations planning. 
 
2.3.1.4. Cross-cultural training and CAP effects 
Training outcomes are articulated in regard to actions that will have 
positive effects on the mission and goals over the short, medium and long 
term. As a result the CAP will be able to facilitate positive outcomes at all 
levels; in brief: 
• At tactical-operational levels: enhancement of a cultural approach 
that improves the ability to understand the local dynamics, in 
order to reduce the level of risk (including staff physical security); 
promotion and use of the "reading of the socio-cultural context" 
approach; 
• At the strategic level: knowledge of local and regional dynamics in 
order to better understand and assess wide ranging and long term 
developments. 
• At the political-institutional level: desirable working relationships 
between GO and NGO. 
• At the academic level: the best use and sharing of resources, tools, 
available technology and scientific-academic products 
(publications, databases, research and analysis, etc.). 
What is being proposed is a process of cultural training standardization 
throughe-learning activities (basic and advanced phases) integrated by seminars, 
lectures and conferences; in brief, these project activities are intended to: 
• Reduce the “cultural gap” and “cultural shock”; 
• Limit direct and indirect risks for operatives; 
• Accomplish the mission. 
The implementation of this project will produce cultural knowledge for 
operational purposes. Furthermore, it will be usefulin regard to the establishment 








Main Implications Concerning the Cross-Cultural Communication Training 
Model 
• Micro-strategy cross-cultural communication approach: 
(1) A mix of bottom-up and top-down processes; 
(2) Result of a conscious commitment to prepare military 
personnel; 
(3) Specific and defined cultural criteria required to operate 
efficaciously; 
(4) Long-term objectives through individual effort; 
(5) A balance with the limits of the classic military approach. 
• Changing approach: from “tribal” to “local”. 
• Change the erroneous perception of the cultural areas. 
• Standardize cultural training and knowledge.  
• (Cultural Awareness Program) Micro-strategic cross-cultural approach 
program is based on the principle of “top-down process and bottom-
up development”, in brief: 
(1) A basic cultural training system based on complementary 
study-modules and advanced interactive seminars; 
(2) On the field on-going learning; 
(3) A fully-critical sharing of experiences; 
(4) Analysis of experience reports and “training standards 
revision”. 
• Expected outcomes: 
(1) Appropriate approach to local cultures; 
(2) Understanding of local dynamics, social and operating 
context; 
(3) Improve knowledge through direct interaction; 
(4) Recognize the struggle for "local power" from activities of 
insurgencies; 
(5) Contribute to intelligence process; 
(6) Immediate feedback to improve the later stages of cultural 
training. 
 




3. Conclusions and recommendations  
 
3.1. Expand Cross-Cultural communication competences 
In order to be able to clearly understand the dynamics characterizing the 
contemporary battlefield, the expansion of cultural communication competence/ 
ability and the development of the intelligence analysis process are necessary. 
Thus, it is important to: 
• Invest in cross-cultural competence training; 
• Implement an Operational and Cultural Network (OCN), in support 
to Intelligence activity. 
Furthermore, the comprehension of systems/sub-systems dynamics and 
communication process, and how to communicate across cultures is vital: this is 
fundamental to build “cultural intelligence”. In particular: 
• Subsystems are the subject NATO needs to communicate with in 
order to obtain success in the mission. 





Connections between and within the sub-systems are based on a 
bottom-up process and top down dynamics (and vice versa).Consequentially, a 
communication process must follow a specific track based on the lines and 
connections between the (sub)systems, seeking to avoid the adoption of an 
approach based on  “modern institutional” lines of communication. 
• The transition from war to peace and the more general conflict 
resolution process requires a comprehensive cross-cultural 
communication approach supported by NATO because it would 
facilitate discussion amongst communities and diverse civil society 
sectors about their relationship with the central government as 
well as the future relations between diverse groups (meant as 
systems and sub-systems). A political settlement without 
significant progress on these dimensions is unlikely to produce a 




consensus supporting conflict resolution and sustainable peace, 
or, in other words, NATO missions and goals.52
A comprehensive cross-cultural communication process in NATO‘s areas 
of operations requires a much more deliberate design than currently exists. Some 
topics that must be emphasized through an effective communication process are: 
 
• Local communities have to be involved in all the decision-making 
processes in order to create an ongoing mechanism and forum for 
identifying key issues, work and activities with the NATO 
counterpart. 
• Local governments, as well as local civil society, have to be 
involved and supported in the design of a comprehensive conflict 
solution process based on permanent dialogue. 
• The local government, civil society and NATO (as well as the 
international community) could invest time in training by technical 
support teams on principled negotiation and mediation processes 
through cross-cultural communication. 
Furthermore, cross-cultural communication is the sum of courses of 
action which are based on, and utilize, the exchange of ideas, values, traditions 
and other aspects of culture of identity, whether to strengthen relationships, 
enhance socio-cultural cooperation or promote national interests. The 
establishment of a dialogue (resulting from a positive cross-communication effort) 
and the conduct of business with a sub-system could have consequences to the 
equilibrium between sub-systems and supra-system. 
In conclusion, cross-cultural communication: 
• Must be based on the principle of the smart-power, soft-power 
and cultural approach as part of the conflict solution; 
• Has to be a tool to change the conflict approach with a cultural 
approach; in brief, cross-cultural communication should be a 
means (a tool), not the end (aim); 
• Should bring people together and build a bridge between 
different cultures, positions, opinions; 
• Finally, it could support (but not substitute) the classic approach 
to military operations. 
                                                          
52 See Lisa Schirch, Afghan Civil Society and a Comprehensive Peace Process, Peace Brief n. 99, United 
States Institute of Peace, 21 July 2011. 




3.2. Additional recommendations  
The topics presented in this section are intended to illustrate a proposal 
with limited costs and able to apply value to available sources (both inside and 
outside NATO) while limiting direct and indirect risks to the safety of the 
operators in the field while enabling them to accomplish the mission. 
• In regard to cultural training, in addition to the role of the SMEs in 
cultural training activities during the pre-deployment phases, it is 
recommended that, as needed, the employment of “on the field” 
SMEs (as special cultural advisors) should take place. Doing so may 
guarantee adequate and continued support to ongoing 
operational activities.  
• The special contribution of SMEs will be the acquisition of 
additional information useful for the support and facilitation of 
the planning and decisional process as well as responding to 
operational developments. 
• The advisory activity and analytical support of SMEs in the field 
will contribute to the assessment and evaluation of the pre-
employment training activity, in an attempt to avoid deficiencies 
in cross-communication skills and competence. 
• In addition, the analyses and assessments provided by SMEs will 
contribute to the intelligence process. Such analyses, 
systematically recorded, will then contribute to the creation of the 
aforementioned OCN, which will be implemented as the result of 
the information sharing policy. 
In conclusion, a final consideration is offered. Correct and complete 
assessments, adviceand analyses are based on the access to reliable, inclusive and 
extended information. For this reason it would be useful to: 
• Guarantee access to information (unclassified and classified) to 
academics, researchers, scholars and to all the SMEs able to 
contribute to NATO missions; 
• Avoid the over-classification of recorded data, information and 
reports, in order to make them available to a large number of 
SMEs; 
• Revise the policy regarding the SMEs access to classified 
information: possibly declassify data, information and reports 
essential for socio-cultural analysis and social research. 
 





• Expand Cross-Cultural communication competences: 
(1) Invest in cross-cultural competence training; 
(2) Implement an Operational and Cultural Network 
(3) Necessary to comprehend systems/sub-systems dynamics 
and communication processes 
• Cross-cultural communication: 
(1) Based on smart-power, soft-power and cultural approach; 
(2) A tool to change the conflict approach with a cultural 
approach; 
(3) Bringing people together; 
(4) Support (but not substitute) classic approach to military 
operation. 
• Cultural Awareness Program (CAP) and Cultural advisor: 
(1) Individual risk reduction 
(2) “On the field” Subject Matter Expert (a Special Cultural 
advisor) 
• “On the field” SME’s capabilities and requirements: 
(1) High professional and cultural background; 
(2) “Gender” operational capacity; 
(3) Contribute to the intelligence process 
• Learning methodology: 
(1) Basic and advanced Training; 
(2) Multidisciplinary approach to cultural environment; 
(3) Distance learning MCOOS (Massive Open Online Course). 
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1.   Introduction 
 
The Human Aspect of the Operational Environment (HAOE) encompasses 
actors and factors that military forces need to understand and/or influence to 
effectively support the host nation. Opponents seek to maximize these same 
elements via lethal and non-lethal mechanisms.  
 
Understanding the plethora of contemporary, human local dynamics in 
theatre is therefore a critical component of a successful operation and a 
stable peace.  Despite the salience of this analysis, there is no clear HAOE 
doctrine to define and frame dynamics of the local situation.  
 




This lacuna adversely impacted operations in UNOSOM in the 1990s, 
recent efforts in Libya, NATO ISAF COIN missions, as well as others.  Although 
these lessons highlight the need for planning that embraces a clear understanding 
of local dynamics in the HAOE, the slow pace of institutional change endemic to 
large political and military entities is also quite problematic. This is particularly 
relevant given that other actors in theatre do not share the same encumbrances 
and adapt quickly to fluid dynamics.  
Macro-level changes in contemporary conflicts and wars also impact the 
local situation. The vast majority of twenty-first century conflicts no longer mirror 
dynamics of the Westphalian, state-centric wars that have been analyzed by 
academics as well as political and military leaders. It took 300 years since the 
Peace of Westphalia in 1648 to establish 50 states.  Since 1948, however, the 
amount of countries has quadrupled.53
In addition, there is now also a preponderance of local, regional, and 
global actors at the sub-, national-, and supra-national levels who effectively 
impact the conduct and termination of war. Their transnational reach is coupled 
with their ability to maximize the ever-changing technological advancements of 
this digital age. As a result, it is quite difficult to understand and thwart their 
efforts. Adding to this complexity, many of these groups evolve and devolve; 
employ different strategies and tactics; take shape in various organizational 
structures; hold legitimacy among passive and active supporters alike; provide 
para- or proto-state governance when a government cannot or will not; and 
effectively use technology to communicate, attack, organize, recruit, retain and 
influence other actors to include nation states.
 Therefore, it is not surprising that the 
majority have fragile institutions with little evidence their process will be any 
faster or smoother than the previous countries’ development. 
54
Concomitantly, a mushrooming of international and non-governmental 
organizations (NGO), corporations, and international organizations (IGOs) in 
theatre also contribute to the fog of war.  This additional layer of complexity is 
apparent in collection activities related to intelligence as well as to the 
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development of other organizations such as Civilian-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) 
bodies. Their impact on the local situation must be factored into any effective 
post-conflict, stabilization planning. For instance, the number of NGOs and IGOs 
has increased by a factor of 300 and 10, respectively, in only a few decades.55 
Furthermore, the impact of transnational corporations (TNCs) operating in many 
fragile states is also a factor. The top 50 TNCs had greater budgets than three-
quarters of existing states in 2006.56
Other key changes in contemporary crises which impact the local 
dynamics are the ‘net-speed’ environment in which operations take place.   The 
decrease of seasoned reporters to meet the demands of the 24-hour/7-day per 
week news cycle as well as the role of social media has changed the definition and 
impact of ‘live news’, ‘weapon’, and ‘enemy’. This places a greater onus on 
leaders to evaluate and respond to events quickly and appropriately to manage 
the contagion effect.  In addition, more senior leaders must rely on younger, more 
technically adept staff that do understand technological threats but are not 
seasoned enough to make appropriate decisions. The increased 
interconnectedness of this information era equally helps friendly and enemy non-
state actors who can more easily coordinate operations and finance activities 
undetected.  Furthermore, this cyber age also affords non-state armed groups a 
reach that used to be relegated only to states.
  Yet, despite their relevance, most non-state 
actors are not reflected in international laws and are frequently not considered in 
traditional intelligence analyses.  
An understanding of the challenges faced by multinational forces also 
merits consideration. Disturbances posed by short rotation cycles, various levels 
of clearances, and the potential to impact the economic and societal fabric of the 
host nation cannot be overstated and require extreme vigilance. In addition, there 
are complexities due to language and translation/interpretation issues, which are 
not only apparent in the multinational nature of the cadre of forces but also can 
be seen when dealing with a local population. Finally, there is also friction caused 
by various types of military cultures within one nation as well as among multiple 
ones operating in theatre. 
57
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This first half of this chapter seeks to provide a blueprint of the crucial 
components that comprise the dynamics of the local situation which need to be 
incorporated into NATO planning and operations. This requires an analysis of how 
narrative and identity in multiple locales has become a salient aspect is 
conducted. In addition, the need to assess the nature of conflict in the 
information age must be factored to include social media, strategic 
communications, as well as both official and unofficial information flows. Third, 
the economic footprint of operations on the local environment must be 
considered. 
The second half of the chapter focuses on mechanisms that can best 
assist in analyzing the human elements in emerging local dynamics. For instance, 
understanding the organizational structure of non-state armed groups is critical.  
Likewise, employing ASCOPE (Area, Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, 
People, and Events) to supplement traditional analysis is advocated. Furthermore, 
elements of Social Cultural Analysis (SOCINT) and Social Network Analysis (SNA) 
are defined and presented as under-utilized tools that can provide an effective 
mechanism to understanding the connection between and among apparently 
murky structures and changing actors. Recommendations on how and when to 
best implement these mechanisms are provided. 
 
Implications: 
• The slow pace of institutional change is problematic. 
• Since 1948 the number of nation-states has quadrupled; most have 
fragile institutions whose development and progress is unlikely to be 
smooth 
• The preponderance of local, regional and global actors at various levels 
may effectively impact the conduct and termination of war. The digital 
age has enhanced their transnational reach, while their constant 
evolution and devolution in various levels of complexity add to the 
difficulty of understanding their strategy and tactics in order to thwart 
them. 
• Non-state actors also contribute to the fog of war, making their impact 
on the local situation a critical component of effective post-stabilization 
planning.  Because international law rarely reflects the activities of non-
                                                                                                                                      
  




state actors, they are not often considered in traditional intelligence 
analyses. 
• Challenges faced by multinational forces must be taken into 
consideration.  
• Present day operations take place in a ‘net-speed’ environment, which 
requires leaders to evaluate and respond to events swiftly in order to 
manage the contagion effect. Both friendly and enemy elements can 
benefit from the ability to coordinate operations or finance activities 
without detection. 
 
2.   Key Components of the Dynamics of the Local Situation 
 
The logical starting point to drafting an effective doctrine is to identify 
the components that require assessment. Some generic information can be found 
in various aspects of the operational area as such culture, religion, history, 
economy, infrastructure, political factors, technology, geography/terrain, as well 
as assessments on centre of gravity ecosystems, neighbours, competing 
narratives, concepts of identity, loyalty, among other elements. However, the 
spectrum of variables is extensive and can vary widely from one locale to another. 
In addition, each of these factors is interlaced by a multitude of actors and 
elements, creating a highly complex system. Continuous analysis is therefore 
warranted. In particular, three components are key to understanding and 
predicting major aspects in the dynamics of the local situation that relate to NATO 
operations.  
 
In addition to conducting layered assessments prior to an operation, 
recognizing that influence from abroad in the form of states, proxies, 
Diaspora populations, NGOs, corporations, international organizations, non-
state armed groups, as well as lone actors is key. 
 
Moreover, understanding various actors’ goals, interactions between and 
among them, their organizational patterns, and levels of legitimacy within a 
population is required. Factoring the impact of regional and transnational trends 




and actors on local actors is also necessary. Another central component is 
assessing who does or does not have access to various media, communication, 
and technology – to include both official and unofficial information flows.58




As NATO has moved towards complex operations beyond members’ 
territories, there is the recognition that the Alliance must be prepared to respond 
across the full spectrum of intervention scenarios “…that not only apply to the 
prevention and mediation of conflict but also extends to the stabilization of 
environments emerging from, or still in, violent conflict, in order to support 
recovery and provide a platform for political, economic and social progress.”
 
60
“The success of both civil and military activities is determined in the 
cognitive realm and is a function of key target perception”.
  
According to the Oxford Dictionary definition, a narrative is “a spoken or written 
account of connected events in order of happening”.  Understanding the nature of 
the narratives that cascade from elites to local communities and vary according to 
the nature of governance can help guide the management of influence and 
message. Furthermore, although ideally civil authorities should take the lead, in 
the event of state collapse, or in the absence of a legitimate civil authority, it is 
important to recognize that the military takes on the role of enabler.  
61 This requires the 
Alliance be able to identify aspects that comprise the local facets of narrative, and 
appropriately manage that sense of shared identity, belonging, and loyalty. 
             In order to be effective, it is thus critical that the Alliance’s narrative be 
framed in a manner that the target population understands. According to 
multiple surveys, Afghans do not understand why the NATO is there despite 
the existence of the Alliance’s detailed efforts to explaining its presence in 
Afghanistan. Simply, NATO’s narrative document does not mesh with the 
target population’s notion of the world.62 
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This highlights an inherent dichotomy in the manner in which various 
regions developed which should be considered when developing future 
narratives. For Alliance countries the idea of ‘the people’ as a unified force 
overrode the regional and the local, suppressing diverse languages and cultures in 
the interests of a national narrative. This has been the lens through which we 
have viewed and measured ‘the other’ across the world.  However, this 
progression of events is not universal. Elsewhere, oral history, local, communal 
memories, family/tribal accounts, and narratives are more deeply embedded, 
rooted, and more enduring than any other recent imposition of state boundaries 
in the Westphalian or international model. In such locales, these are the 
narratives that are most important in understanding people and place in the 
event of military interventions. They are also the narratives and loyalties that can 
be manipulated to challenge security and stability, or managed to create a 
permissive environment for dialogue, co-operation and consent which can be lost 
as well as won.63
The impact of how ‘human rights’ is defined, enforced, and policed by 
nations in the international community is also a factor. Even though there are 
fundamental shared values, however, in large parts of the world lip service is paid 
to human rights. The perceived ‘imposition’ of western values can cause 
incomprehension and resentment. For instance, gender roles vary greatly across 
nations. In addition, often the solution to a crisis is portrayed as a separation of 
religion and politics via the creation a civil, secular, state. However, this is 
contradictory to organizational structure of devout Muslim countries. Another 
conflating issue is that these concepts of democratic process and the rule of law 
are transmitted to the local community level through the very same media that 
has contributed to radicalization and violent mobilization.
 
64
In addition, there are some commonalities to consider such as notions of 
patriotism and groups identifying with the nation through a construction of a 
communal, collective past. There are recognisable themes and subjects of 
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national history, with stories of sacrifice, endurance, struggle, pain, and pride 
made concrete by the erection of monuments, commemoration on currency, road 
names, national days, and remembered events that reach back centuries to 
reinforce the collective identity.  Every nation has them.65
A third element to factor is that the shaping of narrative is fluid and 
continuous. Increasingly, religious faith and affiliation are transcending notions of 
patriotism and either feeding into national narratives or minority groups as a 
means of strengthening identity. At local levels these sentiments are being 
manipulated by radicalisers to create to create tensions, enhance sense of 
grievance, and play on desires for religious purity and exclusivity, sectarianism, 
revolutionary mobilisation, or conversely, resistance to change, progress, and 
development. Moreover, changes in global society take different turns in different 
locales even within the same region, as witnessed recently in variations of the 
Arab Spring across the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries. Here, the 
evolution of new narratives and loyalties is apparent. The management or mis-




The Venn diagram below (Figure 1) of greed, creed, and grievance is a 
framework to illustrate the interlinking regional and local complexities. Here 
genuine and perceived injustices and grievances of communities and peoples 
along with struggle for recognition, rights or justice overlap with struggles over 
resources, monopolies, exploitation, and plunder. In such instances, the 
coherence of a religious or political creed can be the catalyst for rebellion or 
resistance. Communities perceiving a threat to metaphysical security by the 
abstract character of the modern often seek to ‘de-modernise’, returning to an 
imagined past with an uncomplicated narrative that provides simple answers.
 
67 
An example of this can be seen with contemporary dynamics of the Tuareg in 
Mali.68
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Figure 4.1: Factors Impacting Narratives 
 
There are a few contributing factors to this interaction. People retreating 
into a single ethnic or religious identity are vulnerable to having grievances 
reinforced by perceived inequality and institutionalised discrimination. Societies 
with a shared experience of discrimination and exclusion are also more 
susceptible to a single narrative, which binds together multiple sources of 
resentment and proposes a simple solution.  In addition, the failure of the state to 
provide security and justice, made worse by an oppressive and predatory security 
sector will fuel disloyalty.69
Recent events in Syria also demonstrate this process.  Here, ineffective or 
blocked political participation, widespread corruption of the political process, 
elite domination, erosion of tribal authority, suppressed election results, and little 
hope of change create frustrations.  Coupled with the failure of organized civil and 
political groups to achieve change despite attempting to engage with the state by 
peaceful means (meetings, marches, and demonstrations), resistance becomes 
polarised into ethnic, linguistic, and religious groupings with diminishing common 
ground. This produces exclusive political agendas, which in turn, can fuel conflict 
and sectarianism. Often in such circumstances, groups that are banned for calling 
for political rights or equality typically go underground. For instance, the ANC, 
Muslim Brotherhood, and Sinn Fein each continued to work with a clear narrative 
to build up strong constituencies of support with appealing solutions and military 
wings ready to take direct, violent action.
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At the individual level, the search for personal and group identities can 
lead to conflict with national and communal loyalties. The use of the Internet has 
made access beyond state boundaries effortless and outside the control of the 
moderating influences of families and communities. Loyalty to international 
groups such as the Umma, Global Anti-Capitalist Movement, Greenpeace, or 
Animal Rights confers a transcendent solidarity. Moreover, this same 
technological advancement has also spread simplistic narratives that generate 
grievances and outrage and exclude alternative ideas, explanations or 
perspectives.71
Other facets in a society can also impact narrative.  For example, ideals 
of masculinity and honour are increasingly difficult to fulfil in some societies and 
the loss of self-esteem can be considerable for young men.  Living out a dream as 
a warrior in societies that have left behind those notions can lead to fantasy 
narratives. In addition, centres of education, especially those that operate 
learning by rote, can manipulate narratives, especially regarding religious and 
doctrinal purity, suspicion, and rejection of ‘otherness’. It can also lead to 
alienation from civil authority and hatred of wealth and corruption, in contrast to 




Implications of Competing Narratives, Identities and Loyalties: 
• The components that require assessment must be identified 
• However, the spectrum of variables can vary widely from one locale to 
another. Additionally, each of these factors is interlaced by a multitude of 
actors and elements, creating a highly complex system, which warrants 
constant analysis. 
• The perceived imposition of western values can cause incomprehension 
and resentment. 
• Commonalities such as notions of patriotism and groups who identify 
with the nation through a construction of a communal, collective past 
must be considered. 
• The shaping of a narrative is a fluid and continuous process. Religious 
faith and affiliation are increasingly transcending notions of patriotism 
and are feeding into national narratives or minority groups as a means of 
strengthening identity. 
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• The coherence of a religious or political creed can be the catalyst for 
rebellion or resistance. Communities that perceive a threat to 
metaphysical security by an abstract character of the ‘modern’ will often 
seek to ‘de-modernise’ and return to an imagined past with an 
uncomplicated narrative that provides simple answers. 
• Societies with a shared experience of discrimination and exclusion are 
often more susceptible to a single narrative that brings together multiple 
sources of resentment and proposes a simple solution. 
• At the individual level, the search for personal and group identities can 
conflict with national and communal loyalties. 
• Other facets in a society, such as idealizations of masculinity or honour, 
can create fantasy narratives that may conflict with national or 
communal loyalties.  
 
2.2.   NATO Troops and Doctrine as a Facet of the Local Situation73 
Second, it is important to be cognizant of the impact of various doctrines 
and policies by NATO, coalition partners, host nations, non-NATO actors, as well 
as interagency relationships on the local population. According to the Chinese 
warrior philosopher Sun Tzu, “know yourself and you will win all battles”, but too 
often NATO operations fail to account its own organizational dynamics in the 
study and understanding of the HAOE and dynamics of the local situation.  
 
This requires the need to assess the interaction and synchronization of 
political objectives effectively supported by the timely application and the 
right mix of military and civilian operations, capabilities, and activities.   
 
There is also no policy to address the reality of interacting with complex 
social and tribal relationships and determining whom to support. There is also the 
need to create a methodology on how to obtain information on the region in 
question to provide dispassionate views on effective interaction, social customs, 
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and how to best approach the HAOE. Finally, the role of historical colonial or 
military relationships in an area of operation should inform actions but must be 
assessed for biases.74
Language translation remains a key challenge in many operational areas 
for NATO, but it also remains a challenge within NATO. Notwithstanding NATO’s 
published guidance and standing requirements for English and French, language 
remains a barrier to effective partnership, training, education, and operations 
across NATO. If there is an inability to effectively communicate amongst the 
Alliance, consider the challenges of understanding local dynamics working 
through an interpreter in another language. Civilian–military (civ-mil) dynamics 
also remains a vital weakness within NATO and partner nations. Professional 
education, exchange schooling and assignments, and routine collaborative civ-mil 
planning are the exception, not the rule amongst NATO nations and military 
operations. Robust military capability is often inappropriately substituted when 
civilian capacity is lacking, which creates problems in terms of expectations as 
well as perceived equities. For instance, despite the best of plans, ISAF’s 2009-




Standard ISAF troop/unit rotations of 4, 6, or 12 months also run afoul of 
the basic human/cultural instincts of most Afghans, which is to seek and maintain 
long-term rather than transactional relationships. The well-documented effects of 
constant ISAF troop turnover erode continuity and leads to fighting the war six 
months at a time, which is not lost on our Afghan partners, who have seen an 
endless stream of ISAF partners and mentors over the last 10 years.  In addition, 
national, service, and branch/community culture amongst NATO nations and 
partners also pose a challenge. An example of NATO and national cultural 
challenges is apparent when, for instance, posting an Army light infantry officer to 
work with a naval submarine engineering officer. 
 
76





The cultural, language, and social challenges and differences are quite 
apparent. Success in leading change in an area of operation is often tied to 
effectively understanding these complex dynamics and adjusting actions, 
responses, and words accordingly. However, there will be disparities among the 
strategic, operational, and tactical levels of interpreting these aspects. Hence the 
need to harmonize these views and adjust accordingly is needed.  




Implications of NATO Troops and Doctrine as a Facet of the Local Situation 
• The impact of various NATO doctrines and policies, as well as those of 
coalition partners, host nations, non-NATO actors and interagency 
relationships on the local population must be kept in mind. 
• There is a need for a methodology on how to obtain information on the 
region in question in order to provide dispassionate views on effective 
interaction, social customs and how best to approach the HAOE. 
• The role of historical colonial or military relationships in an area of 
operation should inform actions but must also be assessed for biases. 
• Language translation remains a key challenge for NATO in many 
operational areas, and is also a challenge within NATO. Language 
remains a barrier to effective partnership, training, education and 
operations across NATO. If this is a challenge within NATO, consider the 
challenges of understanding local dynamics in another language while 
working through an interpreter. 
• Standard troop/unit rotations of a few months to a year may run counter 
to those societies that seek to develop and maintain long-term 
relationships.  
 
2.3.  Economic Footprint of NATO Operations on the Local Situation77
A third critical aspect to consider in assessing the local situation is that 
any foreign intervention tends to further complicate an already complex local 
situation. Introducing a significant external actor or group of actors (e.g., different 
military units, plus diplomatic and development assistance organizations, in 
addition to international and non-state actors such as NGOs) understandably 
creates misbalance in an already fragile local equilibrium. Moreover, although 
foreign intervention will bring money and other resources into the local society, it 
will also yield unavoidable economic repercussions (price level, rent, labour 
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market, and new patterns of consumption). Likewise new incentive structures 
may strengthen or weaken sectors of the local economy.78  
 
NATO operations have the potential to produce both positive and negative 
effects on local economies, and rarely is there no impact whatsoever – there is 
almost always a footprint/outcome of NATO operations whether planned or 
unplanned, controlled or deliberate, or unintended and emerging.  
 
The amount and type of impacts created by NATO operations on a local 
economy is influenced by many factors including size, scale, and duration of 
operations; amount, character, and length of combat and kinetic operations; and 
the degree and effectiveness of comprehensive/whole of nation/whole of 
government planning and coordination.  NATO forces own cultural awareness, 
preparation, and consideration of the human aspects of the operational 
environment vis à vis the local economy is a key determining factor, but the law 
of unintended consequences frequently prevails. Hence, the best NATO intentions 
and planning may be undone by complex and changing operational realities, 
failure to fully understand and interact with human/social/cultural factors, and 
the realities of coalition politics and warfighting. 79
For instance, the generally well-intended flow of donor-nation funding, 
aid, contractors, and jobs in Afghanistan over many years produced many results 
– not all positive and not all intentional. In fact, in the absence of a long-term 
multi-national, coherent, and coordinated economic aid strategy for Afghanistan, 
many will argue that corruption, criminal patronage networks, and failure of 
government institutions are attributable, in part, to ill-conceived and poorly 
executed western economic aid. The converse is also true. Afghan 
communications, hospitals, schools, roads, electrical, and other infrastructure are 
incredibly improved since 2002. Both views are accurate.
 
80
As NATO operations begin and continue over time in any given Area of 
Responsibility (AOR), local economies have potential for explosive growth and 
development to provide cash flow for fledging governments, while concurrently 
new market forces may be created with unintended and often dire consequences. 
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 The introduction of hard currency to the fabric of fragile states’, lethal 
competition for lucrative resources and power relationships, the emergence of 
new banking practices and industry, flagrant money-laundering, increased 
corruption at all levels, black marketing of or related to NATO fuel, supplies, and 
equipment, in addition rapid growth of criminal patronage networks seeking to 
leverage new opportunities may all be caused directly or develop as a result of 
NATO operations, particularly in the absence of effective whole of government/ 
whole of nation planning.  Depending on conditions and economic expertise 
available, destructive economic trends may or may not be readily identifiable or 
preventable. Fledgling host nation financial, economic, and government 
institutions may or may not be able to discern and respond, or they may in fact be 
part of the tidal wave of change that sweeps over limited government 
institutions. The long historical record of frequent problems and major economic 
challenges with black marketing, corruption, and secondary markets is not new to 
military operations, yet NATO and ISAF planners were apparently surprised by 
these trends in Afghanistan, or at least unable to respond effectively over the 
course of 10 years of operations.81
Following the rapid success of military operations in Iraq in 2003, the 
subsequent dismantling of Iraqi armed forces and Baathist party purges left 
hundreds of thousands of young Iraqi men without work, disenfranchised, and 
hungry. Coalition and U.S. planners failed to prepare for and mitigate a vast array 
of destructive economic impact on post-combat operations and military defeat of 
the Iraqi Army. The complex new economic situation compounded sectarian 
violence, challenged the emergence of new Iraqi government institutions, and 
undercut efforts to stabilize the situation. The harsh lessons of failures in planning 
and execution of post combat economic and other vital whole of government 




In addition, the influx of resources can easily lead to or strengthen 
corruption, and thus undercut governance or the juridical systems. Relatively 
well-paid jobs with foreign or international organizations may unbalance the 
labour market or channel more qualified personnel into higher-paid but low-
quality jobs, as evidences by professors or engineers who become drivers, 
translators, among other dynamics. If foreign intervention includes significant 
military forces, these might lead to a different balance of power in the host 
nation, or it might produce opposition or resistance towards the outside military 
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presence. In any case, it will necessarily make the foreign forces into a local power 
centre. 83
This might unfold as outsiders being in a supporting role to a functioning 
and legitimate government. Or it might turn the outside forces into just another 
militia amongst many others. In either scenario, a significant foreign armed 
presence cannot help but become a key local power player. As a result, local 
power dynamics cannot be unchanged by an intervention. Generally, they will 
become even more complex. Even if a foreign intervention plainly aims at 
stabilizing a local government, is not just a technical operation, but a highly 
political enterprise. This too is not avoidable, but also a necessary goal of the 
operation, if it is to succeed. According to the Field Manual Counterinsurgency of 
the U.S. Army and Marine Corps, “The primary objective of any COIN operation is 
to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government ... A 




Moreover, in certain instances, an intervening multinational force can be 
the most important economic actor locally. War and post-conflict periods directly 
impact production, trade, employment, human resources, and the prevalence of 
illicit markets. Limited electricity and transport capacities undermine economic 
development, including job growth, while simultaneously raising the costs of 
doing business.
 
85 For instance, infrastructure needs for “rural farming 
communities include transport and communication services, energy, water and 
irrigational facilities and extension services”.86  
In order to create effective entrepreneurship training in the stabilization phase 
of an operation, the Alliance needs to cater training to local requirements as 
well as partner with entities with a record of success.87  
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In addition, special safe economic zones may need to be created. These 
offer duty-free imports, solid infrastructure, with a goal of encouraging exports.88 
“SEZs have been established in several post-conflict countries, helped attract 
foreign investors, and spurred job creation. Despite these positive aspects, it is 
equally important to recognize that NATO may also interfere with the interests of 
local power brokers or illicit markets. This may increase local tensions and/or 
violence. Hence, both macro and micro economic factors of troops in the local 
area must be carefully assessed.89
In addition, a multitude of partnerships between and among 
government, business, business associations, and nongovernmental institutions 
have promoted commerce and assuaged the levels of conflict. Such relationships 
have also fostered the development and adherence by many companies to 
voluntary codes of conduct connected with their business activities. These 
“partnerships have helped businesses understand the role they play in areas like 
human rights, equity and violent conflict as well as helped setting standards of 
behaviour”.
  
90  Hence, an assessment of the role of such entities on the ground, 
how they are perceived by multiple other actors, their impact on the local 
dynamic, as well as potential areas of conflict and/or cooperation to affect greater 
efficiency of effort is warranted.91
There are a number of governmental organizations that aid in 
contributing economic vitality.  For instance, the U.S. Department of Defense’s 
Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO), seeks “to reduce 
violence, enhance stability, and restore economic normalcy in areas where unrest 
and insurgency have created a synchronous downward spiral of economic 
hardship and violence. TFBSO creates stabilization by developing economic 
opportunities through a range of efforts, including encouraging investment by U.S. 
and international businesses, developing a country’s natural resources in a way 
that is economically sound and environmentally responsible, and assisting 
industrial development and agricultural revitalization”.
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successes while it operated in Iraq, and, presently provides important economic 
development activities in Afghanistan. More specifically, TFBSO have been 
primarily concentrated in the minerals, energy, indigenous industries, agriculture, 
and information technology sectors of the Afghan economy”.93
Likewise, there are many non-governmental organizations that assist in 
economic development globally. Examples are the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund, International Finance Corporation, regional development banks 
(i.e., Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank, Latin American 
Development Bank), among others.
 
94 Also, national finance and development 
institutions (i.e., Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and U.S. Agency for 
International Development) among many others, succours in economic 
development.95 There are also various non-profit organizations that undertake 
economic development and business accelerator activities in conflict zones and 
developing countries including.  For instance, Mercy Corps provides “financing, 
equipment, training or technical support. These projects help people find jobs, 
build their businesses, supply their communities with the goods they need —and 
improve their lives”.96 Also, “Mercy Corps-sponsored microfinance institutions, 
savings and credit cooperatives, loan-guarantee programs, and technical support 
reach more than one million people in over a dozen countries”.97
Bpeace is “a non-profit coalition of business professionals offering pro-
bono access to our expertise, technical assistance, networks and proven 
methodologies to help entrepreneurs expand their businesses into sustainable and 
profitable enterprises. [They] select motivated entrepreneurs we call Fast Runners 
to receive access to our services”. The organization operates in Afghanistan and 
Rwanda, and plans to initiate activities in Bosnia and El Salvador.
  
98
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potential to succeed in business but lack the necessary support”.99 Other examples 
include, the Small Enterprise Impact Investment Fund increases access of capital 
to small and medium-sized enterprises in developing countries.100 Business Edge, 
part of the International Finance Corporation, offers training seminars and self-
study books for mangers and business owners of small and medium-size 
companies in developing countries.101 
 
Assessing the current and/or potential role of these actors in a post conflict 
phase is critical. Influence (both positive and negative) on powerbrokers, local 
and national government institutions, and rule of law must be ascertained.  
 
While NATO has tremendous capability to plan and conduct successful 
military operations, it is frequently the non-military functions including rule of 
law, governance, development, and economic opportunity that drives the 
eventual outcome of NATO operations. Stability operations also require inherent 
understanding and consideration of economic issues as instability and economic 
opportunity are linked. Local actors are quick to seize new economic 
opportunities generated by the influx of tens of thousands of NATO combat and 
support soldiers and facilities but far too often the legitimate needs of the local or 
national government are lost or stolen due to inadequate planning.102 
 
Implications of the Economic Footprint of NATO Operations on the Local 
Situation 
• Any foreign intervention will complicate an already complex local 
situation, and will yield unavoidable economic repercussions. Likewise, 
new incentive structures may strengthen or weaken sectors of the local 
economy. 
• Even the best intentions of NATO may be undone by complex and 
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changing operational realities, the failure to fully understand and interact 
with human/social/cultural factors and the realities of coalition politics 
and warfighting. 
• NATO operations over time in any AOR may bring about explosive growth 
and development that will provide cash flow for fledgling governments, 
while concurrently, new market forces may be created that may result in 
unintended or dire consequences. 
• Depending on conditions and available economic expertise, destructive 
economic trends may or may not be readily identifiable or preventable.  
• The influx of resources can easily lead to or strengthen corruption, 
thereby undercutting governance or the judicial system. 
• A significant foreign armed presence cannot help but become a key local 
power player. As a result, local power dynamics cannot be unchanged by 
an intervention. Even if the objective is to stabilize a local government, a 
foreign intervention is not just a technical operation but also a highly 
political enterprise. 
• In certain circumstances, an intervening multinational force can be the 
most important economic actor locally.  
• Special safe economic zones may need to be created. However, 
interference by NATO in the interests of local power brokers or illicit 
markets may increase local tensions and/or violence.  
• While a variety of partnerships between public and private entities may 
promote commerce and minimize the effects of conflict, the role of these 
entities on the ground, how they are perceived by other actors, their 
impact on the local dynamic and potential areas of conflict/cooperation 
in order to affect a greater efficiency of effort is warranted. 
• Numerous governmental and non-governmental organizations that can 
assist economic development. 
• NATO has tremendous capability to plan and conduct successful military 
operations, but frequently the non-military functions drive the eventual 








3.  Tools to Assess Actors in the Local Situation 
 
By definition, understanding the dynamics of the local situation requires 
an examination of all actors involved. Two tools are delineated here provide a 
micro-analysis of networks. The first defines group dynamics and structures while 
the second set focuses on dynamics amongst individuals. Each approach provides 
key information re local actors as well as their connection to other local, national, 
regional, and/or transnational actors.  
 
3.1.   Understanding Non-State Armed Groups on the Local Situation103
There is very little analysis on the organizational structure of non-state 
armed groups.  This is due to the plethora of large data sets measuring only 
certain types of groups, difficulties in harmonizing definitions which leads to 
disparate metrics, and the often exclusion (until recently) of criminal, gang, and 
other local groups that have the reach and power of many states.  The Lochard 
model metric merges these various large datasets, along with individual research 
on each group, into one totalling ~1,750 insurgents, terrorists, militias, criminal 
organizations, gangs, and malicious cyber actors greater than 1,000 in strength  
who have been active at least once from 1996 to the present. It then layers these 
data with metrics of governance correlated as well since 1996 to the present, 
areas of operation, para-state capabilities, as well as technological reach.  New 
typologies of groups are presented along with the organizational structures in 
which they may appear, evolve, or devolve. By employing this model, a portrait of 
non-state armed groups’ role in the local situation can be obtained.
 
104
 The Lochard model categorizes the groups in the dataset according to 
function and or goal – international criminal organizations, millenarian or religious 
extremist groups, insurgents/ revolutionaries, the New Left, and local actors. By 
avoiding the sticky challenges related to defining and measuring terrorism and 
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other typologies that other datasets face, this approach is able to capture a wider 
set of actors while concomitantly avoiding smaller groupings that reflect only 
minor criminality or protest rather than a effect based activity that aims to impact 
a nation state. In addition, the organizational structure of each of the 1,750 
groups is assessed, yielding five additional categories related to their 
organizational structure – hierarchical, franchise, hub-spoke, core, and 
flat/networked.  Interestingly, each may appear, evolve or devolve into any of the 
structural typologies inherent to each functional grouping, in no particular order.  
There is no clear line of progression or dectralization for any of the sets 
present.105
 The hierarchical model is where there is a clear head and chain of 
command. This was for example typical of the large South American drug cartels 
of the 1980s. The next is a franchise model where the exact same structure is 
replicated in another AOR or type of commodity, akin to any corporate franchise.  
Here, the head of each franchise reports to the main.  Third, is a hub and spoke 
model, wherein various types of groups of differing organizational structures are 
at each end of the spoke. Their uniting force is the commodity(ies) or issue(s) in 
which they cooperate (located in the hub).  There is clear knowledge of being in a 
network, but each has its own head, chain of command, structure, and goals.
  
106
A fourth depiction is the core model where non-state armed groups are 
at various rings often unaware of other groups within their own or other rings. For 
instance, the silk route demonstrates the long pattern and variation of 
interconnected groups who form an effective chain. Unlike the hub and spoke 
model, there is no clear connectivity between these groups, and they may have 
various sizes and forms. Finally, there is the flat/networked pattern that has been 
dubbed the future of conflict, with the clear example being al-Qaeda. However, 
not all terrorist groups are flat; actually, most are not.
   
107
 The same is true for the broader category of millenarian/religious 
extremists. In addition, there is no empirical evidence that terrorist or other 
groups naturally devolve towards a less hierarchical, loose network. There is no 
doubt many groups do have this structure; however there are far greater 
numbers in the other organizational typologies.  Not realizing the true trajectory 
  








of how groups evolve will result in the inability to garner proper analysis of the 
local situation and thus prolong conflicts. 108
 In terms of functional categories, international criminal organizations 
may appear in all five of these organizational patterns.  They are also the most 
prolific in terms of the use of technology.  Here, however, it is primarily for profit 
or the movement of illicit goods.  Their business model dictates the economic goal 
as well as a high connectivity to informal economies.  Their area of operations 



















Figure 4.2: Lochard 2004 Model of Non-State Armed Groups’ Organizational Structures – Hierarchy, 
Franchise, Hub-Spoke, Core, and Networked110
 Another category is millenarian or religious extremist groups that seek to 
destroy, not disrupt, another people or state as their main objective.  As such, 
their targeting tends to be of civilian populations with very long planning times. 
 
  








They are closely linked to international criminal organizations as well as marriages 
of convenience with other groups. These tend to appear in the hub and spoke or 
networked/flat structures.111
 A third category is the insurgent or revolutionary groups that do not seek 
millenarian goals but are trying to change a political, economic, or territorial 
aspect of a state.  As such, they do not want to destroy the state. These are 
primarily structured in hierarchical, franchise, and hub-and-spoke models. Unlike 
the first two functional categories, these groups’ AOR is not transnational, but 
rather local, national, and regional. Their sense of timing is usually shorter as well. 
Moreover, their hubs tend to be in areas where culture and theology can support 
their message and goals.
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New Left structures are a fourth functional category that has emerged in 
the past 20 years, seeking to keep the state in check by providing high para- or 
proto-state governance capacities.  Examples include very large gangs (upwards of 
80,000 strong), violent anti-globalization groups, as well as violent single-interest 
groups (such as violent variations of animal rights or environmental groups. They 
are reactionary, operating mostly at the local and national levels. They are quite 
structured appearing with hierarchical, franchise, and hub-and-spoke 
organizational patterns. They too are not flat/networked either.
  
113
Local groups comprise the fifth category and are prolific in post-conflict 
settings with very short-term goals. Typologies include militias, warlords, and 
pirates. These usually provide no governance features to the populace and are 
very loose in structure. A final category is strategic non-violent action as well as 
cyber groups who employing cyber/technology as a primary manner in which to 
organize or as a weapon. Examples can be gleaned from the orange, rose, tulip, 




 The key reason for employing such an analysis of non-state armed groups 
is that it demonstrates how they are structured, provides patterns of evolution 
and de-evolution, portrays linkages to other groups, as well as provides their 
sense of timing and goals. All employ technology to cooperate, communicate, 
finance, project power, and increase reach.  Many also employ it for criminal 
 These have the three loosest organizational structures 
(flat/networked, core, and wheel-and-spoke). 









purposes, espionage, as well as to debilitate adversaries by launching technical 
attacks. The levels of sophistication to do this only need to reside in one arm or 
node of the network, and are rarely correlated with the overall typology of the 
group. For instance, Afghanistan has one of the lowest levels of internet 
penetration, yet non-state armed groups are prolific in the use of technology 
there for strategic communications and other purposes. Because these groups 
can adapt and morph to existing challenges rather easily, they are at a 
considerable advantage as they can quickly adapt to maximize the situation on 
the ground to their benefit, unlike the slow process of large militaries and/or 
multinational forces. 115





Social Cultural Intelligence (SOCINT) is the process of directing and/or 
directing data in any social science. This includes geography, anthropology, 
psychology, economics, archaeology, religion, demography, criminology, and 
political science. Analyzing, producing, and disseminating this data yields greater 
situational awareness in any operational environment. Although, SOCINT is not a 
recognized intelligence discipline, it is used in intelligence analyses that focus on a 
local population’s composition, attitudes, and other human-related aspects. It is 
not a new method. It is in line with current effects-based operations approach 




Understanding of the structure and dynamic of the human operational 
environment is one of the key elements of the success in most recent military 
operations.
 
118 Enemies are not only hierarchical as existed in the Cold War but 
may take many organizational patters, evolve and devolve as well as shift 
allegiances often.119
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 Peace support, counterinsurgency, and antiterrorism 
operations heavily depend on the support of the local population, hence the first 




demand is “to win hearts and minds”. This is impossible without deep knowledge 
of local society – its structure, key leaders, group relations, and power 
distribution. Any society exists in the form of social network where individual 
members are connected to each other by specific relations or links.120
One of the effective tools for getting such knowledge seems to be Social 
Network Analysis (SNA), which allows getting complex insight into any social 
network, to understand relationships that form social network, and also to 
understand the specific position of the individual elements of interest of such 
network. SNA is used in SOCINT to understand groups’ social, ethnic, religious, 
tribal, sectarian, and religious composition.
  
121 Examples of groups that can be 
analyzed using this approach include political organizations, leaders, public media, 
web page linkages, social-networking sites, criminal organizations, and other non-
state armed groups.122
SNA is an approach to analyzing organizations that focuses on the 
relationships between people and/or groups as the most important aspect. It 
provides an avenue for analyzing and comparing formal and informal information 
flows in an organization, as well as comparing information flows with officially 
defined work processes. This applies equally to both active and passive 
information.  As such, this type of analysis helps determine position, power and 
influence of each individual node in the network.
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The first goal of SNA is to visualize communication and other 
relationships between people and/or groups by means of diagrams. The second 
goal is to study the factors that influence relationships and to study the 
correlations between relationships. The third goal is to draw out implications of 
the relational data, including bottlenecks where multiple information flows funnel 
through one person or section (slowing down work processes), and situations 
where information flows does not match formal group structures. The fourth and 
most important goal of SNA is to make recommendations to improve 
communication and workflow in an organization.
  
124
SNA as a method of studying social structures (networks) comes from 
psychology method of sociometry. Most network analysts cite Joseph Moreno’s 
 
                                                          
120 L dek, Octo er 2012a, 2012 . 
121 Ibid. 
122 Ibid.;  Lochard, October 2012.  
123 L dek, Octo er 2012a, 2012 . 
124 Erlich, Kate and Inga Carboni, Inside Social Network Analysis, Accessed 7 March 2012; 
http://domino.research.ibm.com/cambridge/research.nsf/0/3f23b2d424be0da6852570a500709975/$
FILE/TR_2005-10.pdf; L dek, Octo er 2012a, 2012 . 




introduction of the tools and methods of sociometry, in 1934 as the year in which 
the formal analysis of social networks began. SNA became much more popular 
with researchers in the early 1970s when advances in computer technology made 
it possible to study large groups. Within the last ten years, SNA has risen to 
prominence in a number of fields, including organizational behaviour, 
anthropology, sociology, and medicine.125
SNA has also been used in the business world to analyze communication 
flows and increase their efficacy. In such instances is equally used to assess the 
consumer, their network or an organization. Law enforcement is another area 
where SNA has been prevalent to collect, trace, and identify communications of 
criminals or other illicit non-state groups. SNA is also employed by social media 
networking sites (e.g., Facebook or LinkedIn) to identify, recommend, or rank 
potential friends/contacts, based on the analysis of the pattern of existing 
contacts of a client. Civil society organizations also employ SNA to uncover 
conflicts of interest in hidden connections between government bodies, lobbies, 
and businesses. A final example of the use of SNA can be gleaned in the mobile 
telephone and cable operators employing SNA-like methods to optimize the 
structure and capacity of their network.
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The main advantage of SNA in comparison with other traditional social 
science methods is that a targeted social structure can not only be described but 
can also effectively reveal the hidden connections that drive the network. 
Obviously such a capability is very desirable for any type of assessment related to 
the level of connectivity between or among individuals or groups. In current 
stability or counterinsurgency operations, the use of SNA more than doubles the 
ability to identify links, relationships, and position of the key individuals as well as 
uncover hidden or not-obviously visible power or information nodes.
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Structural characteristics can be attributed to networks as a whole. 
These include the size (the number of persons who participate in it), the density 
(proportion of existing social relationships compared to all possible relationships 
in a network) and the cohesion of a network. This last characteristic refers to the 
number of intensive and affective social relationships within networks. It is 
assumed that social networks with many mutually affective relationships are 
more permanent and durable than if they were only to consist of instrumental 
relationships. Thus, for example, within many ethnically-based criminal groups 
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that there are affective and other forms of emotional relationships with family 
members. These networks have stronger group cohesion as a result.128
SNA uses several basic measures for description and analysis of the 
position, power, and influence of the each single node of the network. 
 
129  It can 
be employed in any military or intelligence setting to better understand the 
network.  This includes the decision-making process, position and power of the 
nodes, and information flows.  SNA may also be employed to determine how to 
eliminate, fight, and/or disrupt the activity of a targeted network, by determining 
which information node is the most influential (see node 10 in Figure 4.3). It can 
also identify how/where to best spread information; determine the most effective 
area to cut the information in the network; and illuminate where a network can 
be split (see green line in Figure 4.3).  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Example of SOCINT/SNA 
 
The quality and strength of the lines between nodes in a SNA help 
examine are which relations are most important locally as well as the strength 
and quality of relationships between individual elements of the network. For 
example, families are important everywhere however variations in culture, 
ethnicity, religion, politics, and economic factors can yield different dynamics.130
                                                          
128 Gerben Bruinsma and Wim Bernasco, Criminal groups and transnational illegal markets. A more 
detailed examination on the basis of Social Network Theory, in Crime, Law & Social Change 41: 79-94, 
2004. Nethelands: Kluwer Academia Publisher; Ludek, October 2012. 
  
129 The following explanations of the basic SNA measures, including graphs are based, adapted and 
quoted from Cheliotis, Giorgos. Social Network Analysis (SNA) including a tutorial on concepts and 
methods, National University of Singapore. [Accessed 5 October 2010]; 
http://www.slideshare.net/gcheliotis/social-network-analysis-3273045 ; L dek, Octo er 2012a, 2012 . 
130 L dek, Octo er 2012a, 2012 . 




Description and analysis of different social networks that are part of the 
human operational environment is one of the key elements of successful 
operational and intelligence planning process in most current conflicts.131  
 
Understanding the structure, control, and flow of information and identifying 
and analyzing the position, power, and importance of any single element of 
network is the basic knowledge for many passive as well as active kinds of 
operations.132  
 
In a passive way such knowledge is important to evaluating of the impact 
of one’s own military operations. In offensive kind of operations, knowledge of 
the network is essential in determining possible avenues of exploitation for 
information collection, psychological operations (PSYOPS), Force Protection, 
elimination of the network activity, and other uses.133
Current sophisticated SNA software tools are a very good and effective 
analytical method for obtaining such knowledge. Moreover, many are free or of 
little cost. Three of the most common commercial SNA tools are ORA, PAJECK and 
IBMi2ANB.  They can be used to manage large networks and data while provide 
visualization tools to presentations easier, more effective, more flexible, and 
easier to transfer.  Compared to other network tools, it is quicker; however it is 
time consuming to implement correct and complete data points.  Mind-mapping 
often helps as a first-step. These software tools measure five things: degree-




 Degree centrality measures a how many people one node is able to reach 
or influence directly. The in/out numbers associated with it demonstrate the links 
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into or out of the network.  It measures the degree of connectedness, influence, 
or popularity to assess which nodes are central to the spread of information / 
influence to others. It demonstrates the immediate ‘neighbourhood’ of reach. 
Here, numbers 3 and 5 have the highest degree or number of other nodes that it 
can reach.  Hence, it shows the most active members of the node.135
Betweeness centrality measures how likely a node is the direct route between two 
people. It identifies the ‘gatekeepers’ in the network as well as the paths running 
thought them. It shows which nodes are likely to be in communications paths 
between other nodes. As a result, it helps determine where the network will fall 























Figure 4.5: Betweeness Centrality 
 
Link-betweeness is related to this.  It measures links between nodes and 
helps identify critical nodes for communication inside the network.  This is 
identified in the circle below from IBMi2 Analysts’ Notebook program.137
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Figure 4.6: Link Betweeness 
 
Closeness centrality measures speed of communication. It determines 
how fast any one node can reach everyone in the network. Hence it measures the 
shortest path. It is very useful where the dissemination of information is a key 
factor. Here, the lower the number of a node, the higher the speed. Nodes 3 
(1.33) and 5 (1.33) have the lowest values and thus the highest speeds.138
 












Figure 4.8: Eigenvector Centrality 
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 Eigenvector centrality measures how well a node is connected to other 
well-connected nodes. The higher the eigenvector, the greater will be the 
connectivity to other nodes with high eigenvectors. This is similar to how Google 
determines page rankings or LinkedIn determines levels of influence by measuring 
how many other highly connected people to whom one is connected.139
 As discussed in this section, the use of SNA can be employed in multiple 
ways during an operation as well as prior to engaging. However, more training 
and teaching of SNA methodology is needed to military, intelligence analysts, as 
well as others. Likewise, SOCINT needs to be an established organizational 
structure for both intelligence and non-intelligence uses. Inserting it in the 
existing AJP 2 NATO publication
   
140 and applied only when necessary (e.g., Peace 
Support Operations, Crisis Response Operations and COIN). Likewise, SOCINT 
should be included in the Joint Intelligence Centre (JIC) structure.  The main use is 
to support directional control of collection efforts in SOCINT and HAOE, provide 
analysis of information, and produce relevant intelligence.141 
 
Implications Regarding the Use of Tools for the Assessment of Actors in the 
Local Situation 
• The primary reason for the analysis of non-state armed groups within the 
local situation is that it demonstrates how they are structured, provides 
patterns of evolution and de-evolution, portrays linkages to other groups 
and provides their sense of timing and goals. 
• An understanding of the structure and dynamic of the human 
operational environment is one of the key elements of success in the 
most recent military operations. 
• Winning “hearts and minds” requires a deep knowledge of local society – 
its structure, key leaders, group relations and power distribution. Any 
society exists in the form of a social network where individual members 
are connected to each other by specific reasons or links. 
• Social Network Analysis (SNA) focuses on the relationships between 
people/groups as the most important aspect.  It serves to visualize 
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communications between people or groups through the use of diagrams, 
studies the factors that influence relationships and their correlations, 
identifies the implications of the relationship data and makes 
recommendations for the improvement of communication and workflow 
within the organization. 
• The main advantage of SNA is that a targeted social structure can be 
described and the hidden connections that drive the network can be 
revealed. 
• More training in SNA methodology is needed for the military, intelligence 
analysts and others. Also, Social Cultural Intelligence (SOCINT) should be 
an established organizational structure for both intelligence and non-
intelligence uses. SOCINT should be inserted in the existing AJP 2 NATO 
publication and applied only when necessary. 
 
4.  Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
The twenty-first century security environment faced by NATO includes 
complex and constantly evolving asymmetric, unconventional, and irregular 
threats posed by transnational actors and states wielding new technologies, 
significant financial resources, powerful information, and strategic 
communications tools. Often, they work with and through global narco-criminal 
networks to threaten peace, stability, and regional security. Moreover, there 
remains a continued grave threat posed by proliferation of nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons and material.  
 
Just as NATO’s security challenges have evolved from a bipolar cold war 
setting, so too has NATO’s awareness of the inextricable relationship of 
alliance political military objectives with Human Aspects of the Operational 
Environment (HAOE). Whether it is expressed in the lexicon of population-
centric counterinsurgency, human terrain and geography, social network 
analysis, or “hearts and minds of the people”, all point to the centrality of a 
growing understanding of the HAOE and an appreciation of how NATO must 
embrace, explore, and move forward to institutionalize it.  




While discussion of HAOE has not coalesced to the point of imminent 
NATO doctrinal development, this critical topic routinely informs alliance political 
and military leaders and command staff at all levels from whole of nation 
planning efforts; to comprehensive operational planning; to planning, 
coordinating, and executing tactical operations. Cliché perhaps, but it really is all 
about people and relationships; who they are; and how we understand and 
interact with them in increasingly complex and dynamic environments. This panel 
briefly considers “Dynamics of the Local Situation” as a vibrant example of the 
relevance of HAOE and considers the need for NATO to institutionalize HAOE 
using a DOTMLPFI approach.      
Understanding the Human Aspects of the Operational environment, and 
specifically dynamics of the local situation, is not merely a nice supplement to 
other analyses. It is a mission-essential component of planning and successful 
execution of future NATO operations. Only a COPA/WoG/WoN approach will truly 
enable the necessary cultural/organizational changes needed for future NATO 
operations in the complex security environment of the 21st century.  Below are 
several recommendations on how to implement this. 
 
 Correct diagnosis of the local dynamics problem is essential  
NATO will most likely face multiple challenges in future contingencies, so 
it is important to get a detailed understanding of the dynamics of the target 
political, security, economic and socio-cultural system. NA5CRO planning must 
consider the be country-centric model addressing all this systems from the central 
to local perspective. In developing this understanding, NATO should keep in mind 
at least two views of the problematic situation: an external view and an internal 
view142
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. The inside view is from the perspective of both local officials and the 
population. This view reflects long-standing tensions and struggles between key 
local factions. The external view will probably reflect a series of functional 
problems along the lines of the various stakeholders and agencies engaged in the 
effort; some of them tend to define problems in terms of their own expertise 
or/and interest.  




It is assessed that reconciling these two views is essential for successful 
of NATO Stability and Reconstruction operations. Given the goal of achieving a 
locally led, sustainable peace, successful Stability and Reconstruction operations 
will need to do more than just functional problem-solving. They need to 
transform any local conflict into a situation in which key local leaders see it as in 
their own self-interest to develop a process of collaborative decision-making—
away from a more typical zero-sum game view. With such requirements in mind, 
a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of the local political and security 
systems is crucial. Such an understanding also can reduce the chances that S&R 
resources may have the unintended consequences of exacerbating local rivalries. 
 
 Employ A Comprehensive Operations Planning Approach 
Comprehensive Operations Planning/Whole of Government/Whole of Nation 
(COP/WoG/WoN) approach to planning is vital from the first discussions of 
potential operations at the most senior level. Leaders must direct and supervise 
detailed and continuous collaborative planning and information-sharing 
throughout the entire spectrum of NATO operations, with all stakeholders 
present, engaged, and transparently communicating. Traditional approaches to 
inter-service, interagency, or multi-national planning built on the model of 
coordination and de-confliction will not suffice if complex factors are to be 
effectively addressed throughout the planning and conduct of NATO operations.  
Military planners and non-military planners and experts must come 
together early enough, with a clear charter to work collectively, and remain 
engaged throughout operations. Economic and political concerns, factors, and 
outcomes must be addressed in an approach that will not be efficient or 
comfortable for traditional military planners. Yet the failure to consider and 
address the whole realm of economic factors in any given NATO operations 
augurs badly for eventual success particularly in the realm of stability operations. 
 
 Allocate Appropriate Authorities and Resources to Comprehensive Planning 
COPG/WoG/WoN as detailed Recommendation 5.1 is not within most 
military planner’s comfort zone and it requires generational application of 
focused leadership, patience, and new organizational culture. To be truly effective 
this requires resources of time, money, human capital, the right facilities, and 
support. Despite several years of effort, NATO doctrinal, organizational, as well as 
institutional acceptance and support of COPG/WoG/WoN, planning remains 




woefully under-resourced. It is perhaps a generation away from being a routine 
and reflexive response to planning. So, too, it is with authorities needed for truly 
effective COPD/WoG/WoN planning and execution of future NATO operations.  
Within each NATO nation and amongst partners our various national 
government branches and departments generally operate on a last-century model 
with authorities closely guarded and dispensed cautiously in a slow and deliberate 
hierarchical manner. Fights over power, information, and authority are the norm, 
not the exception. NATO doctrine for planning and execution using 
COPD/WoG/WoN approach will only grow slowly over time if senior leaders 
aggressively lead change and organizational reforms (DOTMLPFI) to 
institutionalize those authorities, resources, and practices needed. From a military 
standpoint, economic considerations for planning are but one of many that 
demand new military planning approaches. 
 
 Obtain Proper Resources for Expertise and Continuity 
Planning efforts must be resourced with the right level of economic and 
operational expertise. Few many military planners have the requisite training, 
education and functional expertise for planning and integrating the economic 
aspects of major NATO operations. These capabilities and economic expertise 
exist primarily outside military organizations. Therefore, the need to pursue 
interoperability, professional education and training, and routine interagency 
collaborative planning to change the outcome of a known/predictable deficit of 
planning expertise is necessary.  
This will require the pursuit of long-term organizational change and 
institutional reform, even while responding to current operational needs with ad-
hoc, limited duration partnerships. Professional schooling, interagency 
assignments, directed training and exercises focused on non-military planning 
challenges, in addition to other tools must be considered in order to correct the 
imbalance. While recent NATO operations in Afghanistan are hardly the only 
useful model, our collective experience in the relevance of economic and other 
non-military planning factors in successful stability operations points to the need 








 Conduct Continuous Assessment and Planning 
NATO planners need to consider impacts on the local (as well as the 
national and regional) economy before, during, and post operations.  This 
requires astute military and non-military assessments of the local dynamic to 
properly observe, record, and respond to change.  
 
 Conduct Pre-deployment Assessments of the Local Situation  
Understanding dynamics of the local situation begins with pre-
deployment training for all ranks to understand the regional and national history, 
geography, terrain, culture, tribes, language, and operational environment of 
Afghanistan. Layer this with historical understandings, economic assessments, 
analysis of the dynamics of narrative and identity. Employ assistance from 
interpreters to verify preliminary assessments followed by in-country verification. 
Include positive and negative non-state actors’ level of legitimacy among various 
sectors of society as well as an assessment to which elements of the local 
population have access to information, technology, and media. Pre-deployment 
training such as this is mission critical, rather than mission enhancing. 
 
 Use ASCOPE to Better Understand the Local Situation  
Many of the tools used by ISAF to improve training and COIN focus apply 
equally well to understanding the dynamics of the local situation. Area, 
Structures, Capabilities, Organizations, People, and Events (ASCOPE) is a tool used 
to quantify and understand the populace and their environment. It provides a 
more quantifiable measure of the populace’s environment and shows how each 
part of the ASCOPE makes up and influences the areas (populace) strengths and 
vulnerabilities.  This requires training at home station and upon arrival in-country 
but produces a unifying approach to understanding the dynamics of the local 
situation. In the case of Afghanistan, in-country training for ISAF (Phase III 
training) personnel upon arrival normally consists of “Induction” training of three 
to five days to review key skills and tasks. Additional training is sometimes 
provided for key leaders at the COIN Training Center in Kabul, where HAOE, COIN, 
and social/cultural topics are taught. As the ANSF assume lead for security, COIN 
training focus will shift from ISAF to the ANSF. 
 
 




 Include SOCINT in NATO AJP2, the Joint Intelligence Centre Structure, and 
Training 
Socio-cultural Intelligence (SOCINT) should be officially recognized as a 
special functional category of intelligence (similarly to Target Intelligence) by 
inserting it in the existing AJP 2 NATO publication143
 Be Aware of the Impact on Pre-Deployment Planning on Local Dynamics 
 and applied only when 
necessary (e.g., Peace Support Operations, Crisis Response Operations and COIN).  
Likewise, SOCINT should be included in the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) 
structure.  The main use is to support directional control of collection efforts in 
SOCINT and HAOE, provide analysis of information, and produce relevant 
intelligence.  SOCINT can also be incorporated without the word “intelligence” in 
the title, akin to the US Human Terrain efforts.  As such it could be called 
“Knowledge Management Directorate” working closely with the CJ2.  Teaching 
and training Social Network Analysis methodology and tools to intelligence 
analysts and others will assist in better understanding complex networks, 
communication and power vectors, as well as linkages between and among 
various groups locally, regionally, and trans-nationally. 
 
Likewise, the potential impact of NATO pre-deployment assessments on 
local power brokers and economic drivers should be factored in terms of how it 
may positively or negatively impact dynamics.  The example of NATO operations 
in Afghanistan and the impact of a torrent of western investment fundamentally 
altered the Afghan economy, providing new goods, services, and growth, while 
fuelling massive corruption and creating new centres of power and money.  
 
 Increase Understanding of Non-State Armed Groups in the AOR during Pre-
Deployment Phase 
Knowledge of non-state armed groups in the AOR is equally relevant and 
woefully incomplete. Understanding their locale, leadership structure, 
organizational patterns, goals, power base, finances, and foreign 
fighters/facilitators with whom they cooperate is essential. Working to achieve 
that level of understanding begins with intelligence analysis in coordination with 
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assessments from subject matter experts. Pre-deployment training, professional 
military education, leader training, as well as in-country training complete the 
picture.  
 
 Be Cognizant of Post-Deployment Variables on Local Dynamics 
As NATO operations grow in size and longevity, an assessment of how it 
may impact local economic opportunities for fuel, transportation, support, and 
other goods and services vital to sustainment is needed.   In addition, there is a 
need to weigh local economic risks and opportunities weighed with NATO mission 
support and future stability. The trade-off between long-term investment 
opportunities and security must be considered. 
 
Recommendations 
 Correct diagnosis of the local dynamics problem is essential; 
 Employ a Comprehensive Operations Planning Approach; 
 Allocate Appropriate Authorities and Resources to Comprehensive 
Planning; 
 Obtain Proper Resources for Expertise and Continuity; 
 Conduct Continuous Assessment and Planning; 
 Conduct Pre-deployment Assessments of the Local Situation; 
 Use ASCOPE to Better Understand the Local Situation; 
 Include SOCINT in NATO AJP-2, the Joint Intelligence Centre Structure 
and Training; 
 Be Aware of the Impact on Pre-Deployment Planning on Local 
Dynamics; 
 Increase Understanding of Non-State Armed Groups in the AOR during 
Pre-Deployment Phase; 
 Be Cognizant of Post-Deployment Variables on Local Dynamics. 
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NATO is expanding its operational focus well beyond its traditional 
sphere of influence, as it is the case with on-going or recently concluded 
operations in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). This creates a new set of 
challenges; the most important of these being the legitimacy of NATO presence in 
the area. As such, a proper evaluation about NATO operations perception has to 
be based on data acquired from all societal layers and a careful consideration of 
the relations among them.  
To this end, it is necessary to achieve a balance within communications 
transmitted by the appropriate bodies to a target audience. Such messages 
should serve as expressions of official policy in a manner that is not insensitive to 
local feelings or beliefs so that the legitimacy of the mission does not come under 
question.  Based on this, the purpose of this chapter is to recommend ways NATO 
can influence the perception and acceptance of its mission based on the realities 
of 21st century kinetic and non-kinetic military operations. 




2. A Question of Legitimacy  
In political science, one of the principles for any claim to power is 
legitimacy. If the mission appears to be lacking have legitimacy (legitimacy being 
defined as the acceptance of authority and its actions or policies) NATO’s 
presence in the operational theatre may be challenged by the local population. 
Some of these legitimacy problems can be political, economic or cultural in 
nature. 
Legitimacy is important because both it emphasizes the role of norms 
within international society and it shapes and constraints actual state conducts. 
Also “the degree of legitimacy present in any particular international order is 
directly related to the stability of that order.”144
With regard to military intervention, the United Nations Security Council 
is the body best suited to authorize military actions. UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan has stated that the UN stamp of approval confers “unique legitimacy.”
  
145 
This is critical in regard to NATO since the UN Charter serves as a fundamental 
principle of the alliance because it provides the legal basis for the creation of 
NATO and establishes the overall responsibility of the UN Security Council for 
international peace and security. It is the framework from which the Alliance 
operates.146
As such, NATO was founded on the basis that the North Atlantic Treaty 
upholds the rights and obligations of Allied nations as well as their international 
obligations in accordance with Articles 7 and 12 of the UN Charter.
  
147
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  Therefore, 
NATO works strictly under the confines of international law and mandate. 
Consequently, UN Security Council resolutions have provided the mandate for 
NATO’s major peace support operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. 
Recently concluded operations in Libya were executed in accordance with IAW 
UN Security Resolutions 1970 and 1973. However, some societies may have other 
sources of legitimacy, which will have to be respected before conducting military 
operations. Failing to do so can result in a lack of support for a future NATO 
mission.  
147 Ibid, 256; http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm  




For example, the so-called “War on Terror”148 has been viewed and 
exploited by some radical elements as a conflict against Islam as a whole, rather 
than Islamic fundamentalism, thus undermining the conflict. This is so because 
some Islamic societies believe that “God is concerned with politics, and this belief 
is confirmed by Shari’a, the Holy Law, which deals extensively with the acquisition 
and exercise of power, the nature of legitimacy and authority, the duties of the 
ruler and subject, among other things.”149  
In the case of Afghan society, there is a strong conservative tradition of 
devotion to Islamic, ethnic and tribal canons and this tradition cannot be changed 
overnight. Therefore, if one were perceived as antagonist of Islam, he would 
encounter resistance. Consequently, it becomes important to recognize and 
respect these beliefs and traditions, as well as to work within them, in order to 
achieve legitimacy within the theatre of operations. 
A Question of Legitimacy 
• Legitimacy emphasizes the role of norms within international society 
because it shapes and constrains actual state conduct. 
• With regard to military intervention, the UN Security Council is the 
body best suited to authorize military actions. 
• It becomes important for NATO to recognize and respect locally 
established rules of legitimacy (e.g. beliefs, canons and traditions) and 
work within them in order to achieve legitimacy within the theatre of 
operations from the early stage of planning process. 
 
3. Colonial Legacy 
 
As discussed earlier, at one point or another throughout the history of 
the western world, several nations became colonial powers. This European 
colonial period began with the discovery of the Americas in the late 15th century 
and reached its apex in the 19th century during the period known as the “scramble 
for Africa.” During this period, the Western nations established colonies or 
“spheres of influence” in every corner of the world. 
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Since the creation of the United Nations in 1945, 80 colonies have 
achieved their independence.150
There are examples of amicable relations between former colonial 
powers and their colonies. For instance, in Latin America there is still a rich 
Spanish and Portuguese heritage throughout Central and South America despite 
the bloody wars of independence in the past. This heritage has defined the region 
in terms of its language, religion and other characteristics.  Moreover, there have 
been instances in which Latin American nations have asked that their former 
colonial power (Spain) arbitrate in territorial disputes, as it was in the case in 
1891. In this case, Colombia and Venezuela asked the Spanish Crown to mediate 
in a maritime delineation disagreement in the Gulf of Venezuela.
   However, the colonial legacy has affected the 
political, economic, cultural, racial, ethnic and religious composition of numerous 
nations throughout the world and arguably has been the root cause of many 
conflicts (territorial, ethnic, religious) in these former colonies. 
This colonial legacy must be taken into account in the context of modern 
military operations, both kinetic and non-kinetic, as this can have a significant 
impact, which can be either positive or negative, on the native population. This is 
particularly important when NATO undertakes military operations as NATO is 
mainly composed of European nations, some of which are former colonial 
powers.  
If a previous colonial power has had a turbulent relationship with its 
former colonies prior to or after independence then this relationship should be 
carefully evaluated in regard to its potential implications upon a proposed 
operation.  The former colony’s history, as well as the relationship (if any) 
between this particular nation and its former colonial ruler, must be carefully 
evaluated. Has the relationship been turbulent or amicable, for example? This is 
particularly true in regard to relations between former colonial powers in NATO 
and those nations in Africa and the Middle East that were their colonial 
possessions.  
151
The British Army Training Unit Kenya (BATUK) highlights a contemporary 
example of excellent military cooperation between a former colonial power and 
colony. BATUK is a permanent non-armoured training support unit based north of 
Nairobi. By accord with the Kenyan Government, “six infantry battalions per year 
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carry out six-week exercises in Kenya as well as three Royal Engineer Squadron 
exercises which carry out civil engineering projects and two medical company 
group deployments which provide primary health care assistance to the civilian 
community.”152
The East European, post communist NATO countries, can offer another 
perspective to crisis resolution and/or situation assessment, as a result of their 
own experiences and expertise. Due to a variety of factors (e.g. country / army 
size, economics, politics, etc) it would be very difficult for any of these countries 
to undertake the role of leading a stability or peacekeeping mission. However, 
these nations can assist in building a relationship within an operational 
environment. Appointing a leader (force commander, similar to how the UN does 
it) from these nations can change the perception and acceptance of a NATO 
mission by the local population (e.g. to avoid perception of the mission as 
 The key to the success of this enterprise is that many local people 
are employed by the British military, which also uses local providers and 
contracting to stimulate the economy. This transparent engagement coupled with 
an historic tradition (Kenya is part of the Commonwealth of Nations) translates 
into mission acceptance by the local populace with little opposition.  
Western nations have a tendency to have short memories; this is not the 
case with many other nations, especially those with a colonial past. Therefore, if a 
particular NATO nation has had a turbulent relationship with any of its former 
colonies prior to or after independence, this should be seriously taken into 
account as this could adversely affect any proposed operation before it starts. 
This is particularly true in the Middle East. Consequently, consciousness of the 
colonial legacy (if applicable) of x or y nation must be carefully considered and 
cannot be ignored as this experience has become an intrinsic part of the identity 
of these states.  
Taking into consideration some countries’ negative experience with 
colonization and their positive experience with former communist regime 
countries in the 20th century (some of which are now members of NATO) offers 
another perspective when considering possible operations in these countries. 
These post-communist countries gained experience in dealing with former 
colonial nations during the so called “communist support program to third (less 
developed) world countries” as part of their foreign policy. Most of these post-
communist countries still maintain a good relationship with these emerging 
nations - something NATO may have overlooked. 
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“western occupation/neo-colonialism”).  Doing so, however, will require 
acceptance by the nation tasked with providing the majority of troops to the 
operation. 
Self-recognition of the colonial legacy of some NATO members and the 
impact of their actions upon other nations is the first step to fully assess the 
perception and acceptance to any future NATO military operation.  
Colonial Legacy 
• The colonial legacy has affected the political, economic, cultural, 
racial, ethnic and religious composition of numerous nations. 
• The colonial legacy must be taken into account in the context of 
modern military operations. 
• If a particular NATO nation has had a turbulent relationship with any 
of its former colonies prior to or after independence, this should be 
seriously taken into account as this could adversely affect any 
proposed operation before it starts. 
• Post communist NATO countries and their interactions with former 
colonies in the 20th century can offer another perspective to crisis 
resolution and/or situation assessment in former colonial nations as a 
result of the experiences and expertise they have acquired. 
• Self-recognition of the colonial legacy of some NATO members and 
the impact of their actions upon other nations is the first step to fully 
assess the perception and acceptance to any future NATO military 
operation. 
 
4. Kosovo Peace Building Experience 
 
Since June 1999, NATO has been at the forefront of peacekeeping efforts 
to prevent further bloodshed and establish stability in Kosovo. To this end, the 
United Nations passed Security Resolution 1244 with the intent of widening the 
international efforts to build peace and stability in this troubled region. 
Resolution 1244 authorized the creation of the United Nations Interim 
Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to begin the long process of building 
peace, democracy, stability and self-government in the shattered province. 




When the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) mission first arrived in Kosovo in June of 1999, it found a society in chaos 
without any law and order. Into this disordered environment, some 900,000 
Kosovo Albanians who had fled Serbian security forces returned with 
unprecedented speed. The UNMIK mission was dependent on the NATO Kosovo 
Force (KFOR), a joint NATO command that included troops from 37 countries, who 
were tasked with maintaining a secure and stable environment. The UNMIK 
mission would not have had a chance to do so without the presence of the 
KFOR.153
(1) Administer Kosovo.  
 
The UNMIK tasks were divided in three parts: 
(2) Create the institutions and other conditions necessary for Kosovo to 
exercise substantial self-government.  
(3) Facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's final status. 
However, the key to achieving these tasks was not just the commitment 
of generous resources (over three billion Euros in civilian aid) but applying 
principles learned in previous peace-building experiences, especially in Bosnia. 
Nevertheless, in the case of Kosovo the UN and NATO had a lot more to learn. 154
(1) Pillar one, which created a multi-national UN police force and a 
multi-ethnic Kosovo Police Service that would eventually replace the 
international police. It also created a judicial system from the ground 
up.  
 
Therefore, UNMIK organized itself into four pillars: 
(2) Pillar two, which managed all of Kosovo's public services. Since 
transferring authority in many areas, the UN is currently scaling 
down and playing more of an advisory role.  
(3) Pillar Three, managed by the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) dealt with democratization and 
elections.  
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(4) The European Union (EU), who as Pillar Four, took responsibility for 
rebuilding physical infrastructure and is still helping to create the 
foundation for an EU-compatible economy.155
To fill the administrative vacuum after the war, UNMIK first created joint 
administrative structures. Later, in 2001, UNMIK and Kosovo representatives 
collaborated in drafting a Constitutional Framework as the basis for Provisional 
Institutions of Self-Government. Kosovo-wide elections organized by the OSCE 
created a multi-ethnic Assembly and Government. The Government has eleven 
ministries including finance, education, health, transport and social-welfare. Two 




4.1. Begin with a clear mandate  
 
As a result of NATO’s experiences in this region, it would be wise to focus 
on seven principles, which may be considered to be essential to the success of 
peace-building efforts anywhere. These principles are as follows: 
 
A peace operation has to start with a clear set of objectives. This may 
seem obvious. But even in recent missions, this elementary principle has been 
ignored. Within the Dayton Peace Agreement, the primary objective was to end 
the fighting in Bosnia or, at a minimum, to have a lasting cease-fire agreement.  
A mission's objectives also have to be realistic, both in terms of what the 
local population wants and what can actually be achieved. In Kosovo the aim was 
not nation building but institution building: the UN was fostering institutions and 
attitudes that the people of the region would be able to build themselves. This 
doesn't mean cloning EU societies but, rather, creating the basis for a stable and 
functional society.  
In Bosnia, although the High Representative was clearly the most senior 
international official, the various international organizations have been quasi-
autonomous. In the beginning there was no coordinated decision-making process. 
This structure made it difficult for the international community to coordinate its 
own efforts, much less anyone else's. In Kosovo, UNMIK acted on the lessons 
learned in Bosnia and built a new kind of structure. It created the four pillars 
previously mentioned, each with a well-defined mandate and all of them 
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subordinate to the overall authority of the Special Representative of the Secretary 
General.157
4.2. Match the mandate with the means to achieve it 
 
 
If the mission is given a far-reaching mandate, it must also be given the 
capacity to follow through. This applies both to legal powers and authority and to 
human and physical resources. First and foremost, it is essential to establish 
security and the rule of law - the very basis for all other progress. Courts need the 
authority and resources to dispense justice. Police need the authority and 
resources to enforce it.  
An example of this is the Kosovo Central Fiscal Authority (CFA), UNMIK's 
tax service, and its Customs Service. The CFA and Customs together collected 80% 
of the money that went into Kosovo's budget. The CFA was merged with Kosovo's 
Ministry of Finance.  
Additionally, Resolution 1244 made UNMIK the ultimate authority in 
Kosovo. That gave the UN and NATO the power to carry out police investigations, 
the powers of arrest and the authority to try suspects and imprison criminals. 
These were not advisory powers, as the international police in Bosnia had, but 
executive powers. Powers such as these are critical to meeting the challenge of a 
NATO security mission - achieving fundamental standards that apply to all 
functioning societies.158
4.3. Get it right from the beginning 
 
 
The tone of the entire mission is set in its very first days. The beginning is 
no time for trial-and-error. This is necessary first, in order to establish credibility 
and second, because it is much more difficult to correct the course later on. 
Bosnia lacked the civil mandate and the means to begin strongly; Kosovo had the 
mandate but still lacked the means in the beginning.  
The international community shied away from making Bosnia a 
protectorate. There were two reasons for this: the ideological legacy of 
decolonization and a terror of 'mission creep'. Kosovo, by contrast, was front-
loaded - or so it seemed.  
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But even in Kosovo implementation was too slow. The military prepares 
in advance for crises and NATO was ready. But the civil mission in Kosovo only had 
ten days to prepare. The UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations must be 
given sufficient time and resources to respond quickly and effectively to crises as 
they arise. UNMIK was operating with a skeleton staff. 
The summer and autumn of 1999 saw the most vicious reprisals, both 
among Kosovo Albanians and by the Albanian majority against Kosovo Serbs and 
members of other minority communities. Members of rival Albanian groups 
kidnapped, tortured and murdered one another. People in Kosovo say there have 
been more Kosovo Serbs killed after the war than during it. Local politicians and 
former fighters struggled to fill the power vacuum. As a consequence, developing 
legitimate democratic institutions was delayed by the need to dismantle the 
structures that emerged in the first six months of the mission. 
UNMIK did not focus on organized crime at first because it didn't have 
the means to do so. Taking advantage of the situation, criminal gangs spread their 
tentacles throughout the political and legal vacuum. Starting in 2001, all the 
security forces shifted their resources to suppressing organized crime. Both the 
police and Justice improved their strategic cooperation with KFOR. Though more 
remains to be done, UNMIK's efforts against organized crime demonstrate the 
value of coordination and objective-driven policy.159
4.4. Learn as you go 
 
 
International missions need to be 'learning organizations.' Critical to this 
is admitting that mistakes have been made. Learning cannot take place without 
recognizing that things have not been done right in the first place. Criticism will be 
more effective for the mission and less damaging politically if it comes from 
within the mission itself rather than from outsiders.  
To be effective, missions must study the environment - its political 
rivalries and alliances, how people make a living and the stories they tell one 
another. The mission needs to conduct public opinion surveys and consultations 
with the public in order to understand how people view their situation.  
Essentially, the mission has to recognize what priorities are critical. For 
example, because of Kosovo's open status, it was not clear in the beginning 
whether UNMIK would or could engage in privatization. But UNMIK came to 
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recognize that privatization was essential to putting Kosovo's economy on its 
feet.160
The key to success in these endeavours is to listen to the local people and 
to seek their advice. It might seem trite, but it is important to remember that no 
matter how great the effort on the part of mission personnel, the local population 
knows its own society better than outsiders do. Lessons Learned' has become a 




(1) Democratic institutions. 
 
It is also critical to maintain an ongoing learning environment because a 
mission also requires standards by which it can measure its achievements. For 
example, UNMIK created a list of eight benchmarks as a basis for measuring 
Kosovo's progress. These benchmarks were designed to cover the basic 
requirements for any functional democratic society and included:  
(2) The rule of law. 
(3) A viable market-based economy. 
(4) Property rights. 
(5) Multi-ethnicity and returns. 
(6) Freedom of movement.  
The point of listing and publicizing them was to ensure that all of the 
relevant actors - the international community, NATO, UNMIK, Kosovo's 
institutions and civil society – clearly understood the mission’s objectives. From 
the international perspective, this process made it easier to identify both 
achievements and problems. In Kosovo the UN hoped the standards would help 
to concentrate people's minds on Kosovo's key challenges.162
4.5. Finish what you start  
 
  
Once the international community has begun a peace-building mission, it 
has to see it through until the society and its institutions have become 
sustainable.  
Finishing what has been started is critically important for two reasons. 
The first is for the credibility of other peace-building missions. Secondly, leaving 








business unfinished can lead to the creation of even worse conditions than the 
original intervention was meant to address. 
The problem is that peace building, although it must never be open 
ended, is a long-term process while political logic in individual governments is 
nearly always focuses on the short-term. Concluding a mission before its aims 
have been achieved may be the most common mistake of the international 
community has made in the past.163
Afghanistan offers an excellent example of this type of error. After nearly 
a decade of supporting the mujahedeen, Afghanistan was suddenly abandoned by 
the anti-Soviet coalition. Rival warlords and the Taliban competed to fill the 




Therefore, one of the reasons that measuring progress is so important is 
that the actors need to identify the time when they should make the transition 
from peacekeeping to development. The focal point of the development stage 
should be consolidating the rule of law and creating the institutions and 
regulations of a market economy. What is important about this is that a great deal 
of expertise exists in these subjects, but they are never applied to post-conflict 
areas because they are kept separate from each other (i.e. peacekeepers are kept 
in a box marked “peacekeeping” and developers are locked in a box marked 
“development” with little or no cooperation and coordination between them).
 The same can be said about Iraq.  
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The point of creating a yardstick like UNMIK's standards is to gauge when 
to make the transition from one stage to another and to determine when the 
mission itself is no longer needed.
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4.6. It is about the right sequence (the essential sequence) 
 
 
The focus should be on security and the establishment of rule of law as 
these is the element that forms the basis for creating a stable state. A peace-
building mission must establish order out of chaos. In this phase, the mission is in 
control of everything. Order means no discrimination, no violence, no bullying. 
This is the essential framework for creating stability.  









The mission's first priority must be security and the rule of law. In Bosnia 
the UN made a mistake by holding elections before establishing the rule of law.   
On the other hand, in Kosovo, UNMIK established consent through 
information, dialogue and participation. In this stage, regulations, laws and an 
administrative framework were created.  An essential part of this process is the 
creation of effective institutions that deliver the key benefits of peace. This 
process must extend to all elements of the local population. Elections may be vital 
but they must wait until the time is right to hold them. Consent for the 
established order must be institutionalized so that they will be absorbed into a 
society. The processes of peaceful coexistence, democratic decision-making and 
conflict resolution must become habitual.167
Ultimately, the peace-building or stability operation’s endgame is to 
transfer its responsibilities to a qualified partner. The mission has not succeeded 
until it has become unnecessary. Returning to the example of Kosovo, the eight 
benchmarks were the standard by which progress was measured in terms of 
achieving that goal. The transfer of responsibilities can only be achieved if the 
transition is properly carried out. This is the most critical and potentially volatile 
mission stage. A gradual transfer of responsibilities is essential in order to be 
certain that the society's institutions have the capacity to support them. Pacing 
this process correctly can prove to be a serious challenge. The problem is that 
once the transfer of responsibilities begins, unrealistic expectations may occur. 
These, in turn, may lead to impatience, which can then produce friction.
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The UN worked with other partners in Kosovo to transfer responsibilities 
as quickly as they were able to manage them. Thousands of political 
representatives and civil servants were under pressure to learn quickly. On the 
part of the mission, this required continuous consultation, sensitivity and 
consistency throughout the transition process. In this phase, the support of the 
international community is especially imperative. In responding to the tensions of 
the transfer phase, it is critical for the international community to avoid sending 
mixed signals and vital to speak with one voice.
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4.7. Encouraging social change  
Peace building does not mean creating clones of western European 
societies. Clearly, a range of traditions is consistent with sustainable stability. But 
not all are. The UN must accept that the process of change from violence to peace 
is a struggle in which it will have to take sides. The UN may or may not choose to 
work with any one entity from among those who support the process. But UN 
authorities will have to support those who are for the peace process and oppose 
those who are against it.  
The UN also has to try to change general attitudes that may appear to be 
'traditional' if in reality they undermine the mission and are keeping it from 
achieving its objectives. For example: corruption and cronyism can seriously 
hinder a mission in the pursuit of establishing security and stability. “Corruption 
may have been practiced since time immemorial, but it retards the development 
of any society.”170
The empowerment of local women has been shown to be perhaps the 
most reliable single predictor of overall social and political development. In most 
parts of the world women have limited access to education and employment. 
Knowing this, international missions should not hesitate to improve conditions for 
women in these societies wherever they can
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The willingness to challenge some traditionally accepted social norms, 
however, does not mean forcing change on a society. Encouraging change in a 
society must be the result of a dynamic process of mutual learning. “The 
international community brings its experiences to a community that wants to 
leave conflict behind and enjoy the fruits of peace. The peace-building mission 
must also learn from the local community to understand its values and ways of 
doing things. The point here is that building peace doesn't allow avoiding the hard 
challenges just because they're deeply rooted. When the UN finishes a mission, a 
healthy and self-sustaining society should be left behind. Otherwise weeds will 
grow back and entangle the UN for years to come.”
.  
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4.8 The Art of Letting Go 
 
 
The good news is that the UN has demonstrated that peace building is 
not an exercise in futility, as some media, international organizations and both 
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Kosovo and Serbian representatives have argued. It is instead a manageable 
human enterprise subject to the determined application of certain basic 
principles. When looking at a conflict, the international community can 
legitimately decide whether or not to intervene. Clearly, the UN can't intervene 
everywhere.  However, the UN has to be serious about it and follow it through. 
When it comes to peace-building, this means adhering to tested principles.173
First, a mission must go in with a clear mandate. Second, it must have the 
authority and resources to do the job. Third, it must get it right from the 
beginning. Fourth, it must learn from the host society and from its own mistakes. 
Fifth, it must finish what it starts. Sixth, it must first establish security and the rule 
of law as the framework for democratization. Seventh, it must try to change the 
host society's practices which can hinder the successful achievement of the 
mission’s goals - even if they are 'traditional.'  In the end, this is about handing 
over responsibilities, not clinging to them. As such, the key is to build up the 
importance of those to whom we need to hand over. Letting go is not easy but it 
is the measurement of success.
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Kosovo Peace Building Experience 
• When the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo 
(UNMIK) mission arrived in Kosovo in June of 1999, it found a society 
in chaos without any law and order. 
• As a result of NATO’s experiences in this region, it would be wise to 
focus on seven principles, which may be considered to be essential to 
the success of peace-building efforts anywhere. 
• First, a mission must go in with a clear mandate. Second, it must have 
the authority and resources to do the job. Third, it must get it right 
from the beginning. Fourth, it must learn from the host society and 
from its own mistakes. Fifth, it must finish what it starts. And the two 
hard ones: Sixth, it must first establish security and the rule of law as 
the framework for democratization. Seventh, it must try to change 
the host society's practices which can inhibit the successful 
achievement of the mission’s goals - even if they are 'traditional. 
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5. Importance of Maintaining the Moral High Ground 
 
For over a decade, NATO has been involved in complex 
counterinsurgency and asymmetric type operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere. 
Insurgency is more than combat between armed groups, but rather, a political 
struggle with a high level of violence. This is further complicated by language and 
cultural differences. Cultural misunderstandings can have devastating effects to 
the mission. This is not only a battle against a faceless enemy but much of this 
struggle is being carried out in the “marketplace of ideas.” As such, it is imperative 
to maintain the moral high ground at all costs. 
To this end, NATO must advocate adherence to high moral standards. 
This will deny opportunities for the adversary to take advantages of one’s 
mistakes. In the end, the object is to win the support of the local population; this 
is what is at stake.  
Anger is a normal reaction for troops who witness traumatic events, but 
mission leaders must encourage and enforce restraint. Strict adherence to Rules 
of Engagement (ROE’s) and human rights is critical are crucial if a mission is to 
achieve success. For example, according to General David Petraeus, the former 
U.S. Commander in Iraq, the Abu-Ghraib incident “tarnished our image in Iraq and 
worldwide.”175
The U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Manual (Field Manual 3-24)
 
In the aftermath of the Abu-Ghraib incident, detainee operations were 
completely overhauled. Health care was improved as well as transparency. For 
instance, the International Red Cross inspected the detention centres on 
numerous occasions. This is why it is imperative to take immediate corrective 
action when violations are identified. If the mission intends to establish the rule of 
law, a good way to do that is to start out by observing the law itself. 
176
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Afghanistan, warns of the dangers of losing the moral high ground. It specifically 
states: “A key part of any insurgent’s strategy is to attack the will of the domestic 
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undermine and erode political will is to portray their opposition as untrustworthy 
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or illegitimate. These attacks work especially well when insurgents can portray 
their opposition as unethical by the opposition’s own standards.”  
To address this, the Field Manual highlights the importance of treating 
non-combatants and detainees humanely, according to internationally recognized 
values and human rights standards. 
Importance of Maintaining the Moral High Ground 
• Insurgency is more than a combat between armed groups, but rather, 
a political struggle with a high level of violence in culturally 
complicated environment. 
• Advocate adherence to high moral standards. This will deny 
opportunities for the adversary to take advantages of one’s mistakes. 
• The price for losing the moral high ground is very high having 
implications from tactical up to strategic level. 
 
6. NATO instruments analyzing its perception and acceptance by local 
population 
 
Currently within NATO force structures there are existing assets 
(branches) with convenient procedural background on analyzing and evaluating 
perception and acceptance of NATO mission by local population as Intelligence 
(and HUMINT particularly), Psychological operations (PSYOPS), Civil-Military 
Cooperation (CIMIC) and Commander Advisory Group (POLAD, LEGAD, Cultural 
Advisor). All these branches possess series of documents as doctrines, Standing 
Operating Procedures (SOP), etc describing their role and responsibilities, and 
unfortunately having delimitative functions which influence coordination and 
effective cooperation including knowledge sharing among them. Measurement 
and evaluation of local population perception is a subject of Panel 6.   
Recent ground operations established two new disciplines, Key leader 
engagement and Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams, and they can be 
viewed as the future NATO capabilities. 
 




6.1 Key Leader Engagement as a Valuable Messaging Tool 
Properly transmitting NATO’s message not only is critical to achieve 
acceptance of the mission and achieve desired effects. In line with the principles 
described in Chapter 1 points 2.1, 2.2 and 3.2 NATO can improve its messaging via 
effective Key Leader Engagement (KLE). To this end, Key Leader Engagement (KLE) 
“is about building relationships over time with enough strength and depth, so that 
they can then support our interests during times of crisis.”177
  Key leaders (KLs) include government officials but also student groups, 
women’s groups, grass roots leaders, tribal elders and religious leaders, among 
others. Such KLs should be identified collectively by NATO nations or by individual 
nations stationed in separate parts of the country, sharing the information with 
the other NATO nations.  Key leaders are individuals who hold significant 
influence over a group of people. Methods of contact can vary and differ by 
region, but may include approaching the KL via telephone, translators or local 
power brokers. Direction regarding identifying KLs would come from each NATO 
section's supervisor, and political/cultural advisor. Successful KLEs depend on the 
cultural mores of a nation and may include shared meals, official office visits, and 
the development of genuine friendships, both in one-on-one situations or group 
settings. A situation in which KLE can be very successful is in the case of a NATO 
officer befriending a KL and using this influence to communicate NATO messages 
to the population in a time of crisis. The crisis could result from a NATO misstep 
and the KL might be able to defuse tensions by convincing the population that 
 Key Leader 
Engagement includes building and maintaining working relationships with persons 
or entities that have influence in the theatre. These relationships are sustained by 
face to face, deliberate and focused meetings in order to achieve desired effects.   
Before deploying its forces, NATO should initially identify key leaders in 
the operational theatre. In an informational operation environment the IO 
messages are released to the public. In a KLE environment, the strategic KLE 
messages are controlled by the engager and the results from key leaders can be 
predicted and expected. KLE is of crucial significance because it holds the power 
to convince the population of a country of the legitimacy of NATO's presence in 
the theatre and of NATO's genuine support and care for the population. One 
example of this is using KLEs to gain local support for deeply unpopular night 
operations in Afghanistan.  
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such a mistake was not NATO's intention in order to eliminate potentially violent 
protests.    
Of paramount importance in Key Leader Engagement is a NATO officer’s 
intimate knowledge of local customs, languages, religion and other defining 
factors. A female NATO official who very freely and jovially approaches a deeply 
traditional tribal or religious elder in rural Afghanistan is likely to cause him to 
take offense at the manner of her approach. By doing so, she will probably fail to 
complete her assignment and significantly discredit the mission in that area. 
Situations like these can be avoided if NATO officers are fully and extensively 
trained in the religious, cultural and linguistic customs of the area. This cannot be 
accomplished in a one-day seminar or by reading of a book on local customs. The 
local culture must be studied and genuinely interacted with in low-risk situations 
before a NATO official can successfully engage key leaders. It is best if 
knowledgeable local advisors or other NATO officers who have spent considerable 
time in theatre conduct the KLEs. KLE is based on genuine friendships and these 
friendships must be developed and maintained over time.  
KLE is a cyclical process requiring thoughtful intentionality. The following 
steps outline the basic steps of a KLE cycle: 
(1) Identify key leader/entity (including the potential for long term 
influence and evaluation of the KL network). Identifying key 
leaders require social network analyses of a particular person of 
interest. Analysts involved in this process must be properly 
educated and having broad knowledge of the local situation. 
Other branches represented at Headquarters, including INTEL, 
PSYOPS, CIMIC, and Commander Advisor Cells must support the 
whole process and relevant information must be shared. In case 
of an erroneous Key Leader identification, a negative effect on 
the perception of NATO’s mission by local population may 
result.     
(2) Develop a negotiation strategy. This includes contingencies and 
counters to unfavourable responses and reviews of previous 
post-engagement reports. The primary objective and supporting 
objectives and the preliminary conditions required to achieve 
these objectives must be established. Determine in advance 
what the mission will be able to offer in order to achieve the 
desired results. Finally, predict the probability of favourable 
responses to a request or a desired outcome and develop the 
best alternative when efforts to achieve an agreement fail.  




(3) Rehearse KLE. This includes discussing the desired results and 
common terms with the cultural advisor, designate a recorder 
and photographer, determine which person takes the lead (in 
many cases, this is the cultural advisor), practice social nuances 
(including greetings and leave-taking), and conduct standard 
mission planning (security, logistics, communications, 
contingencies, etc.) 
(4) Engagement. Be certain to adhere to local meeting etiquette; 
focus on the objective while respectfully listening; under 
promise and over deliver. Conclude the business portion by 
clarifying or repeating agreements made.  
(5) Debriefing. Submit a full post-KLE report to appropriate 
personnel or departments. Ensure relevant KL information gets 
returned to the designated database in order to prepare for 
future engagements.  
(6) Re-engage. Reengage KLs and sustain relationships.  
Why is this necessary? Conducting KLEs validates the mission in the eyes 
of the public, allowing the communication of NATO strategic messages to the 
public to take place via those individuals or groups who already have influence 
and legitimacy in the theatre. This in turn strengthens local leaders, thereby 
strengthening the sustainable leadership, while providing opportunities for future 
leaders to be legitimized. 
Identifying Key Leaders, developing a KLE matrix and providing thorough 
assessments of these KLs can greatly assist NATO command groups and all others 
engaging key leaders to deliver NATO mission strategic or priority messages 
effectively to national key leaders and thereby to the greater public. A recently 
concluded JFC Naples NATO Rapid Response Force certification exercise 
highlighted the importance of using and exploiting KLE as a strategic 
communication tool. As such, KLE must be formally incorporated as part of the 
overall NATO doctrine.  
 
6.2 Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams - OMLT 
The Operational Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT) program is an 
important part of NATO’s contribution towards the development of local armed 
force by providing training and mentoring. They also provide a liaison capability 




between the local armed forces and NATO/Coalition forces, co-coordinating the 
planning of operations and ensuring that the local armed forces units receives 
necessary enabling support (including close air support, casualty evacuation and 
medical evacuation). 
Due to the fact that OMLT members daily interact with armed forces 
leaders and members, they can play a vital role in the evaluation process of NATO 
perception by local populations. They can also transmit massages, which can 
strengthen the acceptance of NATO’s presence. Currently, the processes of 
evaluation and messaging can be limited or veiled by the processes of 
bureaucratic reporting. Therefore, processes related to perceptions and 
evaluations of the local situation, as well as the transmission of core messages, 
must be formalized (e.g. reporting format, information flow, etc) as an essential 
part of NATO doctrine. 
NATO instruments for analyzing its perception and acceptance by local 
population 
• NATO forces possess structures and assets (branches) with suitable 
procedural backgrounds for analyzing and evaluating perception and 
acceptance of NATO mission. 
• All these branches are doctrinally framed, enabling them to create 
conditions for the delimitation of their functions, allowing them to 
influence coordination and effective cooperation between them. 
• Recent ground operations have established two new disciplines, Key 
Leader Engagement and Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams 




Mission legitimacy must be achieved and maintained. To this end, these 
five principles must be achieved:  
(1) Strict Adherence to the International Rule of Law and its 
cohesion with locally accepted rules of law. 
(2) Recognizing the importance of historical experience. 
(3) Employing the local population as part of the larger process of 
engagement. 




(4) Preserving non-combatants lives and dignity. 
(5) Seeking and exploiting direct communication with critical 
members of the local population at all levels. 




• Mission legitimacy must be achieved and maintained. Clear NATO 
definition and policy on the level of legitimacy acceptance must be 
established. 
• NATO must reconsider implementation of the UN seven peace-
building principles based on best practices developed in Kosovo. 
• Assess the historical relationship with the country or countries 
involved in a potential crisis area. 
• Establish a force commander, following the example from the UN, 
chosen from an acceptable country / region involved in crisis.  
• Doctrinally formalized Key Leaders Engagement and Operational 
Mentor and Liaison Team functions.  
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The ability of NATO forces and leaders at all levels to understand the 
culture and attitudes of the peoples and nations where we contemplate 
operations should inform all aspects of planning, training, campaign design, and 
operations.  Whatever level of preparation and cultural understanding we may 
bring to the effort must be supplemented by effective survey of the attitudes of 
the local population toward NATO and key actors in areas of NATO operations. 
Properly planned and consistently executed professional surveys of popular 
attitudes can provide key information to help NATO understand vital trends and 
developments in the location population and their perceptions towards NATO, 
the so-called “Human Terrain”. 




The operational effectiveness can be enhanced or diminished by the 
effective and timely understanding of attitudes concerning NATO operations. The 
art form is “how” to plan, train, prepare for and consistently survey/understand 
attitudes in the increasingly complex operational environments of irregular 
activity, insurgency, and asymmetric threats NATO faces today. 
Despite a large number of NATO doctrinal publications which mention 
the importance of attitudes of the local population relative to NATO operations 
(PYSOPS, INFO Ops, COIN), they have been rarely considered, analyzed, and 
integrated in a systematic manner. A brief look at ISAF operations 2002-2012 
reveals a wide variety of efforts to survey attitudes of the local population that 
vary by time, nation, regional command, echelon/level of command, military or 
civilian organization, etc. Unfortunately, such efforts are characterized by 
inconsistent application of survey tools and methods, inconsistent training and 
preparation, non-standard execution, and widely inconsistent collection, analysis, 
storage, marking, sharing, and reporting of data.  
Although there has been, over time, increased NATO awareness of the 
challenges to effectively survey attitudes, there is little evidence of a 
comprehensive Civilian-military, or even exclusively military (NATO/ISAF) effort to 
create and publish basic standards for surveys on popular attitudes. Consider the 
complexity required to standardize training, preparation and execution of surveys 
amongst the following:  an 18 yr old US Marine corporal in Regional Command 
South (RC-S), a seasoned German civilian BMZ official in Regional Command North 
(RC-N), contracted Afghan workers in Wardak Province (Regional Command East 
(RC-E)) or NGO workers in Kabul, and there are dozens more such complex types, 
most of which rotate on a 6 month tour. Each has his own background, 
experience, education, and operational role: without a forcing function for 
standardization and professionalization such as doctrine for Human Aspects of the 
Operational Environment) HAOE, surveys of local attitudes carry a huge risk of 
providing misleading or inaccurate data, skewed by time and quality of data, 
critical analysis, and accurate reporting.  
Indeed, one might say that attitudes are a neglected area in military 
missions on political/policy, strategic, and operational levels. The present 
contribution describes the potential role of attitude research in NATO stabilization 
and reconstruction efforts. The research will focus on the nature of attitudes and 
their relation to behaviour. The operational, strategic, and policy relevance of 
attitudes in military context will also be discussed, as well as relevant 
considerations in this context. Attitudes are critically important yet understudied 
in military context. 





• Operational effectiveness can be enhanced or diminished by the 
effective and timely understanding of attitudes concerning NATO 
operations. 
• • Attitudes of the local population relative to NATO operations 
(PYSOPS, INFO Ops, COIN) have been rarely considered, analyzed, and 
integrated in a systematic manner. 
 
2. What is an attitude? 
 
Attitudes have been one of the most widely researched and used 
concepts in psychology. Psychologists have assumed for a long time that attitudes 
and other associations in memory are stable structures that underlie behaviour in 
a variety of situations (e.g. Allport, 1935; Beck, 1976). The function typically 
attributed to attitudes is to provide valenced summaries of one’s environment 
that serve as a "predisposition or readiness for response" (Allport, 1935, p. 805). 
Attitudes signal people about whether objects in their environment are good or 
bad and thus perform an important approach/avoidance function (Fazio, 1986; 
Katz, 1960; Smith, Bruner, & White, 1956). Eagly and Chaiken (1993), for example, 
defined an attitude as "a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a 
particular entity with some degree of favour or disfavour" (p. 1). Consistent with 
this approach, people are typically asked to rate the positivity or negativity of 
their feelings toward everything from social issues and consumer products to 
political candidates and romantic partners, and they have little trouble doing so. 
These ratings are further used to make predictions about or to explain 
corresponding behaviours (buying behaviour, voting, health-promoting or health 
compromising behaviour, etc.).  
Attitudes are comprised of three components – affective, cognitive, and 
behavioural. The affective component is how one feels about an entity. For 
example: “I feel angry about NATO’s presence.” The cognitive component is what 
a person believes or knows about an attitude object. For example: “I believe the 
presence of NATO is a threat to my safety.” Finally, the behavioural component is 
how an attitude towards an object influences our behaviour. For example: “I will 
avoid NATO troops and not cooperate with them.”  




The relative prominence of an attitude object in the perceptual field is 
known as salience. Attitude strength refers to the extent to which attitudes have 
impact on behaviour and information processing and the degree to which they 
are stable over time and resistant to change (Krosnick and Petty, 1995). The 
positive or negative value of an attitude object is referred to as valence. NATO 
troops, for instance, can be quite a salient object in the environment and 
consequently elicit strong and persistent positive or negative valence. For 
example: “I am very much aware of NATO’s presence” (salience) and “it makes 
me very angry” (valence) and “I am not willing to change my opinion” (strength). 
Because of widespread use and potential, attitude concepts have 
occupied a central place in social research and interventions. The main 
assumption of this research was that in order to promote behavioural change, 
one must first understand and change individuals’ beliefs/attitudes toward the 
targeted behaviour (i.e. Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980). In order to do so, for many years, 
the assessment of attitudes relied exclusively on questionnaires and on 
individuals’ endorsement of positive or negative statements about the attitudinal 
object (i.e. “Drinking alcohol is good------------bad”). In line with this approach, the 
typical behavioural change attempts were based on providing individuals with 
relevant information (i.e. about negative consequences of drinking) that would 
presumably result in attitudinal change and corresponding behavioural change. 
However, comprehensive evaluations of the predictive impact of attitudes on 
behaviour have been rare, and the case for natural attitude as a strong precursor 
to behaviour may not be as strong as some of the basic research would suggest 
(i.e. Stacy et al., 1994). To understand and overcome such inconsistencies 
regarding the attitude-behaviour relationship, researchers re-evaluated both the 
conceptualization as well as the traditional measurement of the attitudes. 
Regarding the conceptualization several issues are particularly relevant. 
First, attitudes have been traditionally conceptualized as bipolar 
(presumably reflecting a natural tendency to classify something as either positive 
or negative). However, one of the most important aspects of behaviour in natural 
context is individuals’ ambivalence. For instance, people hold both positive and 
negative alcohol-related beliefs (e.g. Wiers et al., 2006) with positive attitudes 
usually relating to immediate and negative cognitions to later outcomes. These 
findings challenged the assumption that attitudes represent stable evaluations or 
action tendencies and suggested a different approach whereby attitudes are 
constructed in the moment based on information that happens to be currently 
accessible. From this point of view attitudes can be conceptualized as the current 
state of activation of associations rather than evaluations stored in memory (e.g. 
Wilson et al., 2000; Ledgerwood & Chaiken, 2007). A given attitude object likely 




has not just a single attitude associated with it, but rather a network of attitudes. 
Regarding drinking, an individual may have positive attitudes toward drinking 
when thinking about drinking with friends but negative attitudes when thinking 
about the day following the drinking party. Such attitudinal nuances would be lost 
with the traditional approach of bipolar stable attitudes that does not take into 
account the relevant momentary context. Similarly, attitudes towards NATO may 
not come along a positive versus negative dimension, since people may hold both 
positive and negative attitudes towards NATO.  
Second, the traditional view of attitudes and attitude-behaviour 
relationship is a primarily deliberative one, assuming that attitudes are 
consciously accessible and serve as deliberative input into intentions and 
behaviour. This view has been challenged by the growing evidence suggesting 
that although intentionality can be important, the lion’s share of behaviour is 
dictated by automatic processes, independent of intention (Bargh, 1994; Fazio, 
1990). From this perspective, behaviour is driven less by an individual’s explicit, 
deliberative evaluations toward the attitudinal object, but rather by previous 
associations between a certain context and certain behaviour. One relevant 
example is that of female crack cocaine users’ engagement in sex exchange for 
crack cocaine. When assessed explicitly, women may have negative attitudes 
toward such behaviour and express intentions to avoid it. However, a drug craving 
induced spontaneously by internal (i.e. emotional state) or external cues (i.e. the 
view of a crack pipe) may automatically activate and render more positive the 
behaviours (sex trade) previously associated with successful alleviation of the 
craving. This may increase the likelihood of a person’s involvement in such 
behaviour, despite negative attitudes and even in the absence of conscious 
intentions to behave accordingly (Kopetz et al., in preparation). This research 
speaks to the need of assessing attitudes and corresponding behaviours in specific 
contexts and in a manner capable of tapping into potential automatic processes 
underlying behaviour.  Obviously, these are also topics to take into consideration 
when measuring the populations’ attitude towards NATO.    
Regarding the measurement of attitudes, the traditional approach was 
primarily based on individuals’ endorsement of different statements regarding 
the object of the attitudes. However, whether an individual endorses a statement 
or not, is not fully determined by the attitude proper. It also depends on the 
individual’s awareness of his/her attitude as well as on the willingness to reveal 
that attitude, on social desirability, and self-presentation concerns (Snyder & 
Swann, 1976). To overcome this problem, researchers have recently developed 
more indirect measures of attitudes. Some of these measures are based on the 




assumption that people spontaneously avoid negative stimuli and approach 
positive stimuli (approach/avoidance paradigms, i.e. Forster & Strack, 1997; 
Brendl, Markman, & Messner, 2005, or eye-tracking paradigms). Other measures, 
probably the most widely used, are based on representations in associative 
memory (Implicit Association Test (IAT) and affective priming procedures) and 
assume that people respond faster when presented with pairs of stimuli that are 
strongly rather than weakly associated in the memory. From this perspective a 
positive attitude would be evidenced by a faster reaction time to an attitudinal 
object when paired with a positive rather than a negative adjective (i.e. Olson & 
Fazion, 2003). 
Key Points 
• An “attitude” has been defined as "a psychological tendency that is 
expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of 
favour or disfavour". 
• Attitudes are comprised of three components – affective, cognitive, 
and behavioural. 
• Attitudes have been traditionally conceptualized as bipolar 
(presumably reflecting a natural tendency to classify something as 
either positive or negative). However, one of the most important 
aspects of behaviour in natural context is individuals’ ambivalence. 
• The traditional view of attitudes and attitude-behaviour relationship 
is a primarily deliberative one, assuming that attitudes are consciously 
accessible and serve as deliberative input into intentions and 
behaviour. This view has been challenged by the growing evidence 
suggesting that although intentionality can be important, the lion’s 
share of behaviour is dictated by automatic processes, independent of 
intention. 
• Regarding the measurement of attitudes, the traditional approach 
was primarily based on individuals’ endorsement of different 
statements regarding the object of the attitudes. However, whether 
an individual endorses a statement or not, is not fully determined by 
the attitude proper. It also depends on the individual’s awareness of 
his/her attitude as well as on the willingness to reveal that attitude, 
on social desirability, and self-presentation concerns. 
• Researchers have recently developed more indirect measures of 
attitudes. 




3. Attitudes towards NATO in Afghanistan 
 
Open-source information on measurement of attitudes towards NATO is 
hard to come by (cf. Lyall, Blair, and Imai, 2012; Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov, 
2012). In order to get a sense of current measurement practices, a literature 
search was conducted. We used Google to gain a general sense of the available 
reports on attitudes towards NATO, followed by the use of specialized literature 
databases in psychology (PsychInfo) and the humanities and social sciences 
(Project Muse) to identify relevant scientific literature.  In all cases, the initial 
focus was specifically on attitudes towards NATO in its most recent security 
assistance reconstruction mission in Afghanistan.  
In Project Muse, no hits were for the search keys of “attitudes” AND 
“NATO” AND “Afghanistan”, while the two hits in the PsychInfo database did not 
pertain directly to measurement of the Afghan populations’ attitudes. In 
PsychInfo, the search term “attitudes” AND “Afghanistan” did yield a substantial 
number of hits (99 to be precise), but most of the identified literature focused on 
issues that are less relevant for present purposes. Specifically, the literature 
appears to focus on one of three categories: (1) Attitudes towards the war in 
Afghanistan among Western Samples; (2) Health-related attitudes among the 
Afghan population; and (3) Attitudes among soldiers in Afghanistan and veterans 
of the war. None of the published articles focuses specifically on the issue of 
measurable indicators of the populations’ attitude. Only an informal Google 
search, which using the search term “measuring attitudes in Afghanistan” yielded 
a very limited number of hits, did show an unpublished paper by Princeton 
political scientists Jason Lyall, Greame Blair, and Kosuke Imai. Their “Explaining 
support for combatants during wartime: A survey experiment in Afghanistan” 
exactly addresses the issues under investigation. The literature references of that 
paper contained another directly relevant unpublished paper by Andrew Beath, 
Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov on “Winning hearts and minds through 
development: Evidence from a field experiment in Afghanistan”. These two 
publications will be subjected to closer scrutiny below. Next to these papers, first-
hand observations were used of the German reception of an extensive survey 
study by the Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion Research to illustrate 
the broader political and policy context of attitude research in the context of 
stabilization and reconstruction missions.   




3.1. Winning hearts and minds through development: Evidence from a field 
experiment 
The primary interest of a study by Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov was to 
demonstrate the effects of development programs in Afghanistan on perceptions 
of well-being, attitudes towards the government, and levels of security in 
surrounding areas. The authors identify several hypotheses regarding the possible 
effects of developmental aid in Afghanistan, predicting either increases in 
violence after aid (a ‘bargaining model’ suggesting that aid is considered a reward 
for violence), decreases in unemployment and decreases in violence (an 
‘opportunity cost’ model suggesting that violence undermines economic interests 
once these become available), no changes (a ‘grievance’ model suggesting that 
developmental aid does not affect underlying social and ethnic grievances), and 
decreases in violence and increases in support for the government (a ‘hearts and 
minds’ model suggesting that aid undermines support for the insurgency and 
contributes to stability of the governance structure). 
Of greatest interest here are the methods used to assess these 
hypotheses. The National Solidarity Programme (NSP), a $1 billion aid program to 
improve service and infrastructure of the rural population, is analyzed for its 
impact, whereby 250 villages (25 per district with a total of 10 districts) that 
received treatment were selected and carefully matched with 250 villages that did 
not receive treatment. A total of 13,899 respondents participated in the study. 
The study consisted of a varied set of instruments, including a male household 
questionnaire administered to ten randomly selected male heads-of household; a 
male focus group questionnaire administered to a group of village leaders in each 
village; a female focus group questionnaire administered to a group of locally 
important women; and, a female individual questionnaire.  These questionnaires 
were, except for the female focus group, administered before (Aug-Sept 2007) 
the start of the National Solidarity Programme and twice during the programme 
(in October 2007 and May 2008, and November 2007 and August 2008). The 
investigators also tracked changes in security incidents before and during the 
implementation of the programme. 
The questionnaires relied heavily on self-reporting from the participants. 
A confederate would approach villagers and then follow a carefully determined 
protocol to reach out to participants. The participants were expected to respond 
to items related to general characteristics and social services, economic status, 
perception of government and associated parties (including ISAF), and perception 
of security. The protocol contained over 150 items, irrespective of the groups 




under investigation. For each item, multiple-choice response options were 
provided.   
The authors of the study find that the development program led to 
increases in economic well-being and to a more positive outlook on the 
participants’ security situation. Additionally, the authors find increased positivity 
in attitudes towards the Afghan government, as well as towards NATO, as a result 
of the aid program. There is also mention of decreased violence as a result of the 
program, but only in areas with moderate levels of violence (measured before the 
program implementation). In areas of considerable violence, the program is 
reported to inhibit increased government trust as a result of the program and de-
escalation of violence. 
 
3.2. Explaining support for combatants during wartime: A survey experiment in 
Afghanistan 
Lyall, Blair, and Imai (2012) have recently published on the Internet a 
report of their attempts to better understand how ‘wartime victimization’ (i.e. 
non-combatants facing direct or indirect exposure to violence) affects civilian 
attitudes towards combatants. They conducted their research in five Afghan 
provinces in which the Taliban was particularly active at the time of measurement 
(Uruzgan, Loghar, Khunar, Khost, and Helmand). The authors argue that attitudes 
towards combatant parties among civilians are not merely a function of the 
parties’ relative responsibility for the victimization, but rather, depend on social 
identity. If a civilian has a prior identification with a particular attacking 
combatant party, attacks on the civilian are hypothesized to contribute less to the 
civilian’s negative attitude towards that attacking combatant party than if the 
civilian has no prior identification or an opposing identification.   
To examine this, the authors use “Endorsement experiments” (Bullock, 
Imai & Shapiro, 2011) in which participants are asked to indicate on a five-point 
scale (with an additional “don’t know” option) their agreement with a policy 
proposal that is either endorsed by the Taliban, by ISAF, or no endorsement is 
specified. The study referred to four policy topics: prison reform, direct election of 
district councils, reform of the Independent Election Committee, and 
strengthening of anti-corruption policies. Extra care was spent on the selection of 
these topics as to ensure there was: 1) opportunity to combine the cases for 
aggregated statistical analysis; 2) sufficient knowledge in the sample to complete 
the survey and “don’t know” responses are minimized; 3) realism to the policies 
and the endorsements; 4) sufficient variation in views as to avoid ceiling or floor 




effects. The questionnaire was then distributed by an Afghan owned research 
centre called ORCA (Opinion Research Centre for Afghanistan) in 204 villages, 
each with 20 to 2,509 inhabitants. These villages were chosen on the basis of 
random selection, going down from first the provincial level (a random selection 
of five out of 13 Pashtun Majority provinces), to the district level (a random 
selection of one-third of the districts in a province), to the village level within each 
district (a random selection of villages from the districts, with a minimum of 10% 
of villages with a district being selected). In total, 2,754 only male villagers 
participated in the study. 
The key analysis involved a comparison of the effect of victimization by 
the Taliban and ISAF on support for these parties (whereby support is measured 
on the basis of the endorsement experimental technique described above). Of 
interest, and in line with the authors’ argument, the research shows an 
asymmetrical effect of victimization. If the Taliban has directly or indirectly caused 
harm to the participant, there appears to be little effect on support for the 
Taliban nor on support for ISAF. In contrast, if ISAF has directly or indirectly 
caused harm, it leads to more negative attitudes towards ISAF and more positive 
attitudes towards the Taliban. Thus, the authors demonstrate the importance of 
prior social identification in the effects of attacks on support from a population. 
The findings also demonstrate the use of indirect measures to uncover significant 
aspects of the factors that underlie community support. Finally, the findings 
demonstrate the importance of context in attitude formation (i.e. the same 
influence measure may produce stronger results in one context than in another 
context).    
  
3.3. Reception of attitude research: The German case 
Next to written reports on attitude research in Afghanistan, we also 
obtained a first-hand report of the reception in Germany of a specific enquiry in 
Afghanistan, carried out by The Afghan Center for Socio-Economic and Opinion 
Research (ASCOR). ASCOR is advertised as Afghanistan’s only registered 
commercial market and opinion research agency. In 2010, they published an 
extensive attitude survey in Afghanistan. Among a sample of 1,691 in 34 
provinces, the agency held face-to-face interviews. It is this research that allowed 
the media throughout the world to report on the apparent progress of NATO in 
Afghanistan. For example, ABC News inferred from the results: “Blame on the 
United States and NATO for violence has eased – but their overall ratings remain 
weak”. Beyond the specific outcomes of the research, however, it is the 
perception of the results that is of particular interest. In Germany, soon after the 




publication of the results, discussion erupted among politicians, policy makers, 
and the army. Indeed, what had been presented as “scientific” or “evidence-
based” was eagerly, and easily, discarded as “unscientific”. These criticisms are of 
interest to mention here, because they also pertain to the surveys reviewed 
above.   
First, the survey research was criticized for containing some very 
complicated items that require knowledge of world affairs and politics. This 
knowledge, however, may have been lacking among the Afghans under 
investigation. Consequently, the participants may have recognized symbols of 
NATO, or any other military organization present in Afghanistan. But that doesn’t 
mean participants were able to reflect on it, or able to tie the organization to 
different aspects of world politics. In the face-to-face interviews, opinions may 
thus have been constructed on the spot, and immediately forgotten at the end of 
the interview. Those who wanted to dismiss the results of attitude research could 
thus easily do so. The research may have not tapped into real attitudes. It may 
have created them on the spot. 
Second, the survey contained about 150 questions, and was heavily 
criticized for that amount. Not all of these 150 questions may have required an 
understanding of global affairs. But still, 150 questions is a lot. It is a lot for 
undergraduate students that typically participate in attitude studies. But 
answering 150 questions certainly is an insurmountable challenge for someone 
who has never heard of opinion research; let alone participated in it. Here, it is 
simply the ability of the research group that falls short. 
Third, motivation in answering the questions was argued to have played 
an obscuring role. Questions about education level or financial capabilities are not 
easily answered in a culture where answers to these questions communicate 
one’s all important social status, and indeed, one’s legitimacy to express an 
opinion. Moreover, answering questions with a target audience in mind is very 
important in Afghanistan. That is, in a country where decades of war have made 
distrust a defining feature of the fabric of society.  
Fourth, the total number of 1,691 participants may appear quite 
impressive. However, it is quite a small number in comparison to the task at hand. 
Afghanistan is hardly a single country; with 17 major ethnic groups and multiple 
languages, diverse and challenging terrain and geography, over 70% illiteracy, and 
a history of local power brokers and warlords rather than strong centralized 
government. And once the diversity of Afghanistan is recognized, it would make 
sense to consider sampling more carefully. 




3.4. What the findings indicate 
In the studies described above, we see how the neglect of recent insights 
in attitude research leads to conceptual and practical, often negative 
consequences. The research by Beath and colleagues, and the research by Lyall 
and colleagues, appear to have involved considerable monetary and human 
resources, but the outcomes of both studies appear to be fairly limited. In both 
cases, support for a specific hypothesis in the context of counterinsurgency 
theory was obtained (although not necessarily validated). However, both efforts 
seem to depend to a great extent on verbal reporting of attitudes that the 
researcher assume to be present. But, that may not be the case. Indeed, both 
studies seem to ignore what is known on attitude measurement (although the 
study by Lyall et al. provides an interesting turn to more implicit measurement by 
systematically varying sources that participants are requested to endorse). The 
German reception of the outcomes suggests that attitude research in Afghanistan 
is, at present, difficult to interpret, to frame it positively. But also, to frame it 
more negatively, research outcomes are easily neglected or reframed in strategic 
and political context, and generally accompanied by a significant lack of western 
researchers’ understanding of the social, cultural, and historical context of 
Afghanistan. And this should be considered in the light of the considerable human 
and monetary effort that has been spent to obtain the results.   
In general, there still considerable amounts of work remains to be done 
to increase our understanding of attitudes in Afghanistan, to cut the cost of 
measurement, and to find ways in which attitude research outcome can inform 
policy making.  Specific to NATO operations, there are many complex additional 
cultural and organizational challenges related to measuring, understanding, and 
effectively responding to attitude research in Afghanistan; existing research 
should not be assumed to offer clear answers and accurate insights on attitudes.  
Key Points 
• The research by Beath and colleagues, and the research by Lyall and 
colleagues, appear to have involved considerable monetary and 
human resources, but the outcomes of both studies appear to be fairly 
limited. 
• The German reception of the outcomes suggests that attitude 
research in Afghanistan is, at present, difficult to interpret. Also, 
research outcomes are easily neglected or reframed in strategic and 
political context, and generally accompanied by a significant lack of 
western researchers’ understanding of the social, cultural, and 








We may conclude that the potential of attitude research in military 
context is considerable. Indeed, in peace support operation, understanding the 
attitudes of the local population must be considered a key ingredient to a 
successful mission. Attitude research is critical in the context. At the same time, 
the way attitude research is currently conducted, and used, opens up so much for 
room for interpretation to such an extent that its actual use for military purpose 
seems to be quite limited. Also, from the perspective of NATO, there is simply no 
comprehensive effort to consider, to analyze, integrate, and to publish a doctrine 
on attitudes of the local population. In NATO context, the considerable potential 
of attitudes is underutilized at best.  But, at worst, it is sometimes painfully 
neglected.  
What to do? It is suggested that in order to optimally profit from attitude 
research for NATO operations, it is of importance to: 
(1) Invest in a broader overview of available measures to assess the 
population’s attitudes, and their use for short-term and long-term 
planning. 
There are many measures of attitudes. Some are obvious, others 
less so; some are more effective, others less so. Recently, NATO’s 
Research and Technology Organization (Task groups HFM-160 and 
HFM-183) published a report on “measuring the effectiveness of 
activities that influence attitudes and behaviours”. The report 
contains an impressive overview of the strengths and weaknesses 
of a considerable number of measures to assess attitudes. While 
this seems to be a good start, the report does not contain any 
description of the cognitive architecture of attitudes, and 
consequently fails to specify the psychology of the local 
population before measuring. This makes it difficult to determine 
which measure is most suitable. Additionally, the NATO report 
discusses measurement techniques in quite general terms (e.g. 
the merits of “interviews”), but these techniques come in quite 
diverse forms, and one technique to assess, for example, attitudes 




from behaviour, may be quite different than another. Thus, we 
should still invest in a broader overview of available measures to 
assess the population’s attitudes, while also specifying the 
relevant cognitive mechanisms involved in attitude formation, and 
how the measures can be tailored specifically for NATO purposes. 
(2) Develop a framework to more effectively interpret the outcome of 
attitude research in a NATO context. 
Next to attitude measurement techniques and data, it is critical to 
specify how the data should be used. And here, interpretative 
frameworks are critically important. If there is, for example, an 
increase in the number of people who are positive towards NATO, 
what does that mean? First of all, what is an increase? And then, 
are all increases good? These are all essential questions of the 
results of data are to be used effectively. Frameworks should be 
developed to effectively interpret the outcome of attitude 
research.  
(3) Use advances in technology to improve the quality of attitude data 
gathering and analysis.  
Things have changed over the years. Attitude research is no longer 
a matter of a personal face-to-face conversation, or filling out a 
paper questionnaire with a pencil. There are now of many 
computerized techniques that can be useful (many of the 
techniques have been discussed in the chapter). Clearly, advances 
in technology enable more efficient and precise measurement. 
What is more, the technology available to NATO (e.g. Satellites, X-
Ray vision, etc.) seems to be much more advanced than that 
available to psychologists. Here, NATO could fruitfully collaborate 
with science to develop even more sophisticated techniques.  
(4) Soldiers should be trained to identify, interpret, and use these 
attitudes. 
It should be apparent that whatever technology is available, 
observing, measuring, properly interpreting, reporting and 
planning, still are, and likely will be, human endeavours. Attitudes 
research cannot exist without people, people filling out 
questionnaires, but also, people doing the research. Training 
people in identifying, properly interpreting, and using attitudes, 




may thus be critical to in improving the efficiency of measurement 
to detect the local population’s attitude towards NATO.  
(5) Current doctrine should be revised. 
The existing work of NATO’s Research & Technology Organization 
(Task groups HFM-160 and HFM-183) should be leveraged as a 
starting point. A NATO working group should be established to 
consider and pursue institutional change to NATO doctrine for 
Human Aspects of the operational environment writ large, and 




• Invest in a broader overview of available measures to assess the 
population’s attitudes, and their use for short-term and long-term 
planning 
• Develop a framework to more effectively interpret the outcome of 
attitude research in a NATO context 
• Use advances in technology to improve the quality of attitude data 
gathering and analysis 
• Soldiers should be trained to identify, interpret, and use these 
attitudes 
• Current doctrine should be revised 
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1. Introduction  
 
The recent NATO operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya 
demonstrated that understanding the human environment in a conflict zone and 
comprehending the motivation behind the active or passive support offered by a 




part of local population to NATO opponents is a keynote element implying aspects 
covering different NATO capabilities. 
It is generally agreed, within both the military and civilian realm, that 
culture, or human factors/ aspects/environment is an important factor in military 
operations, especially in irregular warfare and stability, support, transition, and 
reconstruction operations.  
According to some authors, “socio-cultural factors affect every level of 
engagement in irregular warfare, from the interpersonal interactions while 
negotiating with local leaders, military advisers training their counterparts, to 





• Environment, referring to the unique interdependent relationship 
developed by all cultures with their physical environment. 
 argue that gaining a complete and accurate understanding of a 
culture requires spending years living in the region, learning the language and 
interacting with the local people, things that the military cannot do. These 
authors consider that despite their seeming diversity, all cultures are organized 
according to a predictable set of categories or dimensions: 
• Economy, addressing cultures’ specific systems for obtaining, 
producing and distributing the items that people need or want to 
survive in their society. 
• Social Structure dealing with way in which cultures assign people 
different roles, status and power within the group. 
• Political Structure, detailing how cultures systems determines who 
leads the group, and how they make decisions. 
• Belief Systems, covering cultures’ shared set of beliefs and symbols 
that unite the group. 
The importance of understanding the operational environment is 
highlighted as well within different NATO publications, but with limited factual 
information or without further development and guidance in respect of human 
aspects/factors of the Operational Environment (OE). 
                                                          
178 Abbe, Allison and Halpin, Stanley M., The Cultural Imperative for Professional Military Education 
and Leader Development, U.S. Army War College, 2010, p.20.  
179 Salmoni, Barak A and Holmes-Eber, Paula, Operational Culture for the Warfighter Principles and 
Applications, Marine Corps University Press, 2009. 




Despite the significant place on understanding the operational 
environment, the existing NATO publications do not clearly define this term. The 
NATO Glossary of terms and definitions AAP-6 defines the environment180, but 
not the operational environment. The Allied Doctrine for Operations AJP 3(A) also 
fails to define either the operational environment, it just simply explaining its 
meaning within Section II – Command Factors, as being “generally factors and 
conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect 
the force and complete the mission. This includes the sea, land, air and space 
environments, the adversary and friendly forces, facilities, weather, terrain, 
electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), and the information environment within the 
JOA and areas of interest.”  
Many important elements can be considered here as being relevant for 
the operational environment, but a key one is missing: the local population, or 
the “humans”, as it is mentioned in the definition of the environment provided by 
AAP-6. This missing piece is likely the result of an unintentional error, since within 
the text of the above mentioned publication there are several references 
regarding the importance of the local population within operational environment.  
 
However, whatever may be the term that will be used for the human 
aspects/ dynamics/ elements/ factors of the operational environment, it is 
surprisingly that despite the overall recognition of the high importance 
placed upon it, this element is insufficiently addressed within NATO 
publications, especially in regard to transforming NATO capabilities in this 
field. 
 
Although it may not be ideal, the following definition for the purpose of 
this study is proposed: 
 
Human Aspects of the Operational Environment represents a complex set 
of elements, factors, processes, interactions, and perceptions in a society 
                                                          
180 NATO Glossary of terms and definitions AAP-6, 2012 -  Environment: The surroundings in which an 
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affected by medium or major violence that might either influence the 
operations of military forces, or determine the outcome of the conflict. 
HAOE refers to psychological, cultural, and sociological factors in 
connection with an historical, political, military, and economic context of 
crisis situations. They are of the highest relevance in Stability and 
Reconstruction Operations, COIN, Peace Keeping/Enforcing, and similar 
operations. 
 
Analyzing the extent and manner how this “complex set of elements, 
factors, processes, interactions, and perceptions” is addressed within existing 
NATO publications, led us to the conclusion that the “human aspect” of the 
operational environment has been neglected at all decision making levels, and 
that a Concept, a Training Approach and Proper Capabilities, integrated into a 
Coherent Operational Framework are needed in this respect. 
It is not expected that the findings and proposed solutions within this 
chapter will solve all the gaps in understanding the population in a conflict zone, 
however the contributors consider that it will be a useful tool for all elements of 
the military involved in planning and executing operations and missions, and it 
could be the trigger for a further development of the topic of human aspects, 
providing a framework for a common perspective that will help NATO forces 
prepare to operate in a highly complex, uncertain and changing security 
environment. 
Transforming NATO capabilities to adapt to the Human Environment 
requires the consideration of the Comprehensive Approach181
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comprehensive approach to crisis management as part of the international community’s effort and to 
improve NATO’s ability to contribute to stabilization and reconstruction 
 
 principles, and the 
potential implications for different assets having interaction on regular basis with 




the local population – Civil Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Human Intelligence 
(HUMINT), Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT), Provincial 
Reconstruction Team (PRT), Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), Reconnaissance 
(RECCE), Special Operation Forces (SOF). 
Considering this broad coverage several key issues having a direct impact 
on them have been briefly analysed, before addressing the proposed solutions for 
transforming NATO capabilities following the Joint Capabilities Integration 
Development System (DOTMPLFI) elements. 
 
2. Security environment 
 
The most important element to be considered when addressing the need 
for transformation of the capabilities refers to the main characteristics of the 
global security environment in which the respective capabilities have to be 
employed. 
The Multiple Futures Project (MFP) developed by the Supreme Allied 
Command Transformation (SACT) in 2009, highlighted the challenges posed by 
the future security environment as well as the need for NATO forces to 
understand the human environment in theatre and to be able to efficiently 
communicate with the people, authorities and actors. 
The MFP study describes 4 multiples futures - Dark Side of Exclusivity, 
Deceptive Stability, Clash of Modernities and New Power Politics182
• Friction at international decision making level.  
 - and is based 
on the analysis of 19 national studies on the future security environment as well 
as the ACT body of work on drivers, futures, and challenges. 
Using the results of 21 workshops and based on the highest degree of 
commonality, nine drivers of change were identified as most relevant to global 
development over the next 20 years: 
• Economic Integration of globalised actors.  
• Asymmetry of wealth and power.  
• Changing State Capacity and the distribution and management of 
power.  
• Resource Allocation of raw materials, energy, water and food.  
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• Competing Ideologies and World Views.  
• Climate Change impacting international relations and commerce.  
• Use of Technology and innovation likely to produce breakthrough 
events.  
• Demographics including migration and urbanisation. 
The existence of an evolving security environment in the early twenty-
first century, that creates new global challenges have also been noted by different 
regional organizations over the past ten years ago. According to the Organization 
for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) threats to security and stability 
in the OSCE region are today more likely to arise as negative, destabilizing 
consequences of developments that cut across the politico-military, economic 
and environmental and human dimensions, than from any major armed 
conflict183
• Lack of openness and transparency in politico-military matter.; 
.  
The OSCE strategy identifies similar factors posing a challenge to global 
security and stability in the 21st century: 
• Globalization, liberalization and technological change offering new 
opportunities for trade, growth and development, but having not 
equally benefited all participating States. 
• Environmental degradation, unsustainable use of natural 
resources, mismanagement of wastes and pollution affecting 
ecological systems and having a substantial negative impact on 
the health, welfare, stability and security of States. 
An EU Commission’s Study identifies six main dimensions of the future 
shaping the security environment184
• Global demographic and societal challenges.  
:  
• Energy and natural resource security and efficiency, environment 
and climate change.  
• Economy and technology prospects;  
• Geopolitics and governance: EU frontiers, integration and role on 
the global scale;  
• Territorial and mobility dynamics;  
• Research, education and innovation. 
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Another study identifies 4 mega-trends shaping our world up to 2030185
• Individual empowerment; 
: 
• Diffusion of power; 
• Demographic patterns; 
• Growing food, water and energy nexus. 
It can be noticed that since the release of the MFP study these drivers 
have continued to be relevant, some of them being highlighted as well within the 
New NATO Strategic Concept adopted in 2010 by Heads of State and Government 
in Lisbon and are mentioned as referenced within other more recent studies. This 
chapter will focus only on those drivers/features common for most of the studies 
which address future security environment and global trends186
 
. 
2.1. Competing (Clash of) Ideologies and Worldviews. 
This is a permanent issue affecting the security environment, having 
been mentioned within different studies beginning with the last decade of the 
past century. Huntington´s ‘clash of civilizations’ rests on the claim that broad 
cultural and/or religious affinities are now supplanting national loyalties187
This key feature of the security environment is mentioned within all four 
envisioned multiple futures as well as within other recent studies dedicated to 
analyzing the future operational environment
. 
188
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187 Walt, Stephen M., International Relations: One World, Many Theories, Foreign Policy, Washington, 
Spring 1998, Iss. 110. 
188 TRADOC, Operational Environment 2009-2025, August 2009. 
, and refers to alienation, 
disagreement and confrontation based on different cultures, values, religion, and 
historic geopolitical perspectives of international actors. The changing global 
security situation has seen a shift in emphasis from the certainties of super-power 
confrontation towards more complex interactions of state and non-state actors.  
Furthermore, the terrorism, along with the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction, is likely to remain principal threats. It is assessed that the clash of 
ideologies also constitutes a trigger for potential frictions in international decision 
making, a feature of the fourth multiple future – New Power Politics. Friction 
refers to the ease with which decisions are made at the international level, 
ranging from cooperation to confrontation. 




 2.2. Resource Allocation (Conflict on resources and global inequality) 
The majority of studies related to this topic, encompass essential 
resource issues such as availability, affordability, access to and competition. 
Although sufficient resources are likely to be available to sustain the growing 
global population and the global economy, the distribution and access to these 
resources will be uneven, and shortages will occur at local or regional levels, 
increasing the likelihood of societal instability and of disagreement between 
states, thus providing the triggers that may ignite conflict.189
It is envisioned as well that economic, social and political inequality of 
opportunity will continue to fuel perceptions of injustice among individuals and 
groups unable to have met their expectations, generating tension, unrest and 
instability, both within and between societies
 
190
Other studies estimate that the competition for resources such as water 
and food is unlikely to result in state-on-state conflict, although internal or inter-
regional disputes could possibly break out amongst people trying to secure these 





2.3. Globalization (Economic/Integration) 
The globalization issue is present within all of the reference documents, 
including military publications,192
According to the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2030, by 
2030 Asia will have surpassed North America and Europe combined in terms of 
global power, based upon GDP, population size, military spending, and 
technological investment. 
 as a major feature influencing the security 
environment, being considered an all-encompassing trend. It refers to the extent 
to which national and regional economies trade, and their level of functional 
integration. Emerging powers will play a key role within economic integration 
affecting the balance of power in the world and it is likely to have a shift from 
hegemony to national pluralism.  
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Most of the global trends studies foresee that over the next forty years, 
the United States is likely to remain a critical player, but will cede at least partial 
authority to China while low and middle-income countries in Asia and Latin 
America will become an immensely powerful force in the world economy. 
Another study estimates that China alone will probably have the largest economy, 
surpassing that of the United States a few years before 2030193
Globalization is directly linked with competing worldviews, since it has 
shown a tendency to empower some while marginalizing others, and generating 
tensions between individual and group identity. Although it contributes to a 
steady rise in shared economic interests between and among countries, it is 






Globalization, competition for resources and competing ideologies and 
tensions in political and social structures combined with ideological, religious and 
cultural distinctions may generate other features of security environment: 
complexity, unpredictability and uncertainty.  
2.4. Complexity, Unpredictability and Uncertainty  
The MFP’s concluding remarks stress that the future security 
environment will be dominated by complexity and unpredictability, features 
posing real challenges to the solidarity among allies, regarding the strategic unity 
of values and ideas, burden-sharing, and commitment to its decisions, as an 
alliance’s most powerful tools. As the changing global security situation has seen a 
shift in emphasis from the certainties of super-power confrontation towards more 
complex interactions of state and non-state actors, this will remain a real 
challenge in framing the proper response from international community. The 
implications derived from the foreseen multiple futures scenarios reveal that the 
security environment will continue to evolve but it will be subject to a variety of 
unforeseeable developments on political, social, technological and military 
domains. 
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Demographics reflect domestic and regional population trends related to 
birth, death, age, gender, structure, ethnicity, and the other characteristics of a 
state’s population. Current social and demographic trends will have a significant 
impact on the changing future security environment, increasing the potential 
scope and intensity of intrastate conflict and warfare conducted by non-state 
actors195
 
. The world’s population growth, estimated to reach close to 8.3 billion 
people by 2030, could have significant social effects such as expanding 
urbanization, growing the gaps between social classes, poverty, unemployment 
and migration, all of which can be triggers for conflict. 
2.6. Use of Technology/ Innovation 
Nowadays the use of technology has become more and more a factor 
having significant impact on the security environment. It refers to the continuous 
evolution and increased access to technology, especially for non-state actors. 
Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the development of laser 
weapons, electronic warfare, nano & bio technologies as well as space related 
technologies will have the major global effect on the security environment196
 
. The 
increased dependency of today's critical infrastructure on networked computer 
systems in conjunction with the level of access to newest technology cause the 
computer hacking to become a serious security threat. 
2.7. Key Environmental Constraints 
Consideration must be given to climate change as any long-term 
significant development that may have an impact on international relations. 
Increasing water scarcity and growing energy needs are further shaping the 
security environment in areas of concern to NATO. The World Economic Forum 
Report 2013 highlights the importance of understanding the implications of the 
changes in the energy landscape, as well as that of other natural resources and 
warns that this issue must be examined not only from the perspective of the 
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quantity and distribution, but as well within larger ecosystems of societal 
usage197
3. Future operations  
. 
Climate change negatively impacts mostly developing countries – which 
are already under economic hardship and social stresses – inflating existing 
tensions and instabilities.  
 
 
As a direct consequence of the foreseen security environment 
characteristics the contributors consider that the main features of future 
operations will be represented by: 
• Complex operational environment: Simultaneous engagement of 
forces throughout the full operational spectrum – air, land, 
maritime, space, and cyber – with a higher pace of operations and 
an increasing role of non-kinetic means. 
• Combined joint expeditionary operations: Because the most 
unstable areas with the greatest potential for conflict lie outside of 
NATO territories, developing expeditionary capabilities, as directed 
by most current NATO doctrine, becomes a must. 
• Increasingly confronted by Hybrid Threats (HT)198
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198 HT refers to those posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and 
non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives, according to Bi-SC Input to a New 
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environment to include non-physical domains (cyber, info/media, financial). The HT activity is difficult 
to attribute to a proximate adversary or actor as well as to identify of its originator or sponsor and may 
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: Threats will come 
through a hybrid form of warfare employing conventional, irregular, 
and criminal capabilities, integrated operationally and tactically at 
the lowest level possible, mainly in urban environments and in 
locations where the Alliance lacks capabilities support. 




• Diffuse Non-conventional Adversaries: This element is directly linked 
with the HT challenge. We face an important paradigm shift from 
the traditional concept of a super-power confrontation in which the 
enemy is identified as state actor (states or rogue states) toward 
more complex interactions of state and non-state actors. Because 
NATO has demonstrated its ability to quickly and effectively conduct 
major combat operations, states countering NATO will increasingly 
rely on sponsoring and exploiting surrogates and proxies to 
generate asymmetric challenges. Since the use of criminal and 
terrorist elements as well as other non-state actors gives nation-
states options for effectively opposing NATO interests and 
objectives without direct action, their role will likely increase in 
future operations. 
• Urbanization of warfare: Population growth trends, especially in 
developing countries, indicate that by 2025 more than 60% of the 
world’s population will live in cities. From a military perspective, 
urban warfare is extremely challenging due to its specific features 
and requirements (increased number of troops, severe limitations 
in effective use of fire-power, manoeuvre within a multidimensional 
confrontation environment—underground, ground level, and 
buildings—and presence of civilians).   
• Population – centre of gravity: In future operations, operating areas 
will increasingly overlap with densely inhabited areas. 
Subsequently, the local population will represent a key feature of 
the operational environment, and gaining the population’s support 
will become a key prerequisite for success. 
• Comprehensiveness: Recent NATO operations have demonstrated 
that the military is not able to effectively deal with the challenges 
posed by stability operations on its own. The complexity of such 
operations requires a multidisciplinary approach and enhanced 
inter-agency cooperation.   
 
4. NATO’s Role & Mission 
 
The modern security environment contains a broad and evolving set of 
challenges to the security of NATO’s territory and populations. In order to assure 




their security, the Alliance must and will continue fulfilling effectively the three 
essential core tasks mentioned within the NATO 2010 Strategic Concept and 
reiterated in the 2012 Chicago Summit Declaration: Collective Defence, Crisis 
Management and Cooperative Security. 
Considering the transnational nature of the contemporary threats, the 
robust military capabilities needed to address the full spectrum of conflict and 
crisis, beyond NATO borders, it is assessed that these three core tasks make the 
most sense. Within a future cooperative multipolar world order, NATO would be 
viewed as a key element in a globalized collective security and crisis management 
system, a forum for allied security debates on the full range of global issues and 
how best to address transnational shared threats199
• Enhanced Intel Sharing: Intelligence sharing must take place 
between NATO Nations, NATO bodies and with other partners to 
better estimates when and where crises might occur, and how they 
can best be prevented or how NATO might have to respond to 
them. 
. 
Whatever NATO’s missions might be, all are relevant from an HAOE 
standpoint. The Alliance will likely have to respond to security challenges caused 
mainly by poor governance or a lack of governance. Most of the studies 
addressing global trends estimate that these challenges will be generated by a 
mix of factors related to the rampant extremist ideologies, uncontrolled and illicit 
migration, and frictions caused by competition for and access to resources. All 
those triggers are elements of the HAOE, which must be right understood and 
considered for a proper response to these challenges.  
  
 4.1. Strategic requirements 
To be effective across the crisis management spectrum, the following 
issues must be considered while adapting NATO capabilities: 
• Specific Doctrine: Although some of the approached topics are 
covered to a certain extent by AJP-3.4200 and the subsequent 
series201
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understanding of the human dimension of the operational 
environment.     
• Tailored Force Structure: A tailored forces structure requires further 
development of military capabilities and TTPs for expeditionary 
operations, including counterinsurgency, stabilization and 
reconstruction operations. 
• Enhanced Civilian Crisis Management Capability: Enhancing the 
“appropriate but modest civilian crisis management capability202
• Training support for HN: Building local forces in a crisis zone and 
develop training capabilities, so that local authorities to be able, in a 
reasonable timeframe but as quickly as possible, to maintain 
security with minimum international assistance. 
” 
established at NATO HQ and ACO, to interface more effectively with 
civilian partners, build on the lessons learned from previous NATO-
led operations and covering relevant HAOE issues. This capability 
may also be used for integrating civilian-military planning 
throughout the crisis spectrum as well as employing and 
coordinating civilian activities until conditions allow for the transfer 
of those responsibilities and tasks to other actors. 
• Comprehensive Approach to Operations: The establishment and 
common understanding of a comprehensive approach strategy on 
both sides (military and civilian), including identification and 
training of civilian specialists from member states available for rapid 
deployment by Allies for selected missions, who will able to work 
alongside with military personnel and civilian specialists from 
partner countries and institutions. 
• Enhanced Political Cooperation: Broaden and intensify political 
consultations among Allies, as well as with other partners, both on a 
regular basis and in dealing with all stages of a crisis – before, 
during and after.  
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As NATO Secretary General Rassmussen highlighted, as well as expanding 
the range of issues where NATO cooperates, the alliance must also expand the 
range of nations with whom we engage.  
 
 
4.2. Factors influencing NATO 
 
4.2.1. A fundamentally human and non-linear environment 
NATO’s primary mission is collective defence, yet aside from the 
maritime Operation Active Endeavour, all operations have taken place outside of 
NATO nations’ boundaries and most have blended elements of conventional and 
asymmetric warfare.  
Consequently, operating in foreign sometimes far-away countries creates 
specific constraints that need to be addressed. Indeed, operating in any country 
requires action within an interconnected system with its own rules and actors. 
 
4.2.2. Direct and Indirect Complexity  
It is generally understood that when planning a military operation 
abroad, complexity and uncertainty are two key parameters to deal with. Yet it is 
worth keeping them in mind and especially the potential repercussions at all 
levels, as NATO plans activities in such an uncertain environment. Uncertainty 
derives from the multi-faceted complexity at hand and two essential levels of 
complexity can be distinguished.  
The more direct one is to operate on foreign soil against clearly defined 
opposing forces. However, military operations today are increasingly “wars 
among the people” to paraphrase Rupert Smith, where the opposing forces are 
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represented by diffuse insurgencies, rather than industrial conventional wars 
where two state actors fight against each other  
 
4.2.3. Uncertainty in decisions 
Complexity undoubtedly leads to uncertainty. This uncertainty greatly 
affects the ways, means, and ends of any military operation. It is indeed very 
difficult to anticipate the consequences of a given action. Robert Merton outlined 
four common factors that increase the potential for unexpected consequences204
• the impossibility of predicting all possible outcomes, 
: 
• errors, 
• “the imperious immediacy of interest”, and 
• basic values.  
Those reasons are not mutually exclusive and can even overlap. While 
the first is difficult to rectify, the other three demand more scrutiny.  
Errors are often linked to the assumption that past solutions can work 
again. The roots of this thinking are often a lack of appreciation between the 
specificities of different situations especially when they display seeming 
similarities.  
The “imperious immediacy of interest” is an ambiguous concept. It does 
not preclude actors from acting rationally, that is to say to achieve certain goals or 
acting according to their own interests, but they either exclude or fail to take into 
account the potential fallout a course of action can generate.  
The role of basic values is understood, but often overlooked. Whatever 
actions that are taken, whatever decisions that are made, in most cases are based 
on values that NATO believes in and acting against them can influence our 
actions. This factor does not necessarily imply a conscious choice.  
These three examples illustrate that the unexpected consequences of 
NATO’s actions could be limited if we are more careful about the choices and 
decisions we make. 
Interpreting as accurately as possible the local context and the effects 
NATO’s actions can cause depends on how much one can differentiate between 
the constitutive and constraining aspects of culture. Culture can indeed have a 
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constitutive role that shapes our actions and our reactions, but it can also restrain 
us from behaving and acting in certain ways205
 
. 
Debates in the United States about the campaigns in Iraq and 
Afghanistan have rekindled the role of understanding the local context and taking 
into consideration the human environment as an element to ensure successes 
and victories.  
So far, it has been shown that complexity and uncertainty are inherent 
aspects of modern conflicts. In addition, it has been determined that focusing on 
understanding the local context has become a primary concern for any military 
operation among to succeed in gaining the support of the local population. The 
chapter will now turn to the implications that it conveys for the political-strategic 
level.  
4.3. The role of the political-strategic level 
Complexity and uncertainty are indeed two central components that the 
political-strategic level has to tackle. Arguably, if there is a failure to address those 
issues at the highest level, there will invariably be fallout at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels. The clearer the vision and guidance that NATO’s 
political-strategic level can deliver the better for all of the levels below.  
 
4.3.1. Consequences on the political-strategic level 
In most non-conventional military operations, like Counterinsurgency, 
stability operations, peace enforcement and peace keeping, among others, 
military capabilities and military tactics generally are of secondary importance. 
Therefore, NATO's military superiority in regard to military capabilities and 
technology compared to any potential adversary often is of limited relevance in 
dealing with such operations. Afghanistan is a case in point. Instead, the human 
factors are of key importance. Often they constitute the centre of gravity in such 
operations. Success generally will not be decided by overwhelming firepower or 
mobility, but by winning over the population. This goal is of high tactical 
importance, because it can cut off insurgents from logistical support, recruitment 
and intelligence. But generally it also is strategically decisive, because any non-
conventional armed group without political support in society will be reduced to 
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being just a criminal gang. In this case it could be isolated, separated from the 
population and would therefore be much more vulnerable to state repression.  
In this sense winning the loyalty and respect of the population is the 
main battleground, which has to be won to make military operations effective. 
Any effective strategy in non-conventional operations should focus on winning 
over the population. Military superiority and tactical efficiency cannot be 
substitutes for such a strategy.  
Such a strategic focus has to put legitimacy at its centre. Political and 
military forces which are not perceived as legitimate (or: more legitimate than the 
opposition) by the population, will hardly win the loyalty or the population. 
Winning the contest for legitimacy therefore is key for successful 
counterinsurgency, stability, peace keeping/enforcement operations. This applies 
to the legitimacy of NATO, NATO troops and NATO operations, but even more to 
the legitimacy of a host government supported by NATO. If such a government is 
perceived as illegitimate or as less legitimate than the opposition by its own 
population, the supporting foreign troops will be tainted as well. Even if NATO 
troops operate with restraint, culturally sensitive, and efficient, they still will be 
seen as illegitimate if their main purpose is to support a discredited and/or 
illegitimate host government. Also, working with notorious warlords or other non-
state actors for tactical reasons will undercut the legitimacy of NATO troops and 
NATO operations.  
This dependency on often dubious host governments is one of the key 
vulnerabilities of external strategy development. Without a cooperating host 
government external forces would be hardly more than occupation troops - which 
would undercut their legitimacy. But if the host government is incompetent, 
corrupt, repressive or otherwise illegitimate, being its supporter would have the 
same effect. Transforming the host government into an efficient and legitimate 
entity in the eyes of the local population therefore is a keystone for successful 
military operations. Without this, NATO operations will lack a key precondition for 
success. NATO strategy has to offer a working solution to this problem, if it is 
expected to achieve the desired goals. 
 
4.3.2. Implications for NATO’s political-strategic pillar  
Despite the caveat that the North Atlantic Council (NAC) is an 
intergovernmental body, the following recommendations do not require the NAC 
to change its procedures. First, the NAC sets the tone for all levels of war below 




and has a role to pave the way adequately. Second, the NAC’s role is to act as “the 
paragon of good practices.” Third, it should strike the right balance between a 
top-down and bottom-up approach to allow all levels to contribute to the whole 
of the operation.  
First, the role of the NAC is to set the right tone. We have seen that all 
levels of war have both vertical and horizontal dimensions that make them 
interdependent. The NAC is the institution that sets the strategic end-states, and 
the priorities for the operation. Moreover, it sets the level of fighting 
commitments in terms of resources (both human and material) 
Second, the NAC needs to act as the “paragon of good practices.” 
According to the new Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive (COPD), the 
NAC retains the ultimate authority to approve military documents. Throughout 
NATO’s Crisis Management Process, the NAC intervenes politically at six junctures. 
Before the execution (phase 5), the NAC has played a role five times:  
• To decide that a crisis requires assessment and advice on the 
developing situation (the Political-Military Estimate).  
• To task SACEUR to develop a response strategy.  
• To issue the NAC Initiative Directive (NID). 
• To approve the CONOPS and the OPLAN. 
• And to give formal authorization to execute the OPLAN.  
This authority gives the NAC tremendous power and it should be used 
wisely and effectively.  As Paul Van Riper staid, in “a non-linear system, there are 
no right or wrong approach, just better or poorer ones206
Third, it is important to strike the right balance between a top-down and 
bottom-up approach. Once the execution has begun, all levels of war may be 
confronted with situations that require adaptations at one level or more. The new 
COPD anchors more responsibilities to the top political-strategic level, i.e. 
diplomats and civil servants. In the different phases of the crisis management 
process, the role and influence of military officers are diminishing to the point 
that the distinction between the political and the strategic is waning. Yet, the 
longer an operation lasts, the more the strategic and operational levels are 
gaining influence; additionally, this phenomenon holds true when an operation 
.” It requires an 
operational design that is broad and thoughtful.  
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mobilizes vast human resources207
 
. Indeed, periodic mission reviews gives the 
military commanders a platform to interject greater influence. A top-down 
approach gives the political-strategic level more responsibilities but it can also 
lead the political-strategic level to disregard valuable inputs from levels below. A 
heuristic approach offers the opportunity for valuable tactical level assessments 
to be incorporated upward because as we have emphasized, actions on the 
ground can have political fallout.  
4.4. Economy influence  
Another aspects restricting military and NATO itself is the economical 
factor. Despite globalization and increasing economic integration, the economic 
crisis of the past few years demonstrated that the global economy still has 
vulnerabilities. This economic crisis influenced most of the NATO nations’ 
budgets, thus directly impacting through cutbacks and reductions the military 
spending and the budgets of their Ministries of Defence.       
Moreover, according to the World Economic Forum Global Risks 2013 
Report, the global risk thought most likely to manifest itself over the next 10 years 
is severe income disparity, while the risk rated as having the highest impact, if it 
were to occur, is major systemic financial failure208
NATO is of course the sum of its members’ ambitions. At present there is 
a growing gap between aspirations/agreed concepts, and the willingness of 
member nations to meet commitments. In other words, to achieve maximum 
effect in a large complex space over time and distance with limited resources 
would likely require a truly radical reform of the NATO command structure, not to 
mention a new set of relationships with key partners vital to mission success.  
. The challenge is more obvious 
since it will increase the potential for conflicts while the NATO’s need for 
resources to mitigate these conflicts will grow. 
NATO already realized that it has to do more with less and has presented 
its Smart Defence Concept during the NATO Chicago summit (20-21MAY2012). 
However, the decision on military budgets and its spending are directly under the 
political control of the individual member governments.  
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Figure 7.1: Budgetary spending FY2012  
 
4.5. Understanding NATO 
NATO will be required to effectively operate in increasingly complex 
situations within both Article 5 and Non Article 5 Crisis Response Operations. The 
complexity derives firstly from the high number and diversity of actors present in 
the operational environment, and secondly from the heterogeneous composition 
of the Alliance itself.  
NATO is the sum of its members’ ambitions and can be described as a 
country consisting of 28 tribes, each tribe with its own political system which are, 
on one hand, generally very similar, but, on another slightly different as each has 
its own unique characteristics. In order to use NATO effectively to accomplish the 
things they wish to do, the allies primarily need to have, not identical, but 
compatible interests209
The complexity of the entire system, which by nature is a bureaucratic 
system, is closely connected with the complexity of decision making processes 
influenced by different committees, commissions and working groups, framed by 
.   
NATO has a huge structure, combining hierarchical and matrix type’s 
connections. Moreover its management consists of political and military parts and 
the whole system is closely tied to individual nations. It has different links to other 
non-NATO nations and international organizations and with the gradual 
implementation of the comprehensive approach strategy the number of 
connections will grow. 
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priorities and standards, and digitally overloaded.  All of these create conditions 
for a delay in decision making and/or a lack of coordination which supports the 
above mentioned uncertainties. Despite this complexity and uncertainty, NATO 
was and is still able to reach workable solutions, to assume collective 

























































































Figure 7.2: Interrelationships within NATO 
 
4.5.1. Decision making 
A more agile NATO command and control (C2) construct is needed with 
clearly defined roles and responsibilities of different NATO bodies, entities, 
agencies, as well as committees and working groups. Subsequently in the 
contemporary international security environment the Alliance requires a smaller 
but nevertheless effective cluster of headquarters (HQs) that can rotate 
seamlessly without any loss of institutional memory or operational momentum. 
These headquarters should all conform to a common set of C2 standards, 
enabling a plug-and-play structure easily augmentable as and when required.  




A perspective in dealing with diversity, which exists amongst the 
different cultures comprising the Alliance, is presented by the concept of a 
Human Approach to Operations210
5. Remarks on HAOE terminology and strategy 
. 
The Human Approach to Operations is defined as using the consideration 
of human nature to anticipate operational consequences and impacts, and to 
improve the effectiveness of crisis management. 
 
 
“Human Aspects of the Operational Environment” after the experiences 
in Somalia, Afghanistan and other deployments seem to be a key variable of 
successful operations. In all these cases Western military forces were never 
lacking military superiority. In regard to size, mobility and firepower (and financial 
resources) the forces of NATO or NATO member countries have been so 
overwhelmingly superior to any and all adversaries that traditional military 
thinking would have suggested easy, fast and convincing victories. Those did not 
happen, or they only occurred in regard to military forces organized and fielded 
by nation-state governments, like Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and, Afghanistan of the 
Taliban, as well as Muammar Gaddafi's Libya. On the other hand, the use of 
military force against some non-state actors has been less than convincing. For 
instance, all of NATO's expensive and impressive military capabilities after more 
than a decade of war did not result in victory in Afghanistan when facing an often 
illiterate adversary of perhaps 25 or 30,000 fighters without an air force and with 
a comparably meagre budget. The main reason obviously is that this and 
comparable wars have not been conventional military ones, but of a completely 
different character. Counterinsurgency (COIN), as should be well known by now, 
basically is not a military confrontation, but a political struggle in which military 
force is only one variable amongst others, and not even the most important one. 
The Field Manual "Counterinsurgency" of the US Army and the US Marine Corps 
(FM 3-24) was not the first military document to describe this clearly: 
“In fact, some capabilities required for conventional success—for 
example, the ability to execute operational manoeuvre and employ massive 
firepower—may be of limited utility or even counterproductive in COIN operations. 
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Nonetheless, conventional forces beginning COIN operations often try to use these 
capabilities to defeat insurgents; they almost always fail.”211
“Political power is the central issue in insurgencies and 
counterinsurgencies; each side aims to get the people to accept its governance or 
authority as legitimate.”
 
It is very difficult not to agree with this observation. Also the key reasons 
are well known, though not often taken into account: 
212 Therefore, victory can hardly ever be won only by 
military means: “Victory is achieved when the populace consents to the 
government's legitimacy and stops actively and passively supporting the 
insurgency.”213
“War amongst the people is different [compared to other, conventional 
war: it is the reality in which the people in the streets and houses and fields - all 
the people, anywhere - are the battlefield. Military engagements can take place 
anywhere: in the presence of civilians, against civilians, in defence of civilians. 
Civilians are the targets, objectives to be won, as much as an opposing force.”
 
This is a political not military achievement. Several analysts and military 
officers have accordingly emphasized that the centre of gravity in 
counterinsurgencies and similar operations - and therefore the key to success - is 
the loyalty of the population, not destroying enemy forces or controlling territory.   
If these lessons from the last several decades of counterinsurgency 
operations are correct, then the ‘Operational Environment’ does not have some 
‘human aspects’. These ‘human aspects’ are not just aspects of something else, 
but they are key, the centre of gravity of these specific kinds of war. The human 
society is not a factor or aspect in COIN, but the real battlefield, and this 
battlefield is a political not military one. Former British General Rupert Smith 
appropriately coined the term “war amongst the people” and wrote: 
214
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If the people, the whole population of another country, are the centre of 
gravity, the most important resource, the victims and actors, and the battlefield 
of the war at the same time, it is obvious that military force has to have a 
completely different meaning and relevance than in war against another state.  




Success or failure in COIN or related operations will be decided by 
political, social, economic and cultural measures. Military operations may (or may 
not, depending on timing and approach) play important supporting roles. They 
can buy time for political reforms, and they can be very useful to help create a 
secure and stable environment for it. But they will hardly ever be decisive. If no 
coherent political-economic-social strategy is in place to resolve the basic 
problems of a given society, or if this strategy is not implemented resourcefully 
and competently, military operations will only prolong the conflict, but hardly 
ever decide it.215
A ‘comprehensive approach’ should be developed from the centre of 
gravity (winning the trust of the population by creating or strengthening 
legitimacy of governance). An appropriate civil-military strategy, which places the 
loyalty and trust of the population at its centre, has to be developed. Separate 
civilian and military sub-strategies have to serve this integrated approach and 
should not be allowed to undercut it.
 
216
“Capturing the will of the people is a very clear and basic concept, yet 
one that is either misunderstood or ignored by political and military 
establishments around the world. The politician keeps applying force to attain a 
condition, assuming the military will both create and maintain it. And whilst for 
many years the military has understood the need to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of 
the local population, this is still seen as a supporting activity to the defeat of the 
insurgents rather than the overall objective, and it is often under-resourced and 
  
The problem for NATO and its member countries is not, that these 
considerations would not be known and clear. The opposite is true. But the 
problem is that they are very rarely implemented. Winning the loyalty and 
support of the population by creating a legitimate and effective government (in 
the words of Rupert smith: “capturing the will of the people” in obvious 
opposition to capturing territory or enemies) is accepted on paper, but often 
ignored in reality:  
                                                          
215 Jochen Hippler, "Counterinsurgency - Theorien unkonventioneller Kriegführung: Callwell, 
Thompson, Smith, und das US Army Field Manual 3-24" [Counterinsurgency - Theories of 
Unconventional War: Callwell, Thompson, Smith, and the US Army Field Manual 3-24; in German], in: 
Thomas Jäger / Rasmus Beckmann (Hrsg.), Handbuch Kriegstheorien, Wiesbaden 2011, pp. 256-283 
216 Jochen Hippler, Counterinsurgency and Political Control – US Military Strategies Regarding Regional 
Conflict, INEF-Report 81 (Institute for Development and Peace), Duisburg 2006; online: 
http://www.jochenhippler.de/US_Counterinsurgency.pdf 




restricted to low-level acts to ameliorate local conditions and the lot of the 
people.”217
6. Findings and recommendations 
 
When military and civilian deployments take place in a context of violent 
conflict, the different actors tend to apply off-the-shelf instruments and off-the-
shelf strategies they are used to and feel comfortable with. Development officials 
implement their standard development programs, soldiers focus on what they 
know best and are trained for - but in this process the strategic approach in 
regard to the centre of gravity tends to get lost. Winning over the population gets 
translated into “hearts-and-minds” talk, and this in turn is often simply seen as 
civic action, media operations and PSYOPs. This is not enough. Establishing the 
legitimacy of a host government is not achieved by well-drilling or providing other 
useful services by foreign troops - it often requires a complete overhaul of state 
structures and procedures, even a change in political elites. It often requires a 
readjustment of the state-society interface. It is obvious that no military force is in 
a position to achieve this basic goal of COIN or comparable operations. This is a 
key challenge for NATO. If a civilian strategy and the personnel and financial 
resources to implement it are lacking, military forces are placed in an untenable 
situation. They are used as a substitute of policy, instead of being an instrument 
of policy. This is politically unwise. It also is irresponsible towards the soldiers 




6.1. General considerations  
Understanding the human aspects of the operational environment is an 
essential factor of planning for success across the full spectrum of military 
operations. While the adage that “warfare is political conflict by other means” is 
widely recognized, combatants who underestimate the impact of the human 
element in military operations do so at their risk. During the Second World War 
and the reconstruction that followed, as well as during the Cold War, 
understanding human aspects of the operational environment was considered 
essential.  
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Substantial improvements by NATO are needed in understanding human 
aspects today. In particular, NATO must take a longer-term view and build upon 
increased capability achieved in recent operations. It must institutionalize the 
best of current programs and processes so that this capability is also available 
across the full spectrum of military operations, including increased emphasis on 
activities, referred to as Phase 0, that seek to mitigate the likelihood of armed 
conflict. 
To be effective in the long term, NATO must develop more coherence in 
the Alliance’s efforts to enhance human aspects awareness. Most importantly, its 
capability must be expanded beyond the focus of current armed conflicts so that 
both the HQs and military services to have the flexibility to adjust rapidly to 
events in other places in the world. Playing “catch-up” will not be an efficient 
option. 
Establishing a separate military social science structure would probably 
not contribute much to fostering cultural awareness in NATO. However, an 
interagency coordination structure for preparing teams of International 
Organizations (IO), Governmental Organizations (GO), and eventually 
Nongovernmental Organizations (NGO) representatives for stability operations, 
such as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT), would contribute much to the 
preparations for future engagements. Such a structure would provide both socio-
cultural knowledge and human aspects astuteness. It would also foster 
interagency participation and enable the implementation of the Comprehensive 
Approach Strategy in combat operations.  
Using Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) has often been a challenge due to 
some difficulties that have been encountered, such as: 
• Lack of framework, procedures and funding for effectively engaging 
and sharing expertise with academia and think tanks. 
• Insufficient training of military personnel and key advisors in the 
area of human aspects, mainly with respect to cultural/social 
studies, network analysis, and human dynamic models and 
simulations. 
• Lack of pool of military SMEs and an attractive career path for 
military personnel in the human aspects area.  
• Obstructive security rules and documents classification and 
“releaseability”. 
Within academia, think tanks and NGOs there is considerable expertise in 
human aspects knowledge and a willingness to share and constantly improve this 




expertise, but NATO does not currently efficiently employ these existing 
resources, which could enhance military capabilities during operations and 
provide a thorough human aspects understanding. 
Within different NATO bodies and NATO nations there are considerable 
human aspects databases, but they are independent of each other and have been 
created for use by specific elements of the NATO and the international 
community218
Belatedly, Coalition forces realized that the key to success lay in the 
hearts and minds of the population, but often the campaigns directed to win 
hearts and minds have been focused on trying to change opinion or attitudes and 
not behaviour
. Furthermore, no common formats, metadata, or ontology have 
been established. The majority of these databases are not properly maintained, 
fully populated, updated, or interoperable. Another issue is the limited access and 
interaction with these databases is usually tailored to specific users, making them 
of limited utility to others. In addition, some data, such as those related to trends, 
attitudes, and beliefs, are difficult to extract from open source documents, are 
proprietary and held by corporations that conduct polls, or do not exist in regions 
or at levels of granularity necessary for operations.  
The operational environment encompasses not only the threat but also 
the physical, informational, social, cultural, religious, and economic elements of 
the environment. All of these elements are essential for understanding the causes 
of conflicts, developing an appropriate approach, and anticipating subsequent 
effects. Proper understanding of the OE by NATO in recent operations was 
influenced by the prevalence of a conventional approach to operations (i.e. 
operations planning, Intel support). Furthermore, a comprehensive understanding 
of OE requires adequate capabilities (HUMINT, interpreters, SME support or fused 
Intel), that have proved to be insufficient in recent operations. 
Recent operations proved as well that winning in combat is not enough 
to be successful and that on a local or global scale the strategic objectives can be 
achieved without engaging in combat actions. NATO was slow to recognize the 
importance of information and the battle for the narrative in achieving objectives 
at all levels; it was often ineffective in applying and aligning the narrative to goals 
and desired end states.  
219
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Steve Tatham demonstrate that the defining characteristic of resolving armed 
disputes will be people’s behaviour, and our ability to understand and modify that 
behaviour. Relevant in understanding the importance between beliefs, attitude 
and behaviour, the authors mention a field experiment conducted by Harvard 
trained psychologist Elisabeth Levy-Paluck, on the Hutu and Tutsi ethnic tensions 
in Rwanda. During a yearlong field study she used dedicated crafted radio 
programmes in an effort to change beliefs, perception of social norms and 
behaviour. Paluck’s conclusion was that while the study did little to change the 
personal beliefs of the subjects, it was very effective at instilling social norms, 
which drove the observed measurable changes in behaviour.  
Before achieving the desired behaviour of the target audience, a clearly 
defined mission and achievable desired end-state are essential for an operation’s 
success. These primarily derive from proper understanding of both NATO 
capabilities and the operational environment. 
For example, while all the Alliance members voted for the Unified 
Protector Mission in Libya, less than half have effectively participated, and less 
than a third have been willing to get involved in strike missions. Some authors 
argue that many of those allies stay on the sidelines because they do not have the 
necessary military capabilities to participate and not because they don’t want to 
take part in the mission220. 
 
Finding a proper balance between what is wanted, what is possible and 
what can be accepted represents a prerequisite for a successful NATO 
operation. 
 
Transitions between phases of operations offer opportunities for 
advancing NATO’s strategic interests if they are managed well; alternately, they 
are opportunities for the enemy or for the failure of the intended objectives if 
they are not. NATO management of transitions in recent operations had shown:  
• Flaws in preparation, faulty assumptions, and inadequate branches 
and sequels.  
• Disconnects between military and civilian planning efforts.  
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• Insufficient resourcing of key transitions. 
• Lack of guidance and unity of effort from strategic leadership.  
NATO doctrines, training, and equipment were often poorly suited to 
operations other than major combat, forcing extensive and costly transformation, 
and in the process, affecting the mission. Similarly, forces were trained to win 
against another nation’s armed forces, and were not prepared to combat 
adaptive insurgencies as, for example, the one in Afghanistan. 
In regard to this issue, on March 2010, the Security Defence Agenda 
(SDA), the British Council, and NATO organized a conference on the role of 
cultural relations in conflict prevention and resolution. According to the 
Conference Report221
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 the event demonstrated how “cultural” projects on the 
ground can improve dialogue, and hence playing a part in both preventing conflict 
and stabilizing post-conflict theatres. Much of the debate dealt with cultural 
relations in the field of conflict resolution, which put the spotlight directly on 
Afghanistan.  The report highlighted that at  a  previous  SDA  event,  a NATO  
representative  had  stressed  that  the  Alliance’s comprehensive  approach  
meant  all  international  bodies working  together, but 18  months later,  NATO’s  
Deputy Branch  Chief  Joint  Operations  Colonel  Per  Mikkelsen admitted  that  
the  Alliance  was  still on  a  learning  curve. During the same event NATO’s 
Assistant Secretary General for Operations, Martin Howard, agreed that pre-
deployment training in this area was probably not enough and that civil-military 
operations in Afghanistan needed cultural issues and relations to be embedded in 
the overall planning.   
This will be a challenging issue involving both interagency and internal 
coordination and planning, thus a proper integration of different services and 
branches could bring synergies in creating a force multiplying effect. 
In the recent operations interagency coordination was uneven due to 
inconsistent participation in planning, training, and operations; policy gaps; 
resources; and differences in organizational culture. Similarly, the military was 
challenged in working with NGOs, a type of organization that interacts frequently 
with some civilian governmental agencies / bodies but less commonly with the 
military. Overall NATO interagency coordination was unable to connect the full 
extent of national capabilities in order to meet the operational requirements. 




NATO is now a hub for a global network of security partners which have 
served alongside NATO forces in Afghanistan, Libya and Kosovo222. 
 
Partnering is an inherently interagency activity, but there was an overall 
lack of unity in these efforts. Partnering between NATO and host nations is 
essential for NATO to achieve its strategic goals and promote a number of key 
objectives. Partnering enables the host nation to develop a sustainable capacity 
to provide security and counter threats that can provide an exit strategy for NATO 
and offer an alternative to sustaining a large NATO footprint on the ground. 
Partnering also enhances as well the legitimacy of NATO operations and freedom 
of action. Finally, partnering offers NATO a way to advance its objectives through 
influence rather than through direct action. 
NATO’s new Strategic Concept identifies “cooperative security” as one of 
NATO’s three essential core tasks. However, previously establishing and 
sustaining coalition unity of effort was a challenge due to competing national 
interests, cultures, resources, and policies. Critical challenges when operating 
with partners included:  
• national caveats,  
• interoperability, 
• training,  
• tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs),  
• resources, 
• national interests, 
• culture, 
• information sharing, and 
• inclusion in planning.  
 
6.2. Recommendations 
The proposed short to mid-term solutions for transforming NATO 
capabilities panel follow the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System 
(DOTMPLFI) elements:  
                                                          
222 US President Barack Obama and NATO SG Anders Fogh Rasmussen statement before Chicago 
Summit (2010) 





D - Doctrine key recommendation 
Development of a NATO umbrella document under Bi-SC coordination 
regarding HAOE and subsequent revision of the existing doctrines to 
include HAOE in order to provide the framework for oversight and 
coordination of activities related to human aspects in NATO HQs as well as 
in TOs. 
 
The importance of human aspects for the military operations, or other 
similar terms used to address this issue (i.e. human dynamics, human terrain, 
operational culture, cultural aspects) is generally recognised by many of the NATO 
nations. Some of them are more advanced in developing initiatives and 
approaches regarding human aspects but there is no NATO umbrella document in 
this respect. Consequently there is no regulatory framework and effective 
oversight, planning and coordination of activities related to human aspects.  
The importance of the population within an operational environment is 
mentioned within AJP 3(A) Allied Doctrine for Operations but it has been 
concluded that these references are not being sufficiently emphasized. The 
essential points refer to: 
• The importance of the consent of the population regarding the 
presence of a force charged with a Peace Support Operation (PSO) 
mission. 
• The impact of the PSO’s professional conduct in its relations with 
the local population as it works to earn its respect. 
• The partially dependability of the force on the civilian population for 
resources and information. 
• The aim of CIMIC in establishing and maintaining the full 
cooperation of the civilian population and institutions in order to 
offer the joint force commander the greatest possible moral, 
material, environmental and tactical advantages. 
• The commanders’ moral and legal responsibility towards the civilian 
populations. 




• Harmonizing the military commander’s aims and methods with 
those of the civilian population and institutions in the area as part 
of a collective strategy to meet the conditions for military success. 
• The role of Public Information Offices (PIO) activities during the 
preparatory stage of an operation, with the aim of accurately and 
rapidly informing the population within the Joint Operational Area 
(JOA) of NATO’s mission, thereby gaining their understanding and 
support. 
• The needs of the indigenous population which are likely to be 
inextricably linked to the mission. 
The recently introduced and still not institutionalized Comprehensive 
Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment (CIPOE) incorporates 
some elements related to culture but does not reflect properly more relevant 
human aspects that can have a significant influence on military operations. 
Intelligence provides the commander with a prediction of his adversary’s 
likely tactics or an assessment of his capabilities and it is generally admitted that 
possession of intelligence is a battle-winning factor. However, considering the 
definition of Intelligence, which states that it is “The product resulting from the 
processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile 
forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations”223
Crisis Response Operations and the HAOE as a part of them, covers a 
much broader spectrum of activities, processes and factors compared with a 
relatively simplified intelligence role during high intensity warfare, which focused 
mainly on the enemy. Consequently, the intelligence structure and its policies, 
procedures and education must be adapted to these new challenges. A more 
complex and comprehensive approach from the intelligence staff, including close 
coordination and cooperation with other relevant military branches and staff will 
be required. Intelligence perspectives on the significance and value of 
information, over-classification of information as a protective measure and 
reluctance in sharing information are other elements which should be 
reconsidered.  Intelligence gathering should actively engage departments and 
, it is clear that 
the role of Intelligence is not being fully exploited. As presently conducted, there 
is an overwhelming approach directed towards intelligence collection about 
adversary forces and much less focusing on collecting information regarding local 
populations in potential areas of operation.  
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agencies government-wide as well as commercial and NGO resources and 
capabilities in the collection and use of data and preparation of products.   
Additional considerations and recommendations include: 
• Existing national concepts, doctrines and studies (Human Dynamics, 
Human Terrain, Operational Culture, and Cultural Aspects) provide a 
valuable background in this respect. 
• Make NATO HQ’s responsible for developing a comprehensive 
strategy to provide human aspects awareness for future NATO 
operations, to include among others knowledge management and 
sharing, directives on education and training, human aspects 
cells/advisors and other requirements that may be deemed 
necessary. 
• Develop ways to include the HAOE in the operational planning as 
part of CIPOE and eventually reflected as a separate annex of 
Operational Plan (OPLAN). 
• Adapting the role of Intelligence, to better reflect the importance of 
Human Aspects for understanding the OE and building the Common 
Operational Picture.  
• Assess the utility and feasibility of developing Sociological 
Intelligence (SOCINT) capabilities for NATO. 
 
O - Organization key recommendation 
Establish a specialized structure within NATO HQ or subordinate Strategic 
Commands (ACT/ACO) to act as a coordinator and centralized body for 
human aspects knowledge, as well as dedicated cells within subordinates 
commands’ Peace Establishment (PE) and Theatre of Operations (TO’s) 
Crisis Establishment (CE). 
 
Additional considerations and recommendations include: 
• Human Aspects understanding is more than knowing the well-
known dos and don’ts of a given region which can be easily learned 
by all military personnel. What is more difficult is to reach the 




proper regional expertise combined with postgraduate level 
education in social sciences related disciplines. In order to achieve 
this NATO has to adapt its organizational structure to 
institutionalize human aspects as a formal element of its 
operational planning. 
• Personnel assigned within this body should reflect a variety of 
backgrounds: military experts, social sciences professionals 
(psychology, anthropology, sociology, history, and linguistics), 
security and public safety advisors, medics, and engineers as well as 
IO, GO, and NGO representatives. Clear responsibilities would be 
required for each position in order to avoid duplication of effort or 
conflicting advice. 
 A body such as this can assist the military and civil 
participants with achieving readiness for stability operations 
and can also form and train as well multi-disciplinary teams 
for the augmentation of any NATO country team.  
• Include deployable civil-military SME teams to act as a 
Comprehensive Advisors Cell for Commanders and/or an Alternative 
Analysis Team: 
 Commander’s Comprehensive Advisory Cell (Civilian Advisory 
Cluster)224
 This cell can incorporate existing advisors (e.g. Political 
Advisor, Cultural Advisor, etc), however some new advisors 
will be needed (e.g. anthropologist, psychologist, sociologist, 
linguist etc). 
: Organizational synergy can be improved by 
having political and development advisors cooperate closely 
with military commanders in the field. 
• Include a Civilian Planning Element:  
 High Readiness Forces (HRF) HQs must be able to effectively 
‘plug and play’ with a cadre of civilian experts built around a 
dedicated Civilian Planning Element (CPE) itself embedded in 
civil-military planning and the civil support elements of a 
headquarters225
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 The CPE must be able to pass on knowledge and the know-
how to preserve continuity of the campaign.  
• Enhancement of Existing Crisis Management Capabilities: 
 Including HAOE among civilian crisis management 
capabilities established at the NATO HQ and ACO. 
 Incorporation of HAOE (as branch/section) into already 
existing NATO Civil – Military Fusion Centre (CFC), extending 
the CFC teams / focus areas and number of remote interim 
research support organizations; the CFC’s current main focus 
is on Afghanistan, the MENA region and anti-piracy but could 
be extended to potential conflict areas. 
• Socio-cultural Intelligence (SOCINT) cell:  
 A SOCINT cell can be included into the Joint Intelligence 
Centre (JIC) structure.  
 The main role would be the support of direction and control 
of the collection effort in the field of the socio-cultural and 
human aspects of the operational environment as well as the 
analysis of acquired data and information and production of 
relevant intelligence products.  
 Another option would be the establishment of a specific 
organizational structure (similar to the US Human Terrain 
System [HTS]) focusing on the SOCINT function under a 
neutral (not intelligence related) name within the Knowledge 
Management Directorate, which would nevertheless closely 
coordinate its activity with the Intelligence Staff (CJ2).  
 
T – Training key recommendation 
Considering the life-long learning as the key in preparing NATO forces for 
the complexities of the future, support the NATO Bi-SC in modifying the 
standard curriculum at NATO training organizations, as well as national 
curricula, to incorporate various types of units training in human aspects, 
tailored to individual units’ missions. 
 
 




Additional considerations and recommendations include: 
• Expand the curriculum in this area for professional military 
education to provide relevant advanced degree education. Develop 
innovative processes for recruiting and rewarding human aspects 
expertise. 
• Join Force Commands (JFCs) should direct the combatant 
commanders to develop TTPs for employing enhanced knowledge 
of human aspects in anticipation of stability operations with NATO 
forces in non-combatant roles, cooperating closely with combatant 
commands, NATO agencies, and NGOs, as well as allies and host 
nations. 
• Consider planning and organizing an annual NATO Joint Military and 
Civilian Exercise focused on implementation of Comprehensive 
Approach Strategy. 
• Invite participation of interagency and NGO representatives in 
mission readiness exercises during planning and in after-action 
review. 
• Establish education and training for Intelligence analysts on the 
HAOE domain to complement a more technically oriented military 
education with human science education. 
 
M – Material key recommendation 
Create a proper Human Aspects architecture allowing user-friendly and 
quick access to all dedicated databases, including the facility of sharing 
data among multiple users. 
 
Additional considerations and recommendations include: 
• Define and implement a more robust research effort to explore the 
potential of relevant science and technology efforts in cross-cutting 
human aspects research, linking dynamic network analysis to 
findings and models with direct military relevance. 
• Operational commanders should generate general and specific 
requirements for data collection to populate the Human Aspects 




databases with regional, sub regional and local information, as well 
as assuring products preparation and evaluation. They should 
provide guidance, direction and support to forces deployed in 
respective AO for documentation of relevant human aspects.  
• One good example of employing the material capability is the US 
HTS connectivity to a reach-back centre in the USA, allowing access 
via this centre to a Subject Matter Expert Network (SME net). 
 
L – Leadership key recommendation 
Educate leaders on the importance of Human Aspects in the Stability 
Operations, acquiring awareness and skills to manage Intercultural factors 
in Multinational Military Operations. 
 
Additional considerations and recommendations include: 
• The key abilities necessary for leaders in regard to the HAOE should 
address overcoming cultural barriers to effective teamwork, 
generating and promoting trust and mutual respect, as well as 
dealing with communication, conflict resolution, diplomacy, 
mediation and negotiation. 
• Joint education and training with personnel from different 
departments and civilian organizations. 
• Understanding the importance and role of information 
management within current and future operations. Ensure 
communication strategy considering all relevant actors’ instruments 
of power; cultural, religious, and other demographic factors; and 
employing innovative, non-traditional methods and sources.  
 
P – Personnel key recommendation 
Identifying what skills, knowledge and competences are needed in HAOE 
field and developing the new force capabilities by considering the need of 




qualified people for both peacetime and wartime.  
 
Additional considerations and recommendations include: 
• It seems that emerging security challenges of the 21st century will 
require 2 types of armed forces:   
 first one, quick entry forces to win the battle (Marine, Air 
Force, Navy, SOF, Army), 
 second one stabilization forces (Army, SOF). 
• The current military machinery of all NATO countries supports the 
first category. Most of the NATO (as well as national) doctrines and 
procedures are designed to support the first type. Education and 
training are mainly focused on combat skills (from the early 
beginning of the military career) and take precedence over PSO. In 
addition to this the most of the Military Research organizations and 
institutions including military industry, are primarily supportive of 
quick entry forces. 
• It may be naive to propose having two different types of armed 
forces, especially in context of the recent economic situation, but it 
seems that the desired solution for countering emerging security 
challenges of 21st century requires a shift in the current paradigm.  
This transition will influence not only the personnel but also other 
DOTPLMFI capabilities. First, they must be identified and specified: 
 Required capabilities (including new, novel capabilities) – 
Personnel and Organizations. 
 Identification of new TTPs – Doctrines. 
 Rapid changes within / adaptation of Education & Training 
(E&T), as well as development of E&T for newly identified 
capabilities – Training, Organizations, People. 
 Adaptation of Research and Development to new 
capabilities, including military research organizations and 
military industry - Organizations.  
 
 




F – Facilities key recommendation 
It is concluded that there is no need for building new facilities to support 
the implementation of the HAOE concept. The existing infrastructure 
within NATO bodies and HQ in TOs allows fulfilment with a minimum 
effort those HAOE requirements related to DOTMPLI elements. 
 
I – Interoperability key recommendation 
A broad range of common standards needs to be developed, agreed upon 
and implemented between military and civilian actors. 
 
Additional considerations and recommendations:  
• Implementing the HAOE as part of the Comprehensive Approach 
Strategy, within a military organization will require improved 
interoperability based on the partners’ willingness to cooperate. 
Internal institutional prejudices between different military services, 
branches and disciplines must be set aside in order to build up a 
proper cooperative environment. 
• It is imperative to avoid confusion based on differences in 
understanding regarding terms of reference when the NGO’s and 
the military occupy the same space and where missions may 
overlap. 
• The establishment and common understanding of a comprehensive 
approach strategy on both sides (military and civilian) is a pre 
condition for success. As far as it is practical, an agreement on the 
common use of language and standardization of terms should be 
encouraged. A key issue in achieving interoperability is describing in 
common terms what each participant does. 
 
 




7. Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Findings and recommendations presented throughout this chapter will 
not be addressed again in this closing part.  Instead the paragraphs below 
summarize the key recommendations grouped according to a possible 
implementation horizon. 
Short term implementation: 
 Designating a single NATO body to coordinate different working groups 
and panels dealing with human aspects within NATO;  
 Establishing a designated body/structure responsible for human aspects 
knowledge within NATO; 
 Establishing a pool of subject matter experts in the social science and 
humanities that can support and assist NATO in human aspects field;  
 Defining a suitable framework for partnering with external subject 
matter experts, international organizations, non-governmental 
organizations, academia, and think-tanks; 
 Designing a human aspects database architecture; 
 Assessing the utility of establishing socio-cultural capabilities for NATO; 
 Assessing the feasibility of assigning and training specially designated 
stabilization forces. 
Medium term implementation: 
 Developing a Bi-SC Capstone Concept on Human Aspects of the 
Operational Environment; 
 Revision of draft AJP-3.4.5, Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations, 
to address human aspects as key part of the operational environment; 
 Establishing deployable civil-military advisory teams with extensive 
expertise on social sciences and humanities; 
 Revising the Comprehensive Intelligence Preparation of the Operational 
Environment process to properly reflect the human aspects; 




 Revising the Comprehensive Operational Planning Directive to reflect 
human aspects as a separate Annex or Appendix or other appropriate 
manner; 
 Revising the missions and tasks of Intelligence to include human aspects-
related responsibilities; 
 Establishing a SOCINT cell under J2 at Strategic and Joint Forces 
Command level;  
 Developing E&T curricula for training SOCINT analysts; 
 Developing interdepartmental, inter-agencies & inter-organizations 
common E&T programmes; 
 Adapting the TTPs and training programmes of combat units to include 
human aspects awareness; 
 Considering an annual NATO combined joint military and civilian exercise 
focused on implementation of Comprehensive Approach Strategy. 
The findings and recommendations presented by this panel will provide 
the foundation for enhancing NATO capabilities in respect to Human Aspects of 
the Operational Environment. Although all implications presented are of some 
significance to NATO, the Alliance will eventually have to decide how it will adapt, 
considering that the implementation of decisions taken now might become 
effective only in the medium and long term. 
 






History proves that human aspects have always shaped military conflicts. 
Although awareness of this realm cannot guarantee success in current and future 
conflicts, a lack of awareness can certainly solidify resistance of local actors, result 
in unintended repercussions, and generate, if not a self-defeating policy, then a 
failing one. 
Lessons learned from current operations and the efforts made to address 
them must not be overlooked. To capture and make the best use of these lessons 
learned, NATO needs an enduring capability, one that extends beyond the focus 
of current military operations and institutionalizes human aspects considerations 
into conceptual frameworks, doctrine, training and planning. 
Realizing that the battle space of the future may be the human mind, this 
study considers implementation of human aspects related subjects as a new force 
capability requiring a new mindset, new procedures, new decision-making 
processes, and revisions to education and training programmes. 
The strategic environment has evolved into a highly complex, dynamic 
and adaptive system, with multiple and new actors – both state and non-state. 
Nowadays, the economic, political and social structures have become as 
important for NATO Operations as military capabilities.  
Defined as a perceived incompatibility of goals and interests between 
two or more parties, conflicts proved to be and will remain an inevitable aspect of 
human relations. Culture is a part of every social conflict because conflicts occur 
in human relationships.  
Recent NATO Operations proved that the lack of detailed knowledge of 
military about human aspects, the way culture influence them, and furthermore, 
some prejudices and stereotypes, is still an impediment to fulfil their task. 
Deployed in areas where culture it is totally different form theirs, military will 
tend to oversimplify conceptions, opinions or images which are generalized to a 
large population. Furthermore, while neglecting to identify and exploit the 
common values of different cultures, some stereotypes, which deny individuality 




as members of a group, are commonly associated with simplistic, false and usually 
negative generalization.  
The more we know about all aspects of the operational environment, the 
better the quality of our decisions, planning and execution. The findings provided 
within this paper are meant to be an overall framework for decision makers and 
planners, to be aware on what we considered as being relevant human aspects 
with a key influence on the Operational Environment and on the success of the 
NATO Mission.  
Whatever combination of terms we will use for defining it, the 
Human/Cultural Aspects/Dynamics/ Environment/Factors remain a key element 
of the future military operational environment, especially in counterinsurgency, 
irregular warfare, stability, and support, transition, and reconstruction operations.  
Although awareness on human aspects of the operational environment 
cannot guarantee the success in current and future conflicts, the lack of it 
certainly boost resistance of local actors, result in unintended repercussions, 
generating, if not a self-defeating policy, then a failing one. 
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
 
ACO Allied Command Operations 
ACT Allied Command Transformation  
AD Anno Domini 
AJP Allied Joint Publication 
AO Area of operation  
AOR Area of operation responsibility 
BC Before Christ 
CIMIC Civil military cooperation 
CP Collection plan 
DOTMLPFI Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities, Interoperability 
ESCD Emerging Security Challenge Division  
EU European Union  
GO Governmental organization  
HAOE Human Aspects of the Operational Environment  
HQ Headquarters 
HUMINT Human Intelligence 
INTEL Intelligence 
IO International Organizations  
ISAF International Security Assistance Force 
NA5CRO Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations 
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NATO HUMINT COE NATO Human Intelligence Centre of Excellence  
NGO Nongovernmental organization  
OPCOM Operational command 
OPCON Operational control 




OPFOR Opposing forces 
OPLAN Operational plan 
OPORD Operational order 
OPSEC Operational security 
ORBAT Order of battle 
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
OSINT Open source intelligence 
PSYOP Psychological operations 
RECCE Reconnaissance 
ROE Rules of engagement  
SACEUR Supreme Allied Commander Europe  
SACT Supreme Allied Commander Transformation  
SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe  
SME Subject matter experts  
SOF Special operations forces 
SOP  Standing operating procedures 
STANAG Standardization agreement 
TACOM Tactical command 
TACON Tactical control 
TF Task force 
TO Theatre of operation  
UN United Nations  
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